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Extreme weather events, armed conflicts and migration are considered as the most likely, 
and most substantial, risk factors of 2015, 2016 and 2017 in the latest Global Risk Report 
by World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2017). That these factors are in 
turn influenced by climatic conditions is also a well-documented consensus. As global 
warming become an unescapable reality (IPCC, 2014), my thesis attempts to make a 
contribution to understanding of its consequences by quantifying the magnitude and 
significance of the influence of climatic factors on conflict and migration. 
An overview of the thesis is provided in the first chapter.  
The main aim of the second chapter is to provide a comprehensive empirical study of the 
impact of climatic factors on the onset of internal armed conflicts. There is no firm 
consensus in the literature regarding a coherent set of factors that cause armed conflicts. 
In particular, while there are new studies emerging which examine this issue, conclusions 
about the role of climatic factors remain rather ambiguous. The contribution of this 
chapter is to carry out a systematic econometric study of the role of variables commonly 
used in the literature in order to establish a robust empirical specification which could 
aid quantifying the contribution of climatic factors. We find that (i) climate warming is 
instrumental in raising the probability of onset of armed conflicts, and (ii) there is an 
interdependency in the way temperature and precipitation affect the onset of conflicts: 
dryness (low precipitation) increases the effect of temperature growth. 
High levels of political and economic development are widely regarded as important 
factors that contribute to sustained civil peace. However, repeated occurrences of 
conflicts in democratic regimes and their complete absence in some rich countries with 
non-democratic regimes are counter examples that cannot be simply regarded as 
exceptions. Given this anomaly, the third chapter examines whether the influence of 
development and democracy are contingent on each other. Using a robust empirical 
specification that takes account of climatic factors, we find that economic development 
per se reduces the probability of conflicts but its impact is contingent on the extent of 
political development and that the latter might in fact reverse the overall impact of 
former. 
Demographic projections suggest that climate change will be responsible for a large 
displacement of population worldwide (Gemenne et al., 2012). Evidence shows that a 
major part of such displacements primarily take place within national borders in the first 
instance. The fourth chapter investigates the nature of internal migration within Iran 
which has experienced substantial internal migration and is also subject to significant 
climatic variations. We find that even though climatic variables are not the leading 
factors of internal migration in Iran, their role, especially as push factors, is eminent: It 
appears people tend to leave warmer and/or drier regions, and select nearby destinations 























Extreme weather events, mass migration, and armed conflicts were respectively ranked 
as the most likely and impactful risks of 2017, 2016, and 2015 (World Economic Forum, 
2017). The contribution of this thesis consists of three chapters which attempt to enhance 
our understanding of the links that are thought to exist between these natural, social and 
political phenomena. In Section 1.2 we first examine each of these separately and then 
briefly discus their potential associations. In Section 1.3 we present an overview of the 
next three chapters in which we have constructed relevant datasets and used them to 
empirically examine the underlying relationships. 
 
1.2. Climate change, armed conflict, and migration: background 
 
1.2.1. Climate change 
There is now robust evidence that the average temperature of Earth is steadily rising – 
see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2014 Assessment Report – and 
that this warming up of the planet affects our surrounding environment and reconditions 
our behaviour as human beings. The Report considers anthropogenic factors as the most 
likely cause of more than half of the observed increase in the average global surface 
temperature over the last 60 years. IPCC also predicts an average rise of 1.1oC to 6.4oC 
in global temperature by the end of this century. There have already been multiple 
episodes of extreme weather events that are, at least partially, linked with this change in 
the Earth atmosphere and it is very likely that we will see increases in the length and 
severity of heat waves and extreme storm events in the future. The World Economic 
Forum 2017 agreed that the world is now more likely to be ravaged by environmental 
rather than economic catastrophes. The number of natural disasters has more than 
doubled over the last two decades, and statistics show that only in 2008 more than 20 
million people have been displaced by sudden onset of climate related natural disasters 
and extreme weather events – see United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports (OCHA-
IDMC, 2009). The World Bank warns that “… without rapid action, climate change 
could push more than 100 million people into poverty by 2030” (World Bank, 2016: pp. 
17).  
 Despite the geographically heterogeneous impact of climate change, eventually most 





affected more severely at the earlier stages – e.g. some of the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) due to their poverty, weak infrastructure and unstable governments (IPCC, 
2007), or countries with low altitude. However, in the long run, there will be worldwide 
consequences either via direct effects of climate change or indirectly by the repercussions 
of the severely affected regions.   
 Awareness of and concerns for the effects of climate change have stimulated high 
profile policy actions. Jim Yong Kim, the president of the World Bank, optimistically 
stated that “we are the first generation in human history that can end extreme poverty” 
(World Bank, 2016: pp. 3). This statement was made in connection with the recent World 
Bank projection which claimed that for the first time in history the number of people 
living in extreme poverty has fallen below 10 percent of the global population. While 
such news show that policies can be implemented to improve the overall living standards, 
they should be considered together with the news that warn us that such achievements 
become more difficult as the Earth climate warms up: World Bank (2014b) indicates that 
achieving many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)1
 
will be much harder 
with 2°C warming up, but there is serious doubt whether these goals can be achieved at 
all if this becomes 4°C.  
 One of the main challenges that climate change presents is to better understand its 
socio-economic and political consequences.   
 
1.2.2. Armed conflict 
Prolonged and widespread armed conflicts are causing major ongoing human tragedies 
which we continually witness. While their coverage by mass media gives an indication 
of the extent of devastation these conflicts are capable of causing, academic scholars 
from different disciplines have been studying the reasons for and consequences of these 
conflicts. In particular, considerable research has been carried out by political scientists, 
sociologists and economists to identify the factors which contribute to the onset of 
conflicts and to use data to quantify the extent of their contribution.  
 Like the study of any social phenomenon, studies of conflict begin with identifying 
the underlying motives and reasons with the aim of understanding the policies that could 
help reduce their costs and prevent their recurrence. Some studies focus on understanding 
the role of some clearly identified motive such as ‘grievance’ – which reflect 
                                                             
1 Set of goals to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all. Each goal has specific targets 





opportunities for rebels, or rebellion leaders, to take stand against perceived social, 
political or economic injustice – while others analyse the ‘feasibility hypothesis’ – which 
is based on the self-fulfilling prophesy that where rebellion is possible it will occur 
regardless of the motives. The latter put the emphasis on evidence-based, be it case 
studies or statistical analysis, of the determining effects and stress the importance of 
careful and robust empirical analysis that help unravel the explanatory role of the 
potential contributing factors.  
 
1.2.3. Migration 
Human migration has attracted the attention from most social science disciplines: 
geographers, demographers, anthropologists, sociologists and economists have studied 
the phenomenon from different points of view. Historically, economists’ interest in the 
subject goes as far back as a century, with especial focus on features such as rural-urban 
balance, social costs of intensive movements, e.g. ‘brain-drain’, etc. In addition, put 
within the context of human capital mobility, migration has been seen as one of the main 
stimulants of economic and social development: while often resulting from regional 
imbalances in economic or political development in one part, it has fuelled the engine of 
development in another.  
 More recently, one of the most prevalent themes of migration research has been 
concerned with a specific type known as human displacements which are caused by the 
so called push factors which render one’s home unliveable. The scale and frequency with 
which these have been occurring in recent years have led them to be classified as one of 
the most severe human tragedies and multinational efforts are sought to contain them. In 
such circumstances, one of the main challenges facing social scientists is to identify the 
role and impact of factors that lead migrants to move from one location to another in the 
hope that such understanding could contribute to formulating more effective policies that 
could prevent forced migration and reduce its undesirable consequences.   
 
1.2.4. Factor linking climate change, armed conflicts, and migration 
The potential links between climate change, migration, are now more widely discussed 
in the literature and are also taking increasingly higher priorities in national and internal 
policy makers’ agendas (IPCC, 2014; CNA, 2014; World Bank 2014b; World Economic 
Forum, 2017). While different views are on the whole converging to a consensus that 





conflicts, substantial research is still required to determine the appropriate form of 
climate change and to unravel the nature and strength of its impact. 
Climate change is seen as a threat multiplier in that it stimulates political instability 
via severely affecting the maintenance of production for survival – Centre for Naval 
Analyses (CNA) 2007 and 2014 reports, and Joe Bryan (2017).2  It propels sudden 
disasters like floods and storms and gradually shapes catastrophes such as droughts and 
desertification. These in turn contribute to failed crops, famine and which overcrowds 
urban centres; these lead to crises that inflame political unrest and a vicious circle sets 
in. Since there is no official, internationally recognised, category as ‘climate refugees’ – 
i.e. those who leave their original habitat to avoid the harsh consequences of severe 
weather induced disasters – it is not possible to have an accurate measure of climate 
induced migrants. However, to have an idea of the measure involved we can rely on 
a 2010 Gallup World Poll in which about 12% of respondents, from a total of 500 million 
adults, anticipated that severe environmental problems would require them to move 
within the next five years.  
There is a vast literature on the role of climate change in inducing conflicts and/or 
migration (Burke et al., 2009; Anderson and DeLisi, 2011; Salehyan and Hendrix, 2014; 
Joseph and Wodon, 2013), and on the causal relationship between conflicts and migration 
(Homer-Dixon, 1999; Reuveny, 2007). Gleditsch et al. (2007) observe that climate-
induced migration appears as a direct consequence of many episodes of climate-induced 
violences. Reuveny (2007) carries out a non-quantitative empirical study on climate, 
conflict, and migration on Hirschman’s (1970) economic framework of people’s 
response to an unpleasant change. Having classified residents’ response to climate 
change, based on 38 cases studies of environmental migration, as one of  
(i) staying put and accepting the costs,  
(ii) staying put and mitigate changes, or  
(iii) leaving the affected areas, 
the study finds that environmental migration plays a role in initiating a conflict. Reuveny 
(2007) also finds that while developed countries tend to mitigate problems through 
technological innovation and institutional redesign, in less developed countries the 
solution is often one of mass emigration from the affected areas.  
                                                             





A careful scrutiny of the literature, however, reveals a number of issues that motivate 
further exploring of the links described above. In particular, there seem to be no 
consensus yet, especially in the empirical literature, regarding the factors that influence 
armed conflicts. Generally, the academic discipline of researchers govern their choice of 
these variables and there is a lack of systematic selection based on the available statistical 
techniques whose application could improve robustness of the results – e.g. by reducing 
the omitted variable bias. It is therefore not surprising that the existing studies on the role 
of climatic arrive at mixed, and somewhat conflicting, conclusions: some considering 
climatic conditions as the most important factors causing armed conflicts or human 
displacement while others completely dismiss them. In Chapters 2 and 4 of the thesis we 
shall attempt to provide a more coherent empirical study of the impact of climate on 
armed conflicts and migration. While emphasising the role of climatic factors, the study 
of causes of armed conflicts also reveal the crucial role of extent economic and political 
development. Therefore, having studied the role of climatic factors in conjunction with 
other determining variables of armed conflicts in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 we investigate 
the nature of the empirical link between the onset of armed conflicts and economic and 
political development. Below we provide a brief explanation of contribution of these 
chapters. 
 
1.3. Climate change, armed conflict, and migration: the contribution of thesis 
 
Chapter 2. Climate change and armed conflicts: an empirical investigation 
“Although it would be overly simplistic to blame the bloody conflicts in Africa and Asia 
during the latter part of twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century on 
climate change and environmental disasters, it also would be incorrect to ignore the role 
played by the economic hardships (including starvation) wrought by the prolonged 
droughts and resulting resource shortages” (Anderson and DeLisi, 2011, p. 259). 
There is a well-established literature which proposes and analyses a complex causal 
process that links climate change to conflict. Briefly, the deterioration of agricultural 
productivity leads to food shortages and water scarcity, which result in rivalry over the 
natural resources and migration. The socio-economic features of the community are 
thought to be affected by these changes as well as being shaped directly by heat factor. 
Many US military reports, such as the ones conducted by CNA in 2007 and 2014, 





regions, but it would also add tension to the stable regions of the world (e.g., by 
decreasing food production and freshwater). A glance through the wider literature reveals 
that armed conflicts are associated with a number of factors of which climate change is 
merely one: other, economic, sociological and geographical factors such as ‘availability 
of natural resources’, ‘existence of rough terrain’, ‘historical grievance’, ‘ethnic 
dominancy’ and similar factors are also thought to play prominent roles.  The majority 
of studies on the nexus between climate and conflict agree with the neo-Malthusian 
interpretation that sees conflicts arising as a result of scarcity brought about by climatic 
changes (e.g. Fischer et al., 2002; Hertel and Rosch, 2010). A point of view has also 
emerged which considers conflicts as the outcome of the collaborative aggressive 
behaviour of individuals - and which could throw new insights on the questions being 
considered.  
Based on the above background, in Chapter 2 we use a categorisation for climatic 
factors – similar to that employed by Anderson and DeLisi (2011) – to examine the 
explanatory role of (i) the short-run, year-to-year, change in the weather, as well as (ii) 
the long-run or historical trend in the weather. Our results, based on intensive 
econometric scrutiny of regression equations that explain the probability of onset internal 
armed conflicts, suggest that both temperature and precipitation play significant 
explanatory roles once the contribution of other relevant factors is accounted for. In 
addition, we find that the nature of climate matters: change in climatic factors are likely 
to have a different impact – in terms of magnitude and sign – in different climates; in 
particular, change in climatic factors in hot regions is found to be more effective. 
 
Chapter 3. Internal armed conflicts:  contribution of economic and political 
development  
 
A major contribution of Chapter 2 is in its application of a systematic econometric 
procedure to select the relevant subset of the commonly used variables in the literature 
as the control variables on which the relationship between onset of conflict and climatic 
factors could be conditioned.  While this helped to specify and estimate the impact 
variables that represent climatic factors more accurately, it also revealed the existence of 
a complex relationship between per capita income, political regime characteristics and 
the onset of armed conflict: per capita income only possesses a significant coefficient 
when it is interacted with Regime Instability. In other words, the impact of a change in 





discussion in the literature on the role of economic and political development motivated 
the research question for Chapter 3. Using per capita GDP as an indicator of economic 
development and capturing the level of political development by various interpretations 
of the Polity Score, we focus on the robust specification of the joint contribution of these 
after all other relevant factors are accounted for. Building on the work of Collier and 
Rohner (2008), we re-examine the empirical determination of probability of onset of 
internal armed conflicts we find that while more well-off autocracies seem to be less 
prone to conflict, this does not hold for democracies. We also find that major political 
disruptions could escalate the chances of armed conflicts regardless of the regime type, 
and that their impact is larger the higher is per capita income. Our findings highlight the 
importance of political stability in keeping peace and emphasise the role of stable 
democracy.   
 
Chapter 4. Climate change and internal migration: a case study of Iran 
Mass migration is one of the main features of humanity throughout its history. Civil 
conflicts, religious intolerance, and economic opportunities are amongst its recent causes 
(UNEP, 2012). More recently, climate-induced migration has been featuring as one of 
the focus topics: for instance, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) first 
assessment report (IPCC, 1990) identified human migration as the greatest single impact 
of climate change; the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 1992) raised 
concerns regarding the dramatic increase in mass displacements and predicted a 
substantial rise in their numbers when larger areas of the earth would become 
uninhabitable due to climate change. Projections suggest 25 million to 1 billion 
displacements by 2050 due to climate change, with 200 million being the most widely 
cited estimate (Gemenne et al., 2012).  
Given the importance of this phenomenon, in Chapter 4 we use econometric analysis 
of migration data to understand the nature of the process that governs migration flows. 
However, since there are no data on climate-induced migrants, we base our empirical 
investigation on inter-province migration in Iran. This choice is justified on the following 
grounds: (i) Iran provides a good example of a country affected by severe climate change; 
(ii) the recent history of the country shows a relatively high rate of migration stimulated 
by political reasons, by the prolonged war with the neighbouring country Iraq, as well as 
by weather conditions; and (iii) there is some evidence that, due to the high cost of cross 





most of the displacements caused by climate change primarily take place within national 
borders (Beyani, 2014).  
Our main aim in Chapter 4 is to understand whether climate factors, measured by 
temperature and precipitation levels, perform as push and/or pull factors that encourage 
individuals to migrate. We use two waves of national census data to construct an inter-
province dataset consisting of migration flows and the relevant province-level socio-
economic variables, as well as data on temperature and precipitation levels, and use this 
dataset to estimate the impact of the latter on migration flows in the context of a 
generalised gravity model. Our findings suggest that although climatic factors are not 
amongst the most important determinants of internal migration in Iran, their role as push 
factors is eminent and remain so after rigorous robustness checks. More specifically, our 
results indicate that: (i) while people tend to leave warmer and/or drier regions, there is 
not sufficient evidence to ascertain whether the choice of destination also depends on 
climatic factors, since the latter do not appear to act as pull factors; and (ii) distance, 
economic and wellbeing factors rank highest respectively: neighbouring regions are more 














Chapter 2  










This chapter examines the role of climatic factors in affecting the likelihood of onset of 
armed conflicts. A glance through the wider literature reveals that armed conflicts are 
associated with a number of factors of which climate change is merely one: other, 
economic, sociological and geographical factors such as ‘availability of natural 
resources’, ‘existence of rough terrain’, ‘historical grievance’, ‘ethnic dominancy’ and 
similar factors are also thought to play prominent roles.  The majority of studies on the 
nexus between climate and conflict agree with neo-Malthusian interpretation that sees 
conflicts arising as a result of scarcity brought about by climatic changes (e.g. Fischer et 
al., 2002; Hertel and Rosch, 2010). A good share of the literature emphasises the role of 
natural resources where studies have sought to explain the riddle of insurgency by linking 
the motivation of the rebels with their claims on such resources.  Amongst the studies 
which examine the role of sociological and geographical factors, grievance is considered 
as one of the main causes of civil war: it is claimed that grievance is rooted in a 
behavioural paradigm which emphasises relative deprivation, social exclusion and 
inequality (Gurr, 1971; Scott, 1977; Muller, 1985; Connor, 1994). Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) propose ethnic dominancy3 as a factor in influencing the start of a civil war. 
However, they also argue that the ability to loot natural resources has a stronger effect 
on rebellion. Fearon and Laitin (2003) emphasise the facilitating role of rough terrain4, 
which was previously introduced by Collier et al. (2001) as an effective factor.   
 Regarding the role of historic events, the end of the cold war and decolonisation are 
commonly known as the greatest destabilising events of the past century. We should keep 
in mind that accounting for historical events might be difficult at times when conducting 
quantitative studies. Based on the literature, although such events proceeded with new 
conflicts, their direct role in triggering conflicts is widely disputed (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Collier, 2007). Presumably the correlation between these events and prevalence of 
conflict exists because of the new independent, but financially, bureaucratically, and 
militarily weak states that are created as the result (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). For 
instance, collapse of the Soviet Union created a number of new unstable states prone to 
new conflicts. Alternatively, collier (2007) did “… find no relationship between the 
subsequent risk of civil war and either the country that had been the colonial power or 
how long the country had been decolonised” (p. 113).  
                                                             
3 This is defines as a situation in which one ethnic group makes up to 45-90% of the population. 





A point of view has also emerged which considers conflicts as the outcome of the 
collaborative aggressive behaviour of individuals - and which could throw new insights 
on the questions being considered. In this particular context, evidence exists on (i) both 
direct and indirect psychological effects of climate (long-run) and weather (short-run) on 
violence and conflicts (Anderson, 2001; Anderson and DeLisi, 2011; Hsiang et al., 2013; 
Prediger et al. 2014); and (ii) emergence of conflict as a collective aggressive act based 
on crowd behaviour where individual feelings spread to groups (Muller and Opp, 1986; 
Stott and Reicher, 1998). Such studies however attempt to understand the role of factors 
that influence individual-level violence and conflict and therefore lie beyond the interest 
of this chapter whose focus is on the role of climate factors amongst the determinants of 
armed conflicts which are defined as collaborative acts fuelled by political or economic 
motives.  
 Our specific interest in the role of climatic factors is motivated by the global political 
efforts to influence (i) the consequences of climate change, and (ii) reduce the onset of 
armed conflicts. The main aim of this chapter is to address a number of issues that have 
not been considered in the existing literature on the determinants of the onset of conflicts. 
In particular, there is no consensus regarding a coherent set of factors that cause armed 
conflicts and, while there are new studies emerging which examine this issue, 
conclusions about the role of climatic factors remain rather mixed and vary between 
regarding them as the most important and disregarding them completely. The 
contribution of this chapter is to carry out a systematic econometric study of the role of 
variables commonly used in the literature in order to improve the robustness of 
conclusions regarding the specific role of climatic factors.  
 In our empirical analysis we have used a categorisation for climatic factors similar to 
that employed by Anderson and DeLisi (2011) and examine the explanatory role of both 
(i) the short-run, year-to-year, change in the weather, as well as (ii) the long-run, 
historical, trend in the weather. Our results, based on intensive econometric scrutiny of 
regression equations that which explain intra-state armed conflicts, suggest that both 
temperature and precipitation play significant explanatory roles once the contribution of 
other relevant factors are accounted for.  As Homer-Dixon (1999) suggests, 
“environmental scarcity is never a sole or sufficient cause of large migrations, poverty, 
or violence; it always joins with other economic, political, and social factors to produce 





in this chapter is not to single out climatic factors as the important determinant of 
conflicts. Instead, we wish to establish whether or not they feature robustly amongst the 
explanatory variables that determine conflict and to measure the extent of its 
contribution. By doing so, we hope to provide additional support for placing climate 
change issues on the global policy agenda.  
 The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature. 
Section 2.3 describes the data and methodology employed in the empirical analysis. 
Section 2.4 provides and discusses the evidence and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.  
   
2.2. Literature review  
There is an ongoing disagreement on the motives of rebels: looting, religious reforms, 
nationalist and/or economic grievances, and pursuit of more favourable conditions are 
the main reasons highlighted in Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Gurr (1971), and Fearon and 
Laitin (2003). Collier et al. (2009) conclude that for the incidence of civil war is to be 
reduced it will need to be made more difficult to start one.  This is an implication of the 
feasibility hypothesis which proposes rebellion will inevitably occur if there are grounds 
for it. For instance, it has been argued in the literature on the ‘resource curse’ that 
resource wealth (especially oil) increases the probability of civil war since the resource-
rich areas have an incentive to form a separate state (Le Billon, 2001; Fearon, 2005) or 
to seek a high level of autonomy which weakens the state’s bureaucratic capacity and 
influence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In this context, Ross (2004) distinguishes between 
the resource types and finds, in the cases that he considers, that while ‘richness’ in fuel 
and nonfuel minerals and illicit drugs appears to influence conflicts other types of 
resource wealth – especially agricultural commodities – seem to be unrelated to civil 
war.5  
 As far as the role of climate is concerned, the influencing channels in the literature are 
usually separated in terms of time horizon and the actual mechanism.  In particular, there 
are:  
(i)  long-term indirect effects of climate changes that affect the risk factors 
involved;  
(ii)  short-term shocks that raise the survival pressure;  
(iii)  direct effects of extreme temperature on violence.  
                                                             
5 Ross (2004) also states gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis do not seem to be linked to the initiation 






 Gleditsch (2012) acknowledges the importance of recognising the separate role of 
each type and stresses the importance of considering the role of long-term and short-term 
factors separately. Various studies have examined the indirect effects of climatic factors 
which are exerted through food scarcity, malnutrition, economic poverty and 
geographical conditions. Prediger et al. (2014) use experimental methods on Namibians 
and suggest long-term exposure to food scarcity could increase anti-social behaviour and 
aggression. Liu et al. (2004) examine the relationship between malnutrition and 
subsequent antisocial behaviour using a birth cohort of children from the island of 
Mauritius, and conclude that malnourished children show symptoms of more aggressive 
behaviour. Huston and Bentley (2010) and Chen et al. (2010) examine how growing up 
in poverty affects children’s future behaviour. White et al. (2013) show that a greener 
habitat – e.g. larger park and recreation areas in cities – reduces the incidence of 
aggression by raising the happiness levels. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), Buhaug and Gates (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) all examine how the 
topological characteristics of a territory (formed or affected by long-term climate change) 
play a role in facilitating or preventing an uprising.  
 A number of emerging studies examine the impact of short-term weather changes: 
notable amongst these are Hendrix and Glaser (2007) and Fjelde and Uexkull (2012) who 
study the role of precipitation; Burke et al. (2009), Buhaug (2010) and Hsiang et al. 
(2013) who consider the effect of temperature shocks; Raleigh and Urdal (2007) and 
Salehyan and Hendrix (2014) who examine the impact of water resources and arable 
lands; and last but not least, Bergholt and Lujala (2012) and Slettebak (2012) who analyse 
the influence of natural disasters. However, the evidence presented in these studies does 
not lead to a clear conclusion about the size and significance of the estimated impact of 
climatic factors on conflicts.  For instance, Hendrix and Glaser (2007) and Fjelde and 
Uexkull (2012) report a positive effect on probability of armed conflicts, Bergholt and 
Lujala (2012) and Raleigh and Urdal (2007) find the effect to be rather small or 
negligible, while Salehyan and Hendrix (2014) and Slettebak (2012) suggest negative 
effects.  
 One of the main criticisms levelled at some of the recent studies concerns their 
tendency to neglect the role of political and economic related factors (see, e.g., Burke et 
al. 2009 and Hsiang et al. 2013 limit the set of controls of their study – on conflict – to 





and their use of national-level aggregate data. A novel study by Hsiang and Burke (2014) 
examines 50 rigorous quantitative studies on the association between (i) violent conflict, 
and (ii) socio-political stability and deviations of temperature and precipitation from their 
norm.  They use meta-analysis methodology and a broad range of aggressive behaviour 
from individual-level violence to country-level political instability and civil war and 
conclude “… the majority of studies suggest that conflict increases and social stability 
decreases when temperatures are hot and precipitation is extreme…” (p. 52).  Buhaug 
et al. (2014) criticise this methodology arguing that “… the notable discrepancy in views 
between Hsiang and Burke and the larger scholarly community can be traced back to 
problems related to the accompanying meta-analysis” (p. 393), and state that their study 
“suffers from shortcomings with respect to sample selection and analytical coherence” 
(p. 392).  We note in passing that pooling all types of conflicts together is likely to lead 
to inaccurate estimates since the same explanatory variables cannot be used to predict, 
for example, an armed political conflict and a violent act such as murder, rape or other 
similar civil crimes. Buhaug et al. (2014) argue that statistical analysis which pool 
different types of aggressive behaviour “from non-violent land grabbing via urban riots 
to major civil war” that have occurred in “a wide range of spatial scales, from 
municipalities via countries to the entire world” and use as explanatory variables “a wide 
range of climatic events, from heat waves via excess rainfall to global ENSO [El Niño–
Southern Oscillation] cycles” (p. 393) are bound to result in inaccurate and biased 
estimates.  
 The link between temperature levels and incidence of individual-level aggression – 
which been examined by other social scientists, especially psychologists – is worthwhile 
mentioning.  This is because, although this link is not directly related to the focus of this 
chapter which considers the onset of armed conflicts, the evidence provides a strong 
indication of why this factor may play a significant role in providing a fertile environment 
for invoking conflicts. Anderson (1989, 2001) and Baron and Bell (1976) argue that high 
temperature increase aggressive motives and tendencies (the heat hypothesis). Anderson 
(1989) finds that on average there is evidence of a higher level of individual-level 
aggressive behaviour and crime (e.g. murder, rape, assault, riot, wife beatings, etc.) being 
committed in the hotter regions of the world. Anderson et al. (2000) estimate the effect 
of temperature on violent-crime rates in different cities while controlling for the 
geographical location (southness), population size and socioeconomic status of the cities 





lab experiments. They find that temperature has a large (compared with other factors) 
and statistically significant effect on violent crime and conclude that there is a higher 
level of violence level likely to be committed in hotter cities even after other city 
characteristics are accounted for. Anderson (2001), in fact, goes on to claim that “An 
accidental bump in a hot and crowded bar can lead to the trading of insults, punches, 
and (eventually) bullets” (p. 36). Evidence on the effect of high temperature on 
individual behaviour is also found in studies that examine the direct effect of heat on 
aggression. Kenrick and MacFarlan (1986) find that aggressive horn honking is increased 
in hotter temperatures only by drivers who do not have air-conditioned cars. Vrij et al. 
(1994) conducted a field experiment in which Dutch police officers performed in a 
simulated burglary scenario under different conditions. They found that officers were 
reported to be more aggressive and less likely to draw their weapons and shoot the 
suspect when they operated under cooler temperature conditions. Finally, while it is 
acknowledged that, in general, people living in extreme temperature conditions – hot or 
cold – are more likely to experience aggression and violence (see, e.g., C. Anderson and 
K. Anderson, 1998 for evidence on low temperature effects), low temperature is found 
to be less effective. This is explained by the fact that it is easier to overcome the 
environmental aspects of low temperature and is also supported by medical research 
which finds that the level of tritiated paroxetine platelet in body, which is negatively 
correlated with impulsivity and aggression, is reduced in higher temperatures (see 
Tiihonen et al. 1997). 
 To conclude this section, we note that the evidence provided by studies which attempt 
to explain the incidence of aggression and violence in general, and armed conflicts in 
particular, together with the fact grievances felt at the individual levels are known to 
spread to group actions 6 , provides sufficient grounds for postulating an empirical 
relationship the onset of a specific type of conflict and a core set of explanatory variables 
that are thought to cause such a conflict.  In the rest of this chapter therefore we provide 
a systematic empirical study of the relationship between the onset of ‘internal armed 
conflicts’ – whose curtailment is a desirable international objective – and their 
determining factors.  In addition, given the importance of climatic factors, whose control 
                                                             
6 For instance, Muller and Opp (1986) and Stott and Reicher (1998) who study crowd behaviour report 





features on international policy agenda, we narrow our focus on obtaining robust 
estimates of their impact.7 
 
2.3. Data and methodology  
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines conflict as: “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths”. We use the conflict data provided by UCDP and the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) where the following four types of conflicts are 
identified:8  
(i)  ‘Extra systemic armed conflicts’ which occur between a state and a non-state 
group outside its own territory;  
(ii)  ‘Interstate armed conflicts’ which occur between two or more states;  
(iii)  ‘Internal armed conflicts’ which occur between the government of a state and 
one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other 
states;  
(iv)  ‘Internationalised internal armed conflicts’ which occurs between the 
government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with 
intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.  
 In this chapter we shall use ‘internal armed conflicts’ as the dependent variable to be 
explained9 for which there are two main measures available in the dataset: ‘the onset’ 
and ‘the incidence’. The former measure is based on the occurrence or starting of a new 
conflict – or when there is more than one year since the last observation of an old one – 
within a country in a given year, while the latter accounts for the existence of an active 
conflict in a country in a specific year.  The full list of all the conflicts can be found in 
Table A2.1 in the Appendix, followed by Table A2.2 which provides the summary 
information and Table A2.3 that gives the occurrence of missing values. We shall use the 
onset data as our dependent variable, covering 139 countries over the time period 1961-
2011. This amounts to 229 occurrences, which count for 4.15% of the total observations. 
                                                             
7 Although this factor appears in some form in most of the existing studies, the reported results of its impact 
vary substantially. 
8 The actual data can be found at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php and Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
and Harbom and Wallensteen (2012) provide further detail. 
9 The estimates are tested against including ‘internationalised internal armed conflicts’ in the dependent 





We note at the outset that our dependent variable is dichotomous categorical variable 
taking the value of 1 if a new conflict happened in a given year-country combination. 
Therefore the ongoing conflicts in the sample are treated as ‘missing’ so as to avoid the 
confusion that would arise from the similarity between observations corresponding to (i) 
a country-year where there is a continuing that had started before, and (ii) a country-year 
where there is no conflict.  Acknowledging the potential risk of truncating our sample, 
we believe this is the right procedure to avoid counting observations with an active 
conflict as ‘no-conflict’.10 Also, in order to avoid confusion in terminology, hereafter the 
word ‘conflict’ is used interchangeably with “the onset of an armed conflict”. 
 Turning our attention to the choice of variables that determine a conflict, the existing 
studies provide helpful information about the relevance of different variables but there is 
no consensus in the literature regarding a common core set which could be used to predict 
conflict; different studies have used different explanatory variables and the overlapping 
subset is not indicative. Noting this problem, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) identify 88 
variables that are frequently used in the literature to explain civil wars. They group these 
under 18 ‘concept’ categories and to narrow down the number of regressors used in 
regression analysis to a parsimonious set they first select a core subset of the variables 
which they regard as the variables of interest, and then choose the final subset of 
conditioning regressors from the rest of the variables by applying a specification 
procedure on the basis of systematically including plausible combinations from the rest 
of the variables and testing their joint significance and the way they affect the coefficients 
of variables of interest.11  They report their results in each case. We have used the 
information they additionally provide in the appendix on the relevance of these variables 
with respect to statistical robustness of parameter estimates, as well as data availability 
as the main guide in selecting the set of regressors which we have used in our analysis; 
Table 2.1 below provides the list and definition of the variables we have chosen. 
However, we enhance our set of regressors by inclusion of additional variables (which 
do not feature in the above mentioned dataset) which we list in Table 2.2. These variables 
are found, in studies which examine development issues, to play a pertinent role mainly 
in reflecting different aspects of climatic effects.  Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and 
                                                             
10 This method has been widely used in the literature by some of the most established scholars such as 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006). The alternative, treating ongoing conflicts 
as ‘no conflict’, has been tested in robustness checks. 






Boschini et al. (2013) find that a country’s latitude captures the quality of its 
institutions;12  Gallup et al. (1999) argue that health quality and agricultural productivity 
are adversely affected by tropical climatic conditions; Masters and McMillan (2001) 
stress the positive role winter frost on agricultural productivity; Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
claim that a heavy burden of infectious disease in some regions was exploited by 
colonising powers and in most cases these regions subsequently failed to achieve a 
sustained level of development. 
 Finally, there are the direct climatic factors whose impact on conflicts forms the focus 
our study. The list of variables which are typically used as a measure of climatic factor 
is given in Table 2.3. In the rest of this chapter we shall provide an in depth statistical 
analysis of their explanatory role in order to form a better understanding of the impact of 
climate. We therefore conclude this section by anticipating the possible relevance of 
climate in Figure 2.1 which plots, for the countries included in the sample and over the 
sample period: (i) deviations in average annual temperature from its last 30 years’ 
moving average (a.k.a. climate13); (ii) total number of onsets of conflicts; and (iii) total 
incidences of conflicts. A number of points are worth noting.  
 The first point concerns the existence of a long-run pattern in climatic evolution. There 
is clear evidence from data that the temperature deviation series is not stationary: a linear 
trend regression yields a mild but highly significant trend (0.024 with t-ratio of 9.20) and 
the unit root tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that series is I(1). To support this 
evidence further, we also estimated the autocorrelation coefficients of the annual 
temperature deviations using  
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where !"#,% is the annual temperature deviation from climate in country E in year F as 
defined in Table 2.3.  As shown in Figure 2.2, although  9%,%:;  reduces with s, the 
estimates remain positive and significantly different from zero. As a result, we cannot 
rule out a systematic pattern in temperature that is indicative of global warming, typically 
                                                             
12 This was initially suggested by Hall and Jones (1999) who argued that the distance to the equator reflects 
exposure to ‘western influence’ which in turn is correlated with quality of institutions. 
13 IPCC defines climate as the ‘average weather’. World Meteorological Organization (WMO) suggest 





stated to be ‘a gradual increase in the overall temperature of the Earth’s atmosphere’. 
Table A2.4 in the Appendix reports the autocorrelation coefficients for annual average 
temperature series.  
 











    
 
Table 2.1.  List of country-specific explanatory variables  
Variable Description Source 
Regime Instability Number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the 
Polity score over a period of three years or less). This variable is measured in the decaying form 
2	#$% &.()  where *+ is the Regime Instability. See Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Gurr and 
Jaggers (2000) for details of advantages in using this transformation. 
Author’s coding based on 
Polity IV data 
Per Capita GDP Annual gross domestic product in constant 2005 US$ prices divided by population  World Bank (2014a) 
Peace Duration Number of years since that last active conflict during which there were no new conflicts. This  
variable is measured in the decaying form 2	#,% -)  where .+ is the Peace Duration.  See Hegre 
and Sambanis (2006) for details of advantages in using this transformation.  
Author’s coding based on 
conflict data 
Ethnic Heterogeneity Index Based on sub-indices of racial, linguistic, and religious divisions and ranging between 0 (fully 
homogeneous) and 144 (most heterogeneous) 
Vanhanen (1999)  
Rough Terrain Proportion of the country that is mountainous Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Population Mid-year Population estimates World Bank (2014a) 
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of real GDP  World Bank (2014a) 
Military Personnel Number of armed forces personnel per 1000 people World Bank (2014a) 
Regulation of Political 
Participation Index 
Takes the following values: 0, if there is an interregnum or transition;  1, if participation is 
unregulated; 2, if multiple identity; 3, if sectarian; 4, if restricted; 5, if regulated; and ‘missing’  
when foreign interruption 
Marshall and Gurr (2013) 
Anocracy If the Polity score14 lies inside [-5, 5] range and/or if one of the special situation coded as -77 
(interregnum) and -88 (transition), missing for foreign interruption (-66) 
Author’s coding based on 
Polity IV data 
Cold War  A year dummy accounting for the period of disruption resulting from the ending of the cold war 
and breaking up of the Soviet Union 
Author’s coding 
Oil Exporter A country-year dummy when fuel exports revenue exceeding a third of value of exports  Author’s coding 
Neighbouring Conflict A country-year dummy which assumes the value of unity if there is a conflict in one of the 
neighbouring countries 
Hegre et al. (2013) 
Region  A set of dummies, each representing one of the following six political regions,: ‘Western Europe 
and the US’, ‘Eastern Europe and Central Asia’, ‘South and East Asia and Oceania’, ‘Central 
and South America’, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ and ‘Middle East and North Africa’  
Hegre and Sambanis 
(2006) 
                                                             
14 The Polity Score is a weighted average score that captures the ‘regime authority spectrum’ on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy) as well as the three special cases of ‘interregnum’ regimes, regimes in ‘transition’ and those having a ‘foreign interruption’ which are 
respectively assigned the score -77, -88 and -66. See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html for details 
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Table 2.2.  Additional explanatory variables 
Variable Description Source 
Latitude Absolut value of capital city’s latitude over 90 La Porta et al. (1999) 
Malaria Share of 1995 population living in the area with risk of Malaria Gallup et al. (1999) 
Soil Quality Share of areas with suitable soil for crop production Gallup et al. (1999) 
Tropical Area Share of 1995 population living in the tropics or subtropics areas  Mellinger et al. (2000) 
Crop Production Index Annual agricultural production index, 2004-2006 = 100 World Bank (2014a) 
Tropics A regional dummy which assumes unity if the country is in a tropical zone with latitudes within an 




Table 2.3.  Measures of climatic factors used as the explanatory variable of interest1 
Variables Notation and Description2 
Temperature /0,2:   Annual average temperature in Fahrenheit 
Precipitation .02:    Annual total precipitation in mm 
Climate Temperature 3/0,2: Moving averages of  /0,2 	 of over the last 30 years 
Climate Precipitation 3.02:  Moving averages of  .0,2	 of over the last 30 years 
Temperature Deviation from Climate /+0,2 = /0,2 − 3/0,2 
Precipitation Deviation from Climate .+0,2 = .0,2 − 3.0,2 
Change in Temperature  ∆/0,2 = /0,2 − /0,2#7 
Change in Precipitation  ∆.0,2 = .0,2 − .0,2#7 
Growth Rate of Temperature %∆/0,2 = ∆/0,2 /0,2#7⁄  
Growth Rate of Precipitation %∆.0,2 = ∆.0,2 .0,2#7⁄  






1  The raw data were obtained from the Climatic Research Unit (Harris et al. 2014); all measures were constructed by the author. 
2  Subscripts = and S refer to country and year respectively. 
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The second point relates to the evolving pattern of conflicts: while we cannot reject the 
stationarity of the onset series, the incidence series too exhibit very similar characteristics 
to temperature deviations with a linear trend regression yielding a coefficient of 0.253 
with t-ratio of 5.46) and the unit root tests strongly rejecting the series being I(0).   
 Our third point highlights the way conflict and climate are related: the simple static 
cointegration regression of incidence of conflicts on temperature deviations yields a 
highly significant CI coefficient (t-ratio of 4.3) with D-W statistic of 0.5 and we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the CI residuals series is stationary.  
 Together, these points provide sufficient evidence to justify a thorough scrutiny of the 
statistical relationship between conflict and climatic factors once the relationship is 
conditioned on other relevant determinants of conflict outlined above.  Our challenge in 
this chapter is to focus on explaining the onset of conflicts whose total annual number 
we found to exhibit a stationary behaviour over the sample period. However, since our 
main sample has a panel structure and the dependent variable is dichotomised, this issue 
should not cause a serious concern.     
 
2.4. Estimating the impact of climate on the onset of conflicts  
In this section we conduct an in depth study of the role of climatic factors in affecting 
the onset of conflicts. The explanatory role of a climatic factor is, in general, justified in 
the literature by noting that, ceteris paribus, a persistence climate change is expected to 
affect ‘conflict’ via, say, its impact on the associated risks; e.g. a rise in temperature 
facilitates aggressive behaviour, etc.  While a number of studies have examined this 
phenomenon empirically, the accumulated evidence is, as argued before, somewhat 
controversial and unsatisfactory (mostly due to issues surrounding the measurement of 
climatic factor being used and the choice of statistical approach underlying the estimation 
techniques, which have led to an ambiguity in effect of climate change). Given the 
importance of the question being addressed, our contribution aims to provide a systematic 
examination of the impact of climate by applying robust econometric techniques to 
estimate a clearly specified regression equation which includes a well-defined climate 
measure as our explanatory variable of interest. In particular, we shall estimate different 
versions of the regression equation  
 
  !",$ = & + 	)* + 	+$ + ,",$- ./ + .01",$ + 2",$, 3 ∈ [1, 7],			9 ∈ [1,:],  (2.1) 
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where !",$ = 1   if there is an onset of conflict in country 9  in year 3  and !",$ = 0 
otherwise (see Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in the Appendix for details), 1",$   is the 
corresponding climatic factor (one of the variables in Table 2.3) to be further clarified 
below, ,",$ is the vector of  the conditioning explanatory variables listed in Tables 2.1,  
)* is the region fixed effect where each country in the sample is associated with a specific 
geo-political region denoted by the subscript < ∈ [1, =]15, +$	is the year fixed effect, and 
2",$ is the appropriate disturbance term. At this stage we do not include country fixed 
effects but allow for within country correlations by means of clustered errors.16   
 As far as the choice of 1",$ is concerned, it is believed that the appropriate measure 
should adequately reflect both the long-run trend in climate change as well as the short-
run climatic volatility. This is because these characteristics capture the resilience building 
phenomenon linked to the adaptation strategies (see Bloomfield and Nychka, 1992; Rea 
et al., 2011; and Koubi et al. 2012). Therefore, while we shall experiment with all the 
variables listed in Table 2.4, using each as an alternative explanatory variable to represent 
the role of climate change, it might be argued that  ?7",$  or 7",$   – or,  ?@",$  or @",$  –  
capture the long-run pattern while 7A",$ , ∆7",$  or %∆7",$  – or, @A",$ , ∆@",$  or %∆@",$  –  
better embody the short-run volatility in climate. In addition, the humidity index, 
D2E9FG1",$ , which adjusts 7",$  for the impact of humidity so as to provide a more 
accurate measure of ‘how hot the weather feels to the average person’ is used as an 
alternative to 7",$ and is expected to have a similar effect.  
 Our choice of elements of the vector of conditioning variables ,",$ was explained in 
detail in the previous section, listed in Tables 2.1, and here we state the expected 
explanatory role of the main variables of interest and provide a brief explanation of how 
they have featured in other studies:  
• Regime Instability, also known as Regime Durability, is a decay function of the Polity 
Durable variable which measures the number of years since the most recent regime 
change (defined by a three-point change in the Polity score over a period of three 
                                                             
15 See Table 2.1 for the regions. The proposed categorisation is intended to reflect the tendency towards 
conflict in regions. Table A2.5 in the Appendix provides further details of the relevant data.   
16 It is more sensible to cluster errors on countries rather than on regions, of which there are only six in the 
current sample, to reduce the bias in standard errors. See Nichols and Schaffer (2007) and Wooldridge 
(2003) for details. 
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years or less). We use Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002; Marshall and Gurr, 
2013) data to construct this variable, following the instructions in Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006). Political instability has been measured in different forms, e.g. 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Rohner (2008) use a dummy variable to 
capture the contribution of political instability. In general, political instability could 
influence conflict directly or indirectly via its impact on economic performance (see 
Alesina et al., 1996).  
• Peace Duration is related to a measure of the period in which a country has not 
experienced any conflicts. Starting from 1946 (corresponding to the first observation 
in our dataset), we approximate this period by the number of days from the end of the 
last conflict up to two years before the beginning of the next conflict so as to avoid 
endogeneity and to allow for the reconstruction time, etc. - we follow the definition 
suggested in Sambanis (2004) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006).  Peace Duration is 
then measured in decay form and is therefore expected to have a positive contribution. 
The peace period, measured in one form or another, is considered as one of the main 
influencing factors (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Hegre et al., 2013). 
Collier (2008) explains this with the concept of ‘conflict trap’ which is based on the 
evidence that a country has a higher risk of starting another conflict in the post-
conflict period and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) highlight the positive role of conflict-
free years in keeping peace in long run.  
• Ethnic Heterogeneity Index ranges from 0 (perfect homogeneity) to 144 (perfect 
heterogeneity), combining the racial, linguistic and religious diversity indices. These 
were introduced by Vanhanen (1999) and were later combined into one index 
representing overall diversity, usually labelled as ethnic heterogeneity or ethnic 
fragmentation index. Ethnic Heterogeneity is thought to contribute positively to the 
starting of conflicts.  The ideas was originally introduced by Gurr (1971) using 
grievance motives provoked by social exclusion and was further developed later by 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who studied the role of 
ethnic dispersion or diversity. Others, e.g. Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Collier and 
Rohner (2008) and Slettebak (2012), have investigated the contribution of different 
measures of ethnic diversity.  
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• Rough Terrain measures the proportion of the area of the country that is mountainous 
and is considered as important since rough terrains are usually poorly served by roads 
and happen to be located farther away from the centre of state power. Therefore, it is 
expected to have a positive impact since it facilitates insurgency. The idea was first 
introduced conceptually by Fearon and Laitin (1999) and Buhaug and Gates (2002), 
and was later quantified in the study conflict by Fearon and Laitin (2003) to capture 
the hide-out opportunity for rebels. Since then, this variable features as one of the 
important control factors and used in later studies, e.g. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
and Collier and Rohner (2008).  
• Population is expected to have a positive impact. The main reason for this is based on 
the way a conflict is defined, which requires a certain threshold of deaths in order for 
it to be classified as an armed violence against the state; the higher is the population, 
the higher are the casualties and the easier to reach the threshold. (Hegre and 
Sambanis, 2006). Also, Fearon and Laitin (2003) further justify the positive effect of 
population on conflict on two other grounds, namely: (i) higher cost of government 
surveillance and tracking people in populated countries, and (ii) better recruitment 
opportunities of insurgents for a given level of income. To avoid endogeneity issues 
and allow for the time required for it to exert its impact, we use the lagged value of 
this variable.   
• Per Capita GDP is measured as GDP in constant 2005 U.S. dollars divided by the 
midyear population. This variable is thought to reflect the economic opportunity cost 
of the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) as well as  the state’s sovereignty, and 
therefore government’s military capabilities (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In addition, it 
is thought to provide a measure of the level of development. The latter feature forms 
the focus of the next chapter. In all cases one would expect to find a negative 
relationship between per capita GDP and conflict. To avoid endogeneity issues and 
allow for the time required for it to exert its impact, we use the lagged value of this 
variable.  
• GDP Growth is measured as the percentage change in GDP in constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. Its effect does not appear to be unambiguously determined in the literature. 
For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find a negative effect and interpret growth  
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as reflecting the ‘opportunity cost’ of conflict; ceteris paribus, the higher is growth 
the more costly is conflict and hence the lower is the probability of starting a conflict. 
However, as Heston (1994) and Hendrix and Glaser (2007) among others have noted, 
data availability and measurement problems together with relatively high volatility 
of growth across the countries involved can undermine the accuracy of such 
interpretations as well as reducing robustness of the estimated effect. To avoid 
endogeneity issues and allow for the time required for it to exert its impact, we use 
the lagged value for this variable. It is worth noting at this stage that an additional 
econometric specification problem exists that can affect the sign and significance of 
the coefficient of this variable and which results from the link between logarithm of 
Population, logarithm of Per Capita GDP and the change in logarithm of GDP which 
approximates GDP Growth. In other words, including log(@LM2NO39LPQR) , 
log(TA@QR @LM2NO39LPQR⁄ )  and log(TA@QR TA@QV⁄ )  as three explanatory 
variables is equivalent to including log(@LM2NO39LPQR) , log(TA@QR)  and 
log(TA@QV), since the latter is simply the unrestricted version of the former. This 
shows that if the underlying restriction does not hold we might find unexpected signs 
and significance levels for coefficients of one or more of the regressors involved. We 
shall therefore keep these issues in mind but include the restricted form since the 
impact of each variable involved is directly interpretable and can be seen in the 
context of the evidence available in the literature.   
• Military Personnel features frequently amongst the variables used in the literature but 
there is substantial ambiguity associated with its explanatory role. As Collier (2008, 
p. 132) explains “… governments that spend the most are likely to be those that face 
the biggest risk.” and  “…because causality runs from risk to spending, it is hard to 
distinguish any causality from spending to risk.”  Even disregarding the reverse 
causality problem and treating it as an exogenous explanatory variable, data on 
‘military personnel’ is poor and there is a substantial number of missing values which 
reduce the sample considerably. We therefore have decided to exclude this variable 




    
 
 
Table 2.4.   Explanatory variables based on a sample of 139 countries*  
over 51 years, 1961-2011  
Variable Number of Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Regime Instability [decaying] 6330 0.107695 0.289747 0 1 
GDP Per Capita [real, log] 5719 7.694141 1.588392 3.912867 11.31383 
Peace Duration [decaying] 6380 0.431231 0.376947 0.003582 1 
Ethnic Heterogeneity Index [Index] 6380 45.56105 34.07222 0 144 
Rough Terrain [% in Total]   6380 2.057542 1.441827 0 4.55703 
Population [log]  6377 16.00166 1.512535 12.30505 21.01901 
GDP Growth [real, %] 5712 3.996665 6.83548 -64.0471 189.8299 
Military Personnel [log]   3027 1.742921 0.756337 0 4.386381 
Regulation of Political Participation 
Index  6297 3.466254 1.224555 0 5 
Anocracy [dummy] 6297 0.23408 0.423456 0 1 
Cold War [dummy] 6380 0.214263 0.410343 0 1 
Oil Exporter [dummy] 6380 0.171317 0.376815 0 1 
Neighbouring Conflict [dummy] 6380 0.600627 0.489808 0 1 
Latitude  6380 0.280213 0.185997 0.011111 0.711111 
Malaria [% in Total]   6297 38.23458 43.4708 0 100 
Soil Quality [% in Total]    6206 12.78507 9.148625 0 55.0726 
Tropical Area [% in Total]    6297 38.86282 42.86875 0 100 
Crop Production Index  6311 78.65377 46.32625 1.35 962.57 
Tropics [dummy]   6380 0.515047 0.499812 0 1 
Temperature [Fahrenheit]    6380 66.15404 14.69043 18.68 85.64 
Precipitation [log]   6380 6.650115 .9733427 2.595255 8.209498 
Climate Temperature  [Fahrenheit]    6380 65.8012 14.72825 22.082 83.84 
Climate Precipitation  [log]   6380 1093.597 758.2622 37.38333 3164.58 
Temperature Deviation from 
Climate [Fahrenheit]    6380 0.352836 0.867792 -3.48 4.356003 
Precipitation Deviation from 
Climate [millimetre]   6380 -0.202109 163.2015 -919.58 1340.117 
Change in Temperature 
[Fahrenheit]    6380 0.019552 0.975245 -5.4 5.220001 
Change in Precipitation [millimetre]   6380 0.018903 221.8989 -1864.2 1745.2 
Growth Rate of Temperature [%] 6380 0.055140 2.060326 -20.8655 26.01713 
Growth Rate of Precipitation [%] 6380 3.010396 28.18621 -82.5723 471.371 
Humidex Index  6380 22.45607 11.90481 -11.6894 40.57645 
* The full list of countries with a conflict can be found in Table A2.1 in the Appendix. However, the sample is not balanced as not all 
the countries existed throughout the years, e.g. the countries formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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Finally, on the basis of the evidence presented in the literature, we approximate the 
impact of a number of explanatory variables by a quadratic from and therefore include 
both the level and the squared values, e.g. the effect of temperature is captured by 
.RW7",$ + .VW7",$
V .  
 Moving on to estimation issues, given the binary form of the dependent variable, our 
regression equation in (2.1) is modified to reflect the assumption that its right-hand-side 
determines the conditional probability of onset subject to an unpredictable random error, 
namely,  
 
@<LX Y!",$ = 1Z[1",$, ,",$
- \] = ^[& + 	)* + 	+$ + ,",$
- ./ + .01",$\ + 2",$ 
 
We therefore estimate our regressions using the logit model17 and present and discuss 
estimates of marginal effects of the variables of interest while the actual parameter 
estimates are reported in Table A2.6 in the Appendix. 
 
2.4.1. Evidence 
Table 2.5 reports our estimates of the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the main 
explanatory variables (the actual parameter estimates are reported in Table A2.6 in the 
Appendix) where each column corresponds to capturing the climate effect with one of 
the variables defined in Table 2.3; column A does not include any climate factor as 
explanatory variable and provides a benchmark with which the estimates reported in the 
other columns can be compared. Columns B and C show the impact of long-run climatic 
factors captured by the quadratic forms of ?7",$ and ?@",$ respectively: the AMEs have 
the correct sign – consistent with the role of climate in contributing to onset of conflict – 
but only temperature exerts a significant impact: a one s.d. rise in climate-level 
temperature (in Fahrenheit) raises the probability of conflict by 3.1 percentage points. 
Similar results are obtained when we use the average annual temperature to capture the 
long-run impact of climate – see columns D and E. Thus, precipitation does not seem to 
be a significant proxy for the long-term effect of climate. However, this changes when 
we focus on the short-term effect and use the deviation in climate: as shown in columns 
                                                             
17 While both logit and probit models are appropriate in these circumstances, the former performs better 
in statistical tests and is more relaxed regarding the assumptions on the distribution function representing 
the conditional probability. 
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Table 2.5. Logit estimates of equation (2.1) with different climatic factors: average marginal effects of selected explanatory variables 
Dependent: conflict onset 



























0.0115*** 0.0122*** 0.0115*** 0.0121*** 0.0116*** 0.0114*** 0.0116*** 0.0115*** 0.0116*** 0.0115*** 0.0116*** 0.0117*** 
             
GDP Per Capita  
[real, log, lagged] 
-0.00772 -0.00648 -0.00771 -0.00647 -0.00780 -0.00776 -0.00786 -0.00783 -0.00772 -0.00792 -0.00773 -0.00733 
             
Peace Duration  
[decaying] 
0.0300*** 0.0289*** 0.0300*** 0.0288*** 0.0298*** 0.0301*** 0.0300*** 0.0302*** 0.0300*** 0.0301*** 0.0300*** 0.0290*** 
             
Ethnic Heterogeneity 
[Index] 
0.0147*** 0.0112*** 0.0147*** 0.0111*** 0.0149*** 0.0147*** 0.0146*** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0127*** 
             
Rough Terrain 
[% in Total] 
0.00657 0.0154*** 0.00649 0.0157*** 0.00489 0.00686* 0.00654 0.00660 0.00651 0.00659 0.00658 0.0118** 
             
Population  
[log, lagged] 
0.0197*** 0.0222*** 0.0195*** 0.0222*** 0.0182*** 0.0194*** 0.0197*** 0.0196*** 0.0197*** 0.0195*** 0.0197*** 0.0219*** 
             
GDP Growth  
[real, lagged] 
0.00258 0.00244 0.00257 0.00240 0.00257 0.00253 0.00259 0.00249 0.00257 0.00249 0.00259* 0.00240 
             
Climate: 01234,5 + 07234,57   0.0307*** -0.00041 0.0317*** -0.00283 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
             
 Climate:                01234,5   -- -- -- -- 0.00677* -0.0042** 0.00551* -0.00261 0.00707** 0.000476 0.0150** 
             
MENA 
[Region dummy] 
0.0212 0.0332* 0.0209 0.0334* 0.0273* 0.0229 0.0217 0.0218 0.0214 0.0219 0.0211 0.0285* 
             
R2 0.2746 0.2814 0.2747 0.2819 0.2760 0.2780 0.2757 0.2760 0.2751 0.2765 0.2747 0.2781 
L -603.29 -597.66 -603.29 -597.23 -602.14 -600.52 -602.39 -602.19 -602.94 -601.76 -603.28 -600.46 
§ The dependent variable ‘onset of conflict’, is set to unity if there is onset of conflict and to zero otherwise.  
§ This table only presents the estimates of explanatory variables which had a statistically significant effect in atleast one of the regressions.  
§ In order to facilitate comparison, all non-dummy explanatory variables are standardised so that the marginal effects reflect the impact of a one s.d. change in the value of the variables.  
§ The sample size in all regressions is 4463, consisting an unbalanced combination of 139 countries over the period 1961-2011.   
§ ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% critical values based on standard errors clustered at the country level. 87 and 9  are the pseudo R2 and log pseudo likelihood values respectively. 
§ We only report the fixed effect of MENA region where the base line region is Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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F and G, the AMEs associated with both !"#,% and &"#,% are statistically significant with 
correct signs. But replacing deviations with changes or growth rates to capture the short- 
term effect reverts to only temperature effect being significant as shown in columns H to 
J. In particular, a 1% rise in the current temperature increases the probability of onset of 
conflict by 0.7 percentage points.  Finally, in the last column we report the role of 
humidity index whose effect turns out to be positive and significant but, as expected, its 
impact is lower than that of !#,%, i.e. 0.015 < 0.032, since the former adjusts the latter for 
the impact of humidity. To summarise, as far as the impact of climate is concerned 
measures which are based on temperature levels always play a positive and statistically 
significant role; while precipitation effect too always has the correct sign, it is only find 
to be significant when its deviation from the long-run climate level is used to proxy the 
short-run effect.   
 Turning to the effects of other determining factors we find that most have the expected 
signs and feature mostly significantly. The exceptions are Per Capita GDP whose 
coefficients have the correct sign but are statistically insignificant and GDP Growth 
which exerts statistically significant but positive effect. This anomaly was, to some 
extent, anticipated above where we discussed the issues related to GDP variables. While 
this is not fully satisfactory, we shall leave this set of explanatory variables intact on the 
understanding that together they remove the omitted variable effect and allow a more 
robust estimation of the climatic effect which is the primary focus of this chapter. 
However, it is worth mentioning at this stage that the coefficient of Per Capita GDP is 
always significant when it is interacted with variables that reflect the political feature of 
a country – e.g., Regime Instability as reported in Table A2.6 in the Appendix. The role 
of Per Capita GDP is explored in detail in Chapter 3 in the context of development and 
conflict.  
 Amongst the fixed effects, we only report the coefficient capturing the MENA region 
effect because it is one of the most troubled regions. The estimated effect is always 
positive and is statistically significant in columns B and D where temperature is used to 
capture the climate effect.    
 In order to compare the quantitative impact of the variables, in Table 2.6 we provide 
a comparative illustration of the AMEs where we also show the corresponding 90% 
confidence interval for each effect. Two observations are worth highlighting:  
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(i)  The pattern of predictive margins, calculated at different sample values of the 
relevant climate factor, suggest a clear positive association between climate 
warming and the probability of onset of conflicts; the hotter is the climate, the 
larger is the associated probability.  
(ii)  Based on the estimates of AMEs, Peace Duration has the highest impact followed 
by Annual Average Temperature, T, and then Population.   
 These results are worth emphasising since they convey a clear message for 
international peace agenda since they imply that promoting peace and controlling climate 
and population growth are the most effective factors in contributing to a reduction in the 
onset of armed conflicts. It is also important to consider at this stage that policies that 
aiming to affect these are not necessarily target specific. For instance, Collier (2008) 
interprets the prominent role of Peace Durability in the context of ‘conflict trap’ theory 
and it is believed that properly targeted foreign aid and direct external intervention can 
be effective in breaking the vicious circle by enhancing peace durability.  However, there 
is no reason why such policies should not target both Peace Durability and climate 
control.  
 We conclude our discussion of the evidence by examining two further questions 
regarding the effect of climate factor we have considered. First, we ask: which one of the 
measures used as a proxy for climate is more effective? In Table 2.7 we report the AMEs 
based on using the actual data (rather than standardised data) for the climatic factor 
whose effect we found to be significant as reported in Table 2.5. The results are revealing 
in that they stress the particular effectiveness of climate control policies that target 
reducing the deviation of current temperature from the long-run: a 1o F increase above 
the climate average increases the probability of conflict by 0.8 percentage point. 
 Next, we ask whether there is an interaction between the two main climate factors, 
temperature and precipitation. So far, we have used these as alternative indicators. We 
now examine if they play a joint role in capturing the effect of climate on the grounds 
that while only one of these – and on the basis of the above evidence, a temperature-
based measure – is more likely to capture the direct effect of climate, the direct effect is 
bound to be influence by the extent to which the other factor varies. As argued by Lilleør 
and Van den Broeck (2011), the impact of temperature is likely to be higher in drought-
prone areas.  We  therefore  experimented with  different  specifications by  keeping the  
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Table 2.6.   Selected summary results based on the estimates reported in Table 2.5  
Predictive Margins with 90% CIs (Column D)  
 
AMEs with 90% CIs (Column D) 
 
Predictive Margins with 90% CIs (Column G)  
 
Predictive Margins with 90% CIs (Column H) 
 
 








    
 
 
sample and all other control variables intact and using different combinations of 
temperature and precipitation measures and found that data supports the following model 
where we also report the estimated values of parameters of interest (t-ratio in 
parentheses):  
 
 !",$ = & + () + 	+$ + ,",$- ./ + .%∆23%∆4",$5 + .67",$ 
+	.%∆2,63%∆4",$ × 7",$5 + 9",$, (2.2) 
 
 




= .%∆2 + .%∆2,67",$ 
 
 The choice of this specification was justified on the grounds that while together 
%∆4",$ and 7",$ capture the short-run and long-run impacts, they are less correlated and 
their interaction provides a better reflection of the hypothesis put forward by Lilleør and 
Van den Broeck (2011) in measuring how the impact of temperature fluctuations is 
enhanced in dryer climates. As expected, we find the direct effect of 7",$  to remain 
insignificant but to impact upon the effect exerted by %∆4",$ : a rise in precipitation 
moderates the impact of growing temperature. In Figure 2.3 we illustrate this 
quantitatively by plotting the evolution of AMEs of %∆4",$ as 7",$ rises.  
 
 
Table 2.7.  AMEs for different climatic factors1  
Climatic Factor HIJ,K3 IJ,K3 ∆IJ,K %∆IJ,K ILJ,K MLJ,K 
 Climate 
Temperature 











AME2 0.21 0.22 0.6 0.4 0.8 -0.3 
1  See the note below Table 2.5. The difference between these estimates and those reported in Table 2.5 is due to use 
of raw rather than standardised data.  
2 These measure the impact of 1o F or 100mm rise in temperature or precipitation on the probability of onset of conflict.  
3 These variables appear in quadratic form as in Table 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Impact of temperature growth on probability of onset of conflict  
35 
 
    
 




2.4.2.  Robustness of evidence on the climate effects 
Our evidence already supports the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, the warming of 
climate raises the probability of onset of conflicts. In order to further strengthen this 
support, we now address a number of questions that could weaken our evidence if they 
are left unanswered.  There is no particular order in which one should consider these 
questions. We therefore examine them in order of their importance and relevance.   
 The first question is whether the effectiveness of the climate factor significantly 
diminishes over time. To answer this, we re-estimated the regression equations 
corresponding to columns D and E in Table 2.5 over the shorter period of 1967-2011 
where we used the current and lagged climate factors, 4",$NO and 7",$NO, in order to check 
if their impact is reduced as P rises. We present the results in Table 2.8 where, given that 
all regressions are estimated using an identical sample, the evidence suggest the passage 
of time does not significantly erode the climate effect. 
 The next issue concerns the fact that our evidence is based on the whole sample and 
imposes the restriction that the impact of climate is homogeneous across different 
climatic conditions. We therefore examine if this restriction is supported by dividing our 
observations into three groups in terms of climate, namely cold, mild and hot, where the 
mild climate is assumed to prevail when the temperature is within one s.d. of mean; the 
cold and hot climates then correspond to temperatures below and above the lower and 
the upper bounds of the interval.  
 
Table 2.8.  Comparing the AMEs of current and past temperature 
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0.0305 0.0291 0.0296 0.0301 0.0292 0.0286 0.0275 
(2.40) (2.35) (2.40) (2.38) (2.35) (2.29) (2.27) 
UT 0.295 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.293 





-0.00363 -0.00237 -0.00351 -0.00433 -0.00207 -0.00394 -0.00215 
(0.78) (0.52) (0.77) (0.92) (0.43) (0.83) (0.47) 
UT 0.290 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.288 0.290 0.288 
VWX 1236 1237 1238 1237 1238 1236 1238 
§ See the notes below Table 2.5. The dependent variable and the set of regressors are identical to that used in Table 2.5, but 
the sample size is reduced to 4212 since we have dropped the observations for 1961-1966 to allow for maximum of 6 lags. 
The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t-ratios (standard errors are clustered at the country level). 
 
 
 Respectively,  cold,  mild  and  hot  climate occur in 22.6%, 66.83% and 10.56% of 
observations in the sample. Accordingly, we constructed three dummy variables, denoted 
by YX",$, YZ",$ and Y[",$ and assigned the value of unity if the observation corresponds 
to a cold, mild and hot climate respectively and zero otherwise. Using these, we examined 
estimates based on the following regression equation which augments equation (2.1) with 
the dummies and their interactions with the climate variable, \",$,  
 
 !",$ = & + () + 	+$ + ,",$- ./ + .]\",$ 	+ _̂YZ",$ + ^`Y[",$ 
+.]_YZ",$\",$ + .]`Y[",$\",$ + a",$. (2.3) 
 
 In Table 2.9 we only report estimates of ^ coefficients and the interaction effects when 
\",$ is set to 4Y",$, %∆4",$, 7Y",$ and %∆7",$ and the cold climate is treated as baseline 
and in Figures 2.4-2.7 we provide an illustration of how the impact of climate is likely to 
evolve in each case.   
Table 2.9.  Effect of climatic factors in different climates 
based on estimates of equation (2.3) 
\",$: 4Y",$  %∆4",$  7Y",$  %∆7",$ 
^_ 0.955** 1.011** 0.977** 0.978** 
^` 1.788*** 1.920*** 1.891*** 1.881*** 
	.]  0.0780 0.110** 0.00497* 0.00858 
.]_ 0.0512 -0.0124 -0.00590** -0.00903 
.]` 0.176 0.103 -0.00590** -0.00719 
Constant -11.85 -11.70 -11.96 -11.87 
UT 0.2857 0.2873 0.2883 0.2852 
b -594.08 -592.78 -591.96 -594.50 
§ See the notes below Table 2.5. The dependent variable, the set of regressors and the sample are 
identical to that used in Table 2.5. The ‘cold’ case is used as the baseline.   
§ This table exceptionally reports Log odds, as interpreting joint role and  interaction terms 








Figure 2.4. Predictive Margins of temperature conditions    







Figure 2.5.  Predictive Margins of temperature conditions in different MLJ,K 




    
 
Figure 2.6. AMEs of temperature conditions in different %∆IJ,K with 90% CI 





Figure 2.7. AMEs of temperature conditions in different MLJ,K with 90% CI 
based on estimates of equation (2.3) 
 
 
 As expected, including the interaction term improves the predictive power and fit of 
the model. This is mainly results from separating observations by their climate condition, 
as evidently the effect of climatic factors is somewhat sensitive to the designated climates 
as the magnitudes and even signs of the effects differ. From Figures 2.4 and 2.5 it is 
apparent that the effect of a rise in temperature is less substantial in cold climates 
compared to mild and hot climates. This is in line with our expectations that hot climates 
are more vulnerable to warming (Anderson, 1989; Lilleør and Van den Broeck, 2011); 
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the same argument applies to hot climates which are likely to be more drought-prone. 
Lilleør and Van den Broeck (2011) state “Areas which are close to the upper threshold 
of, say, temperature for agricultural production are likely to suffer more [from global 
warming] than similar cooler areas. Likewise, already drought-prone areas will suffer 
more from further lack of rain than very wet areas, which may even benefit from such a 
change” (p. 77). 
 In an attempt to examine the impact of climate on violence (not necessary armed 
conflicts), a number of recent studies which use cross country data (e.g. Burke et al., 
2009; Hsiang, 2013) have argued in favour of estimating a restricted version of equation 
(2.1) which replaces the effect off country characteristics, captured by  () + ,",$- ./  in 
(2.1), with a country fixed effect, namely 
 
  !",$ = & + c" + 	+$ + .]\",$ + d",$, (2.4) 
 
where c" is the country fixed effect. This approach is worth considering when assessing 
the robustness of our evidence: if country fixed effects provide a better way of capturing 
country-specific characteristics embodied in variables listed in Table 2.1 and used in our 
approach, then clearly one ought to at least provide estimates on the basis of both.  
However, estimation of the specification in (2.4) restricts the sample since all the 
observations pertaining to countries that did not experience any conflict will drop out.  In 
addition to reducing the sample considerably (limiting the number of countries to 75 out 
of original 139), and eliminating the possibility of distinguishing between countries on 
the basis of a specific characteristic, this approach also raises the likelihood of 
introducing a sample selection problem since those countries which have experienced a 
conflict tend to have some common characteristics. Before comparing our estimate based 
on this approach with those discussed above, reported in Table 2.10, we note that the 
sample mean and median of ‘risks of onset’ for countries with a history of conflict are 
respective 11.3% and 5%, which are noticeably larger than the corresponding values for 
the whole sample of 7.3% and 1.8% – see Table A2.7 in the Appendix for a comparison 
of sample statistics between the two sets of countries.  In Table 2.10, the set of estimates 
entitled (A) are our original estimates which can be compared with those entitled (B); 
climatic factors retain their sign and significance but, as expected, their effects are 
considerably larger. To make direct comparison between the two specifications possible, 
the corresponding estimates based on identical samples are also reported in the table 
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entitled (C) and (D) respectively. These results too support our original conclusions 
regarding the sign of the impacts. While there are certain drawbacks in using this method 
– which stem from eliminating important observations from the sample and hence over-
estimating the effects and introducing sample selection bias – it should be noted that this 
approach could be more appropriate in situations where the focus is on countries with a 
history of conflict and/or there are data availability issues regarding the country-specific 
characteristics.  
 The next question concerns the adequacy of our sample. In this connection we 
consider three main issues:  
 
(i)  the rare event characteristic of the dependent variable: King and Zeng (2001) and 
Tomz et al. (2003) discuss the rare event problem and propose using an adjusted 
logit model specifically designed for estimating regression equations where data 
exhibits the so called rare-events characteristic. In particular, the results presented 
in King and Zeng (2001) suggest that standard logit estimates may under predict 
the probability of an event occurring when the events are rare and Tomz et al. 
(2003) show how their modified estimator yields lower mean squared errors when 
applied to rare events data such as wars, political activism or epidemiological 
infections. Given that our dependent variable could be classified as rare-event 
since !",$ = 1 only for less than 5% of the observations, we re-estimated equation 
(2.1) for \",$ = .S24",$ + 	.T24",$T  using the modified logit estimator and found 
support for our original conclusion, with .:S2 = 0.262 , .:T2 = 0.269  and both 
statistically significant at 5%.18  
(ii)  treatment of the observation corresponding to on-going conflicts: Our sample so 
far only includes the observations in which at least one new conflict has started 
but all the on-going conflicts (defined as an active conflict that started before that 
observation) are excluded. An alternative would be to include the latter but treat 
them as if there were no new conflict starting. Although this modification skews 
the sample (since observations with an active conflict are not distinguished from 
those with no conflict), it is worthwhile checking if it affects the estimated impact 
of climatic effect. We therefore re-estimated equation (2.1) for \",$ = .S24",$ +
                                                             




    
 
	.T24",$
T  using the modified sample and found that the results support our original 
conclusion with the estimated AME of 4",$ 0.0211 being statistically significant at 
5%. 
(iii) inclusion of ‘internationalised internal armed conflicts’: There is a clear 
distinction between internal and internationalised internal armed conflicts based 
on the definition introduced earlier: there is evident involvement of a foreign state 
in the later. The foreign intervention might be obscure at times, but it is assumed 
that internal armed conflicts with an apparent third-party support and involvement 
being fundamentally different from the rest of internal conflicts. We tested our 
findings by accounting for internationalised conflicts in our dependent variable 
and did not find any noticeable change in our main findings. 
(iv)  exclusion of the observations corresponding to high leverage cases: Since there 
are a number observations within the sample which could be described as ‘outliers’ 
and/or ‘influential’, due to the country-specific characteristics, it is important to 
ensure that their inclusion does not skew the estimates. We therefore used (i) the 
approach recommended in Pregibon (1981) to eliminate observations with high 
leverage from the sample, and (ii) the method advocated by Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (1989) and Hosmer et al. (2013) to omit observations with large 
residuals – based on Pearson and Deviance Residuals. Re-estimating (2.1) with 
after excluding such outliers did not alter the general conclusions and as far as the 
AME of  \",$ = .S24",$ + 	.T24",$T  was, respectively,  0.026 (statistically significant 
at 5%) and 0.037 (statistically significant at 1%).  
 
Finally, we experimented with enhancing the set of country-specific explanatory 
variables, in particular by including indicators of development level (which were 
explained in Section 2.3 and listed in Table 2.2), the lagged value of Military Personnel 
(which we had not originally included on the grounds of ambiguity surrounding its 
explanatory role as explained in Section 2.3), as well as the variables listed in Table A2.8.  
In all cases we found the results to support our original conclusion regarding the impact 






    
 
 
Table 2.10.  Comparing estimates of specifications (2.1) and (2.4)  
Dependent: conflict onset      
climatic factor used: fgIIJ,K + fhIIJ,Kh  %∆IJ,K ILJ,K MLJ,K -- 




from Climate -- 
(A)  Estimates based on equation (2.1) with full sample, reported in Table 2.5; sample size: 4463 
Estimated AME 0.0317*** 0.00707** 0.00677* -0.0042** -- 
UT 0.2819 0.2765 0.2780 0.2757 0.2746 
b -597.23 -601.76 -600.52 -602.39 -603.29 
AIC 1326.47 1333.53 1335.055 1334.78 1334.59 
BIC 1749.11 1749.77 1764.09 1751.02 1744.42 
(B)  Estimates based on equation (2.4) with reduced sample; sample size: 2678 
Estimated AME 0.21* 0.00821** 0.015** -0.0116*** -- 
UT 0.2542 0.2533 0.2558 0.2551 0.2520 
b -577.9 -578.65 -576.67 -577.28 -579.67 
AIC 1251.8 1253.30 1253.35 1250.56 1253.35 
BIC 1534.66 1536.15 1547.99 1533.41 1530.31 
(C)  Estimates based on equation (2.1) with restricted sample; sample size: 2224 
Estimated AME 0.0374 0.0173** 0.0154* -0.00754* -- 
UT 0.1994 0.1983 0.1995 0.1966 0.1955 
b -542.0861 -542.8295 -542.0183 -543.9887 -544.7094 
AIC 1216.172 1215.659 1218.037 1217.977 1217.419 
BIC 1592.838 1586.618 1600.41 1588.936 1582.671 
(D)  Estimates based on equation (2.4) with restricted sample; sample size: 2224 
Estimated AME 0.317* 0.0162** 0.0182** -0.00891** -- 
UT 0.2563 0.2546 0.2567 0.2535 0.2518 
b -503.5323 -504.7215 -503.2512 -505.4388 -506.583 
AIC 1103.065 1103.443 1104.502 1104.878 1105.166 
BIC 1377.004 1371.675 1384.148 1373.11 1367.691 
§ See the notes below Table 2.5. The dependent variable in all cases, the set of regressors in (A) and (C) and the sample in (A) are 
identical to that used in Table 2.5. The set of regressors in (B) and (D) replace the country-specific explanatory variables with country-
specific fixed effects. The sample size in (A) and (B) is the maximum possible number of observations in each case and in (C) and 
(D) is the maximum possible common observations.  
 
 
2.5. Summary and conclusion 
 In this chapter we have empirically examined the existence and robustness of the 
relationship between climatic factors and the probability of onset of armed conflicts once 
all other relevant factors are accounted for.  This was motivated by the received wisdom 
which identifies several channels relating climatic factors to conflicts which could be 
grouped as:  
(i)  The indirect long-term channels that operate through altering other risk factors 
by affecting, for example, economic wellbeing – such as the level of 
production in the agricultural sector.  
(ii)  The more direct long-term channels which function via changing the 
environment and therefore affecting attitude towards aggression and violence.  
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(iii) The short-term climatic shocks – such as heat waves, droughts or floods – 
which significantly disrupt life via causing sudden severe shortages and even 
epidemic of diseases. These could then result in poverty and force migration 
hence leading to fertile grounds for conflict.  
 It is therefore important to understand whether climatic factors have a significant 
effect on conflict after taking into account the impact of all other contributing factors. In 
order to examine this question empirically, we have constructed a dataset consisting of a 
sample of 139 countries over the period 1961-2011 which, for each country-year 
observation, contains the relevant country-specific characteristics which are believed to 
feature in affecting the probability of an armed conflict as well as recording whether there 
has been an armed conflict. In particular, we have constructed different measures of 
climatic factors based on daily record of temperature and precipitation in each country. 
We used CRU TS3.22 (Harris et al. 2014) dataset, which provides monthly gridded fields 
based on daily values and is calculated on high-resolution (0.5x0.5 degree) grids based 
on an archive of monthly values provided by thousands of weather stations distributed 
globally. Therefore, after matching the weather stations by their host countries and 
measuring the annual values of our main variables, we prepared the climatic dataset 
corresponding to our sample in a country-year format. 
 After establishing that (i) a steady and persistent climate warming cannot be ruled out, 
and (ii) there is a significant positive correlation between the incidence of armed conflicts 
and climate warming, we have used our dataset to estimate the direct contribution of each 
of the climatic factors once all other likely country-specific elements are accounted for.  
Our findings suggest that climate warming is instrumental in raising the probability of 
onset of armed conflicts. Given the robustness of this finding, it conveys an important 
policy message. In addition to this message, which results from the main focus of our 
research, a number of points are worth highlighting:  
• Dividing the sample by grouping the observations into cold, mild, and hot climates 
shows that the nature of climate matters and that change in climatic factors are 
likely to have different impact – in terms of magnitude and sign – in different 




    
 
• By allowing a time lag for the effect of climatic factors we have found that passage 
of time does not erode the climate effect.    
• Examining whether there is an interdependency in the way temperature and 
precipitation (the two main climatic factors) affect the onset of conflicts, we have 
found that dryness (low precipitation) increases the effect of temperature growth. 
• We have established that allowing country fixed effects to capture all country-
specific characteristics does not alter the qualitative conclusions but leads to an 
over-estimation of the impact of climatic factors. We have indicated that this could 
be due to the fact that this method restricts the sample to conflict countries only 
hence could, in practice, be subject to sample selection bias.  
• Comparing the standardised marginal effect of variables of interest we have found 
peace duration, annual temperature, and population to play the most influential (in 
terms of significant quantitative impact) respectively. While peace duration and 
population have been highlighted in the literature as being the more important 
factors, our finding regarding the robust impact of annual temperature is a 
significant contribution to the literature which reports unclear and vague results in 
this respect.  
• Finally, while conducting this study, we found some evidence implying the 
existence of a complex relationship between Per Capita GDP and conflict: Per 
Capita GDP only possesses a significant coefficient when it is interacted with 
Regime Instability (see the results in Table A2.6 in the Appendix). In other words, 
the impact of a change in per capita income is contingent on political factors. This 
finding, together with the discussion in the literature on the role of economic and 
political development in the literature, motivates the research question for the next 
chapter. Using Per Capita GDP as an indicator of economic development and 
capturing the level of political development by various interpretations of the Polity 
Score in Chapter 3 we shall focus on the robust specification of the joint 
contribution of these after all other relevant factors are accounted for.  
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Appendix 
Table A2.1. Full list of conflicts in the sample 
Y
ea
r GWNO Location Side A Side B 
Y
ea




41 Haiti Haiti Military faction (forces of Himmler Rebu and Guy Francois) 19
98
 




41 Haiti Haiti Military faction (forces of Raol Cédras) 20
02
 




41 Haiti Haiti FLRN, OP Lavalas (Chimères) 20
04
 




42 Dominican Republic 
Dominican 
Republic Military faction (Constitutionalists) 20
07
 




52 Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Jamaat al-Muslimeen 20
09
 




70 Mexico Mexico EZLN 19
77
 




70 Mexico Mexico EPR 19
67
 






90 Guatemala Guatemala FAR I 19
73
 
552 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 
Zimbabwe 




90 Guatemala Guatemala FAR I 19
66
 




92 El Salvador El Salvador Military faction (forces of Benjamin Mejia) 19
81
 




92 El Salvador El Salvador ERP, FPL 19
85
 




93 Nicaragua Nicaragua FSLN 19
71
 






93 Nicaragua Nicaragua Contras/FDN 19
71
 




95 Panama Panama Military faction (forces of Moisés Giroldi) 19
75
 




100 Colombia Colombia FARC 19
91
 




101 Venezuela Venezuela Military faction (navy) 19
80
 




101 Venezuela Venezuela Bandera Roja 20
11
 




101 Venezuela Venezuela Military faction (forces of Hugo Chávez) 19
63
 




135 Peru Peru ELN, MIR 19
71
 




135 Peru Peru Sendero Luminoso 19
76
 




135 Peru Peru Sendero Luminoso 19
83
 




145 Bolivia Bolivia ELN 20
11
 




150 Paraguay Paraguay Military faction (forces of Andres Rodriguez) 19
66
 




155 Chile Chile Military faction (forces of Augusto Pinochet, Toribio Merino and Leigh Guzman) 19
79
 




160 Argentina Argentina Military faction (Colorados) 19
79
 




160 Argentina Argentina ERP 19
79
 




165 Uruguay Uruguay MLN/Tupamaros 19
86
 









630 Iran Iran KDPI 
GWNO (Gleditsch-Ward numbers) is the most common way of identifying countries by digits. Side A identifies the government side 





    
 
Table A2.1. Full list of conflicts (continued) 
Y
ea
r GWNO Location Side A Side B 
Y
ea













220 France France OAS 19
93
 




230 Spain Spain ETA 19
96
 




230 Spain Spain ETA 19
97
 




230 Spain Spain ETA 19
99
 




359 Moldova Moldova PMR 20
05
 




360 Rumania Rumania NSF 19
84
 









Union) Republic of Armenia 19
91
 





















Union) Parliamentary forces 19
61
 









Union) Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 19
63
 
645 Iraq Iraq 
Military faction (forces of 










Union) Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 19
73
 









Union) Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district 19
82
 









Union) Forces of the Caucasus Emirate 19
87
 




372 Georgia Georgia National Guard and Mkhedrioni 19
91
 




372 Georgia Georgia Republic of Abkhazia 19
95
 




372 Georgia Georgia Republic of South Ossetia 19
93
 




372 Georgia Georgia Republic of South Ossetia 19
66
 
652 Syria Syria 
Military faction (forces 
loyal to Nureddin Atassi 




373 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Military faction (forces of Suret Husseinov) 19
79
 




373 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan OPON forces 20
11
 




432 Mali Mali MPA 19
75
 




432 Mali Mali FIAA 19
82
 




432 Mali Mali ATNMC 19
90
 




433 Senegal Senegal MFDC 20
00
 




433 Senegal Senegal MFDC 20
06
 




433 Senegal Senegal MFDC 19
79
 




433 Senegal Senegal MFDC 19
92
 




433 Senegal Senegal MFDC 19
98
 




433 Senegal Senegal MFDC 20
10
 




433 Senegal Senegal MFDC 19
99
 





    
 
Table A2.1. Full list of conflicts (continued) 
Y
ea
r GWNO Location Side A Side B 
Y
ea




435 Mauritania Mauritania POLISARIO 20
04
 




436 Niger Niger FLAA 19
61
 




436 Niger Niger CRA 19
66
 




436 Niger Niger FDR 19
69
 




436 Niger Niger UFRA 19
79
 




436 Niger Niger MNJ 19
82
 




438 Guinea Guinea RFDG 19
83
 




439 Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Popular Front 19
89
 




450 Liberia Liberia Military faction (forces of Samuel Doe) 19
89
 




450 Liberia Liberia NPFL 19
90
 




450 Liberia Liberia LURD 19
90
 




452 Ghana Ghana NLC 19
92
 




452 Ghana Ghana Military faction (forces of Jerry John Rawlings) 19
92
 




452 Ghana Ghana Military faction (forces of Ekow Dennis and Edward Adjei-Ampofo) 19
92
 




461 Togo Togo MTD 19
93
 




471 Cameroon Cameroon Military faction (forces of Ibrahim Saleh) 19
94
 




475 Nigeria Nigeria Military faction (forces of Patrick Nzeogwu) 19
95
 




475 Nigeria Nigeria Republic of Biafra 19
96
 




475 Nigeria Nigeria Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa 19
97
 




475 Nigeria Nigeria NDPVF 19
97
 




475 Nigeria Nigeria Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad 20
00
 




475 Nigeria Nigeria Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad 20
03
 
















483 Chad Chad Frolinat 20
08
 




483 Chad Chad FAN 20
08
 




483 Chad Chad Islamic Legion, Revolutionary Forces of 1 April, MOSANAT 20
09
 




483 Chad Chad FARF, MDD 19
71
 




483 Chad Chad FUCD 19
74
 




484 Congo Congo Ninjas 19
90
 














    
 
Table A2.1. Full list of conflicts (continued) 
Y
ea
r GWNO Location Side A Side B 
Y
ea




490 DR Congo (Zaire) 
DR Congo 
(Zaire) Opposition militias 20
04
 






















500 Uganda Uganda Military faction (forces of Idi Amin) 19
75
 




500 Uganda Uganda Military faction (forces of Charles Arube) 19
71
 




500 Uganda Uganda LRA 19
84
 




501 Kenya Kenya Military faction (forces of Hezekiah Ochuka) 19
89
 




516 Burundi Burundi Military faction (forces loyal to Gervais Nyangoma) 20
03
 




516 Burundi Burundi Palipehutu 20
05
 




516 Burundi Burundi CNDD 19
96
 




516 Burundi Burundi Palipehutu-FNL 19
74
 




517 Rwanda Rwanda ALiR 20
03
 




522 Djibouti Djibouti FRUD 19
67
 






522 Djibouti Djibouti FRUD - AD 19
90
 








530 Ethiopia Ethiopia ELF 19
89
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia Ogaden Liberation Front 19
63
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia ALF 19
74
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia EPRP, TPLF 19
81
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia WSLF 19
69
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia OLF 19
70
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia SALF 19
93
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia OLF 19
97
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia SLM 19
99
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia IGLF 19
65
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia AIAI 19
67
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia OLF 19
75
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia ONLF, AIAI 19
76
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia ARDUF 19
81
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia ONLF 19
84
 




530 Ethiopia Ethiopia OLF 19
90
 






    
 
Table A2.1. Full list of conflicts (continued) 
Y
ea
r GWNO Location Side A Side B 
Y
ea




531 Eritrea Eritrea EIJM - AS 19
92
 




531 Eritrea Eritrea EIJM - AS 19
97
 




531 Eritrea Eritrea EIJM - AS 19
99
 




540 Angola Angola FLEC-R 19
89
 




540 Angola Angola FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R 19
92
 




540 Angola Angola FLEC-FAC  
    
 
 
Table A2.2.  Conflict data categories 
Onset of conflicts  
(ongoing as missing) Onset of conflicts Incidence of conflicts 
 Number %  Number %  Number % 
No conflict 5,286 95.85 No conflict 6,123 95.97 No conflict 5,286 82.85 
Minor 190 3.45 Internal conflict 229 3.59 Internal conflict 938 14.7 
Major 39 0.70 Internationalised 28 0.44 Internationalised 156 2.45 




Table A2.3.  Missing observations 
Variable Missing (%) Missing (#) Available/Total 
Military Personnel 50.4 3217 3163/6380 
GDP Growth 10.5 668 5712/6380 
GDP Per Capita 10.4 661 5719/6380 
Anocracy 1.3 83 6297/6380 
Regulation of Political Participation 1.3 83 6297/6380 
Regime Instability 0.8 50 6330/6380 
Population 0.0 3 6377/6380 
Neighbouring Conflict 0.0 0 6380/6380 
Peace Duration 0.0 0 6380/6380 
Ethnic Heterogeneity Index 0.0 0 6380/6380 
Oil Exporter 0.0 0 6380/6380 
Cold War 0.0 0 6380/6380 
Rough Terrain 0.0 0 6380/6380 
MENA 0.0 0 6380/6380 
Temperature 0.0 0 6380/6380 











Table A2.4.  Sample autocorrelations coefficients  
for the annual average temperature and precipitation levels 
lags 0 1 2 3 4 
1 0.9978 (0.9592) 
    
2 0.9975 (0.9589) 
0.9979 
(0.9590) 
   























The figures in parentheses are the coefficients for precipitation. All 
coefficient estimates are statistically significantly different from 




Table A2.5.  Summary statistics for the regions 
Regions Number % Cum. % 
Western Europe and the US 816 12.8 12.8 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 619 9.7 22.5 
Middle east and North Africa 897 14.06 36.55 
South and East Asia and Oceania 1,034 16.21 52.77 
Latin America 1,116 17.5 70.27 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,898 29.75 100 
Total 6,380 100  
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Table A2.6. Logit estimates of equation (2.1) with different climatic factors: log odds of selected explanatory variables  
Dependent: conflict onset 

























             
Regime Instability -2.067 -2.206 -1.950 -2.170 -1.886 -2.012 -2.037 -2.109 -2.069 -2.133 -2.067 -2.108 
[decaying] (-1.47) (-1.64) (-1.37) (-1.61) (-1.32) (-1.40) (-1.44) (-1.49) (-1.47) (-1.50) (-1.47) (-1.54) 
GDP Per Capita -0.230* -0.214 -0.227* -0.213 -0.227* -0.228* -0.232* -0.233* -0.230* -0.235* -0.230* -0.225* 
[real, log, lagged] (-1.90) (-1.63) (-1.88) (-1.60) (-1.88) (-1.86) (-1.90) (-1.92) (-1.89) (-1.94) (-1.90) (-1.75) 
             
GDP Per Capita  0.459** 0.489** 0.443** 0.483** 0.435** 0.449** 0.456** 0.465** 0.460** 0.469** 0.459** 0.468** 
& Regime Instability (2.23) (2.46) (2.11) (2.43) (2.07) (2.12) (2.19) (2.24) (2.23) (2.25) (2.23) (2.33) 
[interacted]             
Peace Duration 2.235*** 2.156*** 2.228*** 2.151*** 2.226*** 2.245*** 2.238*** 2.246*** 2.237*** 2.245*** 2.235*** 2.164*** 
[decaying] (7.57) (6.93) (7.56) (6.88) (7.52) (7.46) (7.55) (7.59) (7.56) (7.59) (7.58) (7.02) 
Ethnic Heterogeneity Index 0.0121*** 0.00927*** 0.0122*** 0.00913*** 0.0123*** 0.0121*** 0.0120*** 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.0105*** 
[Index] (3.70) (2.92) (3.82) (2.86) (3.87) (3.69) (3.66) (3.71) (3.69) (3.72) (3.71) (3.34) 
Rough Terrain 0.128 0.299*** 0.107 0.306*** 0.0953 0.134* 0.127 0.128 0.127 0.128 0.128 0.230** 
[% in Total] (1.60) (2.74) (1.19) (2.80) (1.08) (1.67) (1.58) (1.60) (1.58) (1.60) (1.60) (2.18) 
Population 0.363*** 0.411*** 0.347*** 0.412*** 0.337*** 0.360*** 0.365*** 0.363*** 0.364*** 0.362*** 0.363*** 0.406*** 
[log, lagged] (4.89) (5.78) (4.60) (5.75) (4.48) (4.79) (4.88) (4.90) (4.89) (4.92) (4.89) (5.79) 
GDP Growth 0.0115* 0.0109 0.0113* 0.0107 0.0114 0.0114* 0.0115* 0.0111 0.0114* 0.0111 0.0115* 0.0107 
[real, lagged] (1.73) (1.64) (1.67) (1.61) (1.64) (1.72) (1.71) (1.63) (1.70) (1.64) (1.74) (1.61) 
Climate: 01234,5   0.477** 1.063 0.521** 1.677 0.448** -0.00073** 0.158* -0.00033 0.0962** 0.000473 0.0354* 
  (2.09) (0.79) (2.21) (1.39) (2.27) (-2.12) (1.74) (-0.94) (2.31) (0.15) (1.73) 
Climate: 06234,56   0.250* -0.0836 0.239* -0.132 -0.0339       
  (1.66) (-0.78) (1.73) (-1.37) (-0.32)       
Climate: 07234,57       -0.0991*       
      (-1.71)       
MENA  0.914* 0.685 0.917* 0.750* 0.637 0.594 0.599 0.583 0.601 0.575 0.794* 
[Region dummy]  (1.90) (1.60) (1.89) (1.82) (1.56) (1.49) (1.51) (1.48) (1.52) (1.46) (1.74) 
86 0.2746 0.2814 0.2747 0.2819 0.2760 0.2780 0.2757 0.2760 0.2751 0.2765 0.2747 0.2781 
9 -603.29 -597.66 -603.29 -597.23 -602.14 -600.52 -602.39 -602.19 -602.94 -601.76 -603.28 -600.46 
§ The dependent variable ‘onset of conflict’, is set to unity if there is onset of conflict and to zero otherwise.  
§ The sample size in all regressions is 4463, consisting an unbalanced combination of 139 countries over the period 1961-2011.   
§ The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t-ratios (standard errors are clustered at the country level). 86 and 9  are the pseudo R2 and log pseudo likelihood values respectively. 
§ ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% critical values based on standard errors clustered at the country level.   
§ We only report the fixed effect of MENA region where the base line region is Sub-Saharan Africa.  
§ The following variables are in Logarithmic format: Population, GDP per capita, Rough Terrain, and Precipitation. This variable is measured in the decaying form 2	<=> ?.AB  where 8C is the Regime Instability 
defined in Table 2.1. See Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Gurr and Jaggers (2000) for details of advantages in using this transformation.  
§ This variable is measured in the decaying form 2	<D> EB  where FC is the Peace Duration defined in Table 2.1.  See Hegre and Sambanis (2006) for details of advantages in using this transformation. 
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Table A2.7. Explanatory variables with summary statistics, by history of conflict within the sample period 
Variable Number of Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of 
Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 History of conflict No history of conflict 
Regime Instability 4004 0.135 0.320 0 1 2326 0.061 0.221 0 1 
Per Capita GDP 3691 7.171 1.333 3.913 10.724 2028 8.646 1.573 4.424 11.314 
Peace Duration 4052 0.58256 0.36318 0.0055 1 2328 0.1678 0.2249 0.00358 1 
Ethnic Heterogeneity Index 4052 50.945 32.174 1 144 2328 36.189 35.241 0 144 
Rough Terrain 4052 2.180 1.380 0 4.421 2328 1.844 1.520 0 4.557 
Population 4052 16.231 1.429 12.534 20.923 2325 15.602 1.570 12.305 21.019 
GDP Growth 3676 4.00581 7.56162 -64.05 189.829 2036 3.9801 5.2789 -41.8 33.991 
Military Personnel 1893 1.697 0.785 0 4.386 1134 1.820 0.7 0.248 4.146 
Regulation of Political Participation Index 3972 3.21903 1.1723 0 5 2325 3.8886 1.1964 0 5 
Anocracy 3972 0.290 0.454 0 1 2325 0.138 0.345 0 1 
Cold War 4052 .207798 .405781 0 1 2328 .22551 .41801 0 1 
Oil exporter 4052 0.212 0.409 0 1 2328 0.100 0.300 0 1 
Neighbouring Conflict 4052 0.64955 0.47716 0 1 2328 0.5180 0.4997 0 1 
Latitude 4052 0.219 0.149 0.011 0.667 2328 0.387 0.196 0.014 0.711 
Malaria 4052 49.673 43.679 0 100 2245 17.589 34.570 0 100 
Soil Quality 4052 12.66 9.344 0.154 48.1481 2154 13.02 8.768 0 55.073 
Tropical Area 4052 48.353 43.365 0 100 2245 21.733 36.126 0 100 
Crop Production Index 4020 72.32 30.929 7.61 235.67 2291 89.768 63.566 1.35 962.57 
Tropics 4052 0.65079 0.47678 0 1 2328 0.279 0.448 0 1 
Temperature 4052 70.886 11.695 20.12 85.64 2328 57.917 15.704 18.68 84.38 
Precipitation 4052 1127.26 806.017 21.5 3635.8 2328 1034.4 721.27 13.4 3675.7 
Climate Temperature 4052 70.572 11.698 22.364 83.84 2328 57.498 15.742 22.082 82.37 
Climate Precipitation 4052 6.6569 1.0161 3.0680 8.1985 2328 6.6383 .89414 2.59525 8.2094 
Temperature Deviation from Climate 4052 0.315 0.765 -2.322 4.122 2328 0.419 1.019 -3.48 4.356 
Precipitation Deviation from Climate 4052 -2.248 161.848 -724.7 898.37 2328 3.359 165.50 -919.58 1340.1 
Change in Temperature 4052 0.017 0.847 -4.32 3.6 2328 0.024 1.165 -5.4 5.22 
Change in Precipitation 4052 0.265 214.39 -1186.3 1089.5 2328 -0.409 234.44 -1864.2 1745.2 
Growth Rate of Temperature 4052 0.038 1.536 -13.79 17.425 2328 0.085 2.744 -20.866 26.017 
Growth Rate of Precipitation 4052 2.622 24.816 -73.2 300.453 2328 3.686 33.243 -82.572 471.37 
Humidex Index 4052 26.1561 9.82575 -10.58 40.5764 2328 16.015 12.453 -11.689 39.249 
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Table A2.8. Extra variables used for robustness checks 




Ethnic fragmentation Using the structural distance 
between languages as a proxy 
for the cultural between groups 




Ethnic fragmentation ranges from 0 to 100 and 
measures the probability that 
two randomly selected 








Share of largest 
ethnic group 
Ethnic fragmentation Share of largest ethnic group Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) 
Language diversity Ethnic fragmentation Linguistic component of ehet Vanhanen (1999) 
Religion diversity Ethnic fragmentation Religious component of ehet Vanhanen (1999) 
Ethnic dominance Ethnic 
dominance/polarisation 
Ethnic dominance measure Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) 
Oil production Resources Oil production in metric tons. 
1932-69: USGS, 1970-2000: 
WB, 2001-2011: EIA 
Ross (2013) 
Oil exports Resources In thousands barrels per day. 
Data from EIA 
Ross (2013) 
Partially free Polity Inconsistency of 
political institutions 
Dummy for a country with 
limited respect for political 





Political instability whether the country had a 
change of Polity score in any of 
the three prior years2 
Author’s coding 
using Polity IV 
Presidential 
democracy 
Political system Presidential democracy system Cheibub et al. 
(2010) 












Neighbourhood war Total number of neighbours at 
war in a given year 
Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) 
1 See the categorisations in Hegre and Sambanis (2006). 


















Chapter 3  
Internal Armed Conflicts: contribution of Economic and 







    
 
3.1. Introduction  
High levels of national wealth and development and consistent democracy are widely 
regarded as important factors that contribute to sustained civil peace (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Collier and Rohner, 2008). 
However, repeated occurrences of conflicts in democratic regimes – e.g. India (1961, 
1966, 1983, 1989, 1995, 1997, 2005, 2008) and Philippines (1993, 1997, 1999)19 – and 
their complete absence in some rich countries with non-democratic regimes – such as 
Kuwait or Saudi Arabia – are counter examples that cannot be simply regarded as 
exceptions.20  
 Understanding the underlying causes of the anomaly highlighted above is important, 
in particular because it raises a question regarding whether democracy alone promotes 
peace, and if not then how does its role interact with the extent of development. A glance 
through the relevant literature on this issue suggests that both the quality of political 
institutions and the extent of development matter for the containment of risk of conflicts 
but there is also evidence that their roles are in fact contingent on each other.  Therefore, 
building on the work of Collier and Rohner (2008), in this chapter we re-examine the 
empirical determination of probability of onset of internal armed conflicts by focusing 
on the role of per capita income – which is considered as a proxy for the level of 
development – and the regime type – which is an indicator of level of democracy and 
quality of political institutions. Our intensive empirical analysis of a rich dataset suggests 
that more well-off autocracies seem to be less prone to conflict, where this does not hold 
for democracies. We also find that major political disruptions could escalate the chances 
of armed conflicts regardless of the regime type, and that their impact is larger the higher 
is per capita income. Our findings highlight the importance of political stability in 
keeping peace and emphasise the role of stable democracy.   
 The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3.3 describes the data and methodology employed in the empirical analysis. 
Section 3.4 presents and discusses the empirical evidence based on using a measure of 
regime type as a proxy for political development and in Section 3.5 we provide evidence 
based on replacing the regime type measures with those that correspond to regime 
                                                             
19 The full list of democratic regimes with conflict since 1960 is in Table A3.1 in the Appendix. 
20 To stress this in Table A3.2 in the Appendix we provide the list of countries with high income which 
have experienced an armed conflict since 1960. Table A3.3, additionally, lists the wealthy autocracies. 
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instability. Section 3.6 briefly presents our robustness checks and Section 3.7 concludes 
the chapter. 
 
3.2. Literature review  
Internal armed conflicts are amongst the most tormenting development issues of our era 
(World Economic Forum, 2015 and 2016) and are therefore of utmost concern. A better 
understanding of how they could be prevented, curtailed and/or contained requires a good 
knowledge of their cause and impact. Only then can policy makers take on the 
challenging task of designing policies to avoid their onset and/or to limit their effects. As 
explained in some detail in Chapter 2, a number of studies have focused on the 
motivating, or provoking, factors such as ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. For instance, the 
rational choice hypothesis considers the civil war phenomenon as an outcome of (a 
special form of) non-cooperative behaviour within the game theory framework where the 
greed motive simply reflects opportunities for rebels (or rebel leaders) to enrich 
themselves, possibly by seizing resource rents. Grievance, in contrast, is seen as a 
behavioural pattern which is invoked by relative deprivation, social exclusion and 
inequality. In the case of resource rich countries, insufficiently compensated land 
expropriation, environmental degradation, insufficient job opportunities, and labour 
migration could be considered as giving rise to grievance motives. In short, there are 
three, by now classical, causes of internal armed conflict and insurgency: (i) looting 
motivation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); (ii) religious reforming, nationalist or economic 
grievances (Gurr, 1971); and (iii) favourable conditions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  The 
first two explain the motivation behind insurgency and the third one justifies the 
feasibility of forming and maintaining insurgent groups. The ongoing research in this 
area has led to some policy implications which aim at reducing the risk of conflict and 
encouraging peace. Specifically recommended policies are: (i) stimulating growth and 
creating jobs – especially for youth (Collier and Hoefller, 2004); (ii) spreading 
democracy and tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities (Fearon and Laitin, 2003); 
and (iii) improving state’s defence capability (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and 
Hoefller, 2004). In addition, the feasibility hypothesis, which is based on the self-
fulfilling nature of the conflict phenomenon, proposes that where rebellion is possible, it 
will occur. Therefore, it is thought to be possible to reduce the onset of armed conflicts 
by making the circumstances more difficult. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
regard state weakness as the prime source of rebel opportunities. 
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 Models proposed on the basis of both the rational choice and the feasibility 
hypotheses have been assessed empirically by various studies where a number of 
explanatory variables, which we outlined and used in Chapter 2, are considered to 
provide proxies for capturing the relevant measures.  In the context of the above 
hypotheses, for instance, Collier et al. (2009) use the ‘per capita GDP’, ‘GDP growth 
rate’ and ‘male secondary education level’ as reliable proxies for ‘forgone earnings’ on 
the grounds that ‘low forgone earnings facilitate conflict’ while Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
regard ‘per capita GDP’ primarily as a proxy for ‘state sovereignty’ and therefore 
represent government’s military capabilities.  
 In addition to the rational choice and feasibility hypotheses, there is a third strand of 
literature which sees low levels of economic and political development as factors 
responsible for the onset of armed conflicts. It is argued that the lower is the extent of 
economic development the smaller will be the opportunity cost of a conflict and this link 
is stronger at the lower levels of democratic accountability. There is, however, only a 
limited number of studies that focus on the relationship between development, political 
institutions, and armed conflicts and they, by and large, do not provide quantitative 
assessments of the nature of the relationship. Collier and Rohner (2008) is an exception, 
who use data on incidents of guerrilla warfare21, as well as COW classification of civil 
war22 and find that although the net effect of democracy is ambiguous, it is systematically 
related to the effect of income. In particular, they claim that “as [per capita] income rises, 
not only might democracies become safer, but the greater weight placed upon the goal 
of accountability might make autocracies absolutely more prone to violence” (p. 532). 
The only other empirical evidence we have found in the existing literature is reported in 
Hegre and Nome (2010) who find the relationships between democracy and conflict and 
development and conflict to be interdependent. Using UCDP/PRIO conflict data and the 
Scalar Index of Polities (instead of conventional Polity Index) as a proxy for democracy 
level they find support for the results reported by Collier and Rohner (2008) stating that 
“increasing the level of economic development reduces the risk of armed conflict only 
for democratic countries, and increasing the level of democracy only for developed 
countries” (p. 27).  
                                                             
21 Defined as any armed activity, sabotage, or bombing aimed at the overthrow of the regime.  
22  See Correlates of War at http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war and Sarkees and Wayman 
(2010). These include any armed conflict that involve: (1) military action internal to the metropole of the 
state system member; (2) the active participation of the national government; (3) effective resistance by 
both sides; and (4) a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths during each year of the war. 
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 This chapter is motivated by the further need for enhancing our understanding of the 
impact of economic and political developments levels on the onset of internal armed 
conflicts. We shall therefore attempt to undertake more in depth empirical analysis of the 
relevant data to explore this question. In Chapter 2 we found per capita GDP to have a 
correctly signed but statistically insignificant effect on the probability of onset of conflict. 
We noted that this finding is in agreement with the empirical evidence reported in the 
literature. However, an additional complication stems from the lack of clarity about the 
role assigned to per capita income in the literature since it has been used in as a measure 
of ‘development’, ‘opportunity cost’ and/or ‘state’s sovereignty’. Our aim in this chapter 
is to further investigate the role of per capita income, particularly in conjunction with the 
effect of level of democracy, in determining the probability of armed conflicts, after all 
other likely effects are accounted for.   
   
3.3. Data and methodology  
We shall use the same dataset that we constructed and used in Chapter 2.  However, given 
the focus of the research question in this chapter, some further clarifications regarding 
the choice of the dependent and explanatory variables are required.   
 First, we shall continue to use the term ‘conflict’ to refer ‘internal armed conflicts’ 
as defined by UCDP, namely: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one 
is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”.23  However, 
since we shall also examine the incidence of armed conflicts it is worthwhile to pay 
specific attention to how these two variables are defined and constructed. Our sample 
consists of data for 139 countries over the period 1961-2011. The onset is characterised 
by a dichotomous variable denoted by !",$ for country % in year & in the sample. !",$ = 1 
if a new conflict, or one that is separated from the last onset of any conflict by at least 
one year, has started in country % in year &. Otherwise, !",$ = 0. The incidence, too, is 
characterised by a dichotomous variable. However, in the case of incidence !",$ = 1 if 
there is an active, newly started or on-going, conflict in country % in year &. Otherwise, 
!",$ = 0.  
                                                             
23  See Chapter 2 for further details. Armed conflicts are classified into ‘internal’, ‘interstate’, ‘extra 
systemic’, and ‘internationalised internal’ types. 
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 Next, it is worthwhile to clarify at the outset the main issues in connection with the 
use of regression analysis which are based on conditioning the probability of ! = 1 in a 
country on variables which represent the country’s relevant features. In particular:   
(i) There is a potential simultaneity problem since internal armed conflicts could, in 
principle, alter the socio-economic characteristics of the nation. As a result, we 
follow the common practice in these circumstances of using the lagged values of 
the time-varying explanatory variables.24  
(ii) The onset cases form a subsample of the incidence cases, since incidence not only 
accounts for all onsets, but also for every observation where there is an active 
conflict as long as the annual number of fatalities reaches the threshold. Thus, 
when constructing the onset sample the on-going conflicts are treated as missing. 
Otherwise a country-year observation with an on-going conflict cannot be 
distinguished from one with no conflict, which in turn can lead to inaccurate 
results. The top panel of Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics distinguishing 
between the onset and incidence in the full sample.25  
(iii) The occurrence of internal armed conflict is not evenly distributed across countries 
and varies with the extent of economic and political development. As a 
preliminary indication of this, in the lower part of Table 3.1 we provide the 
summary statistics for the subsamples based on four groups of countries: ‘high-
income & democratic’, ‘high-income & autocratic’, ‘low-income & democratic’, 
‘low-income & autocratic’ which show a non-negligible variation in the frequency 
of onset and incidence. It is worth to note in passing that according to the relative 
frequencies reported in the table: (a) democracies have a higher chance of entering 
into a new conflict compared to autocracies in high and low income countries; and 
(b) amongst the high-income countries, conflicts last longer in democracies 
                                                             
24 The alternative approach is to use an appropriate instrumental variable estimator. But in these cases it is 
difficult to find robust instruments. It might, of course, be argued that the lagged variables should be used 
as instruments. However, using the lagged variables directly as the explanatory variables is more efficient 
in these circumstances and, as mentioned above, is also justified on the grounds that it takes time for the 
effect to materialise.  
25 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) advocate this distinction stating that “Initiation and duration are radically 
different processes” (p. 572). They explain the shortcoming of their previous work in this respect and 
recommend that “Ongoing wars are coded as missing observations as to not conflate the analysis of civil 
war initiation and duration” (p. 572).  
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compared to autocracies while the opposite is true for low-income countries.  
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 further illustrate these points by means of histograms.    
 
Figure 3.1. Number of conflicts by regime type and income level 
 
Figure 3.2. Rate of conflicts by regime type and income level 
 
Rate of conflict is measured as sample frequency (observed conflicts / total observations) 
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Table 3.1.  Summary statistics for the internal armed conflicts in the sample1  
 All Countries in Full Sample 
 Sample Size, N 100×Mean5 S.D. 
Onset2 5515 4.15 0.1995 
Onset3  6352 3.61 0.1864 
Incidence4 6224 15.07 0.3578 
 Countries with High Per Capita Income6 
 Democratic Regimes7 Anocratic Regimes7 Autocratic Regimes7 
 N 100×Mean5 S.D. N 100×Mean5 S.D. N 100×Mean5 S.D. 
Onset2 941 0.85 0.0919 41 2.43 0.1561 155 0.65 0.080 
Onset3  1006 0.80 0.0889 42 2.39 0.1543 155 0.65 0.080 
Incidence4 997 6.42 0.2452 42 4.76 0.2155 155 0.65 0.0801 
 Countries with Middle Per Capita Income6 
 Democratic Regimes7 Anocratic Regimes7 Autocratic Regimes7 
 N 100×Mean5 S.D. N 100×Mean5 S.D. N 100×Mean5 S.D. 
Onset2 944 2.22 0.147 528 8.52 0.2794 626 3.19 0.176 
Onset3  1104 1.90 0.136 652 6.9 0.2536 721 2.77 0.164 
Incidence4 1102 16.24 0.369 642 24.76 0.4319 707 14.28 0.350 
 Countries with Low Per Capita Income6 
 Democratic Regimes7 Anocratic Regimes7 Autocratic Regimes7 
 N 100×Mean5 S.D. N 100×Mean5 S.D. N 100×Mean5 S.D. 
Onset2 315 10.16 0.3026 527 7.21 0.2589 817 5.39 0.2259 
Onset3  361 8.86 0.2846 681 5.58 0.2297 932 4.72 0.2122 
Incidence4 361 21.61 0.4121 656 25.46 0.4359 911 15.15 0.3587 
1 We have treated the ‘internationalised internal armed conflicts’ as missing in order to maintain the focus 
of analysis on ‘Internal armed conflicts’. 
2 All ongoing conflicts are treated as missing.  
3 All ongoing conflicts are treated as no-conflict. 
4 All newly started and ongoing conflicts are treated as a conflict. The reason for differences in the sample 
size is that in the difference between the onset and incidence internationalised conflicts.  
5 100×Mean is the relative frequency, given that the variables are set to either 0 or 1.  
6 The income thresholds are $875 and $10725, based on the World Bank evaluations in 2005.  
7 Democratic, anocratic, and autocratic regimes are identified using the Polity Score. See below for further 
details. 
 
 As for the choice of explanatory variable, while we shall use the same variables 
which we identified and used in the previous chapter – see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 – here 
we shall group them differently so as to distinguish the general control variables from 
those on which we wish to focus. The former group consists of ‘Peace Duration’, ‘Ethnic 
Heterogeneity, ‘Rough Terrain’, ‘Population’, ‘GDP Growth’, a variable representing 
the climatic factor –the annual average temperature and its growth rate which were found 
in the previous chapter to have significant impact – as well as dummy variables for ‘Cold 
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War’, ‘Oil exporter’, ‘Neighbouring Conflict’ and ‘Region’. These variables do not 
directly reflect the level of development and/or democracy and will always feature as the 
fixed set of control variables in all our regressions.  
 The focus group consists of two variables which capture the level of development 
(how potentially well-off a country is) and democracy (the quality and characteristics of 
a country’s political institutions).  For the former, we shall use the real Per Capita GDP 
in constant $US prices. In addition, we shall also examine if the explanatory role of 
income is altered when Per Capita GDP is replaced with the per capita income thresholds 
advocated in World Bank (2014a).  
 To capture the level of democracy, we shall use the Polity IV index which consists 
of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints 
on executive authority and political competition and is a weighted average score that 
reflects the ‘regime authority spectrum’ on a 21-point scale assigning -10 to ‘hereditary 
monarchy’ and +10 to ‘consolidated democracy’ as well as the three special cases of 
‘interregnum’ regimes, regimes in ‘transition’ and those having a ‘foreign interruption’ 
which are respectively assigned the score -77, -88 and -66.26 We shall exclude the latter 
category from our analysis, in all cases treating them as missing observations, and use 
*+",$
,  in our regressions to denote the Polity Score for country % in year & in the sample.  
 As an alternative to using the Polity Score itself, which provides a continuous 
measure of regime types, Collier and Rohner (2008) propose categorising regimes into 
‘democratic’ and ‘non-democratic’.  We shall use *+",$-  in our regressions to denote their 
dummy variable, which is defined as follows  
                                                             
26  In our explanations we make frequent use of the key terms ‘state’, ‘government’, and ‘regime’. 
Therefore, to prevent any confusion we define these at the outset.  Following Hague and Harrop (2013), a 
state, or a country, is regarded as a sovereign “… political community formed by a territorial population 
subject to one government”. As Barfield (1997) explains, general categories of state institutions include 
administrative bureaucracies, legal systems, and military or religious organisations. A state is, therefore, 
an indestructible union of citizens having the chief characteristic of permanence and continuity. The 
‘government’ is a part of the state and is said to “consists of institutions responsible for collective decisions 
for society” (Hague and Harrop, 2013). A regime, as explained in Siaroff (2005) and Van den Bosch (2013) 
is the type of political system that exists in a sovereign state which is considered to be a more permanent 
form of political organisation than its specific government, but less permanent than the state itself. Political 
regimes are normally classified by their distance from a ‘fully fledged consolidated democracy’ which is 
defined, e.g. by the Economist Intelligence Unit which compiles the Democracy Index, as a situation in 
which civil liberties and basic political freedoms are respected and reinforced by a political culture 
conducive to the thriving of democratic principles. According to Morlino (1998, 2004), the minimal 
definition of democracy suggests that such a regime has all the following characteristics: (i) universal, 
adult suffrage; (ii) recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; (iii) more than one political party; and 
(iv) more than one source of information. 
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• *+",$- = 1 if country i in year t is has an non-democratic regime – i.e. if its Polity 
Scores is either within [-10, +5] interval or -77 or -88.   
• *+",$- = 0  if the country in question is treated as one with a democratic regime – 
i.e. if its Polity Scores is within [+6, +10] interval. 
 We shall first examine in some detail the explanatory role of *+",$,  and then check 
whether replacing it with *+",$-   provides a sharper empirical distinction. We then build 
on this approach following the classification proposed by the Centre for Systemic Peace27 
and examine whether a further dividing of the ‘non-democratic’ regimes, associated with 
*+",$
- = 1, can provide any additional insight. To this end, we note that within our sample 
the proportion of countries that have a democratic and an autocratic regime is 43.6% and 
32%, respectively. To check if autocracies are sufficiently distinct from the rest – i.e. 
from anocratic regimes, interregnum regimes or regimes in transition28 – we report in 
Table 3.2 the statistical test results for equality of sample means for the main 
characteristics of the countries with these regimes. As can be seen from the table, the null 
hypothesis of equality of means is rejected in all cases.  Thus merging anocracies and 
autocracies into one group on the assumption that there are ample similarities amongst 
them could hide differences arising from institutional quality and frequent periods of 
instability. We therefore define the following dummies to replace the *+",$- = 1 cases:  
• *+",$. = 1 if country i in year t is has an autocratic regime, i.e. its Polity scores 
lies within [-10, -6] interval.   *+",$. = 0 otherwise; 
• *+",$/ = 1 if country i in year t is has an anocratic regime, an interregnum regime 
or a regime in transition, i.e. its Polity scores lies within [-5, +5] interval or 
corresponds to either -77 or -88.  *+",$/ = 0 otherwise. 
                                                             
27.  
28 In order to facilitate the use of the Polity Score measure in time-series analyses, Marshall and Gurr 
(2013) applied some simple treatments, or ‘fixes’,  to convert instances of ‘standardised authority scores’ 
(-66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores, i.e., within the range, -10 to +10, as the follows: -66 Cases 
of foreign ‘interruption’ are treated as ‘system missing’; -77 Cases of ‘interregnum’, or anarchy, are 
converted to a ‘neutral’ Polity score of ‘0’; -88 Cases of ‘transition’ are prorated across the span of the 
transition. Yet, tracking them down is possible. 
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 Finally, applying the same principle, we shall also consider the effect of separating 
anocratic regimes from interregnum regimes and regimes in transition, by replacing 
*+",$
/ = 1 cases with the following dummies: 
• *+",$0 = 1 if country i in year t is has an anocratic regime,  *+",$0 = 0 otherwise; 
• *+",$1 = 1 if country i in year t is has an interregnum regime or a regime in 
transition,   *+",$1 = 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 3.2. Autocracy vs. Anocracy: testing the equality of sample 
means of the main country-specific characteristics   
Characteristic  P-value* 
Population  0.0000 
Peace years 0.0000 
GDP growth  0.0292 
Ethnic heterogeneity index 0.0000 
Rough terrain  0.0002 
Annual temperature  0.0001 
Oil exporter  0.0000 
Neighbour in war  0.0014 
GDP per capita  0.0235 
Polity index 0.0000 
Regime durability 0.0000 
Major instability 0.0000 
* Probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis of equality based on two 
sample t-ratio test.  
 
 
3.4. Evidence on the explanatory role of economic and political development  
In this section we provide the results of regression analyses that concentrate on 
quantifying the impact of economic and political development on conflict. We shall 
proxy economic and political development respectively by the real per capita income and 
the Polity score, as outlined above, as our focus explanatory variables and augment all 
the regressions with the same set of control variables specified above.   
 
3.4.1. Using the Polity score to represent political development 
We start our regression analysis with specifications based on 23456  and *+, where the 
latter provides a continuous measure of political development.   In order to highlight the 
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relevance of these variables in explaining conflicts, in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 we show how 
annual real per capita GDP  and the Polity scores, averaged across the countries within 
the sample, compare with the conflict patterns when plotted over the sample period, 
1961-2011.  
 Given the nature of aggregation, these figures are, of course, rather illustrative and 
can only provide an indication of how 23456 and *+, have, on average, evolved over 
time in comparison the dependent variable. Nevertheless, even at this level of 
aggregation the existence of some mild counter cyclical pattern is evident which 
encourages the use of more detailed regression analysis. We therefore start by examining 
the coefficient estimates of the following general specification 
 
  !",$ = 7, + 9,234",$:-







+ B,,C + D,,$ + E",$:-
F G, + H",$
, ,																								(3.1) 
 
where & ∈ [1,+] and % ∈ [1,P] are the year and country indices respectively, !",$ = 1 if 
there is an onset of an internal armed conflict in country %  in year &  and !",$ = 0 
otherwise, B,,C is the region fixed effect where each country in the sample is associated 
with a specific geo-political region denoted by the subscript Q ∈ [1, *], D,,$	is the year 
fixed effect, E" is the vector of the conditioning explanatory variables outlined above, and 
H",$ is the appropriate disturbance term.  The specific functional form of equation (3.1) is 
postulated on the basis of two main assumption: (i) the impact of regime type is 
nonlinear, and (ii) the interaction effect of regime type with per capita GDP is inverse-u-
shaped. This is because we do not want to rule out, a priori, the possibility that the impact 
of regime type and the effectiveness of a rise in per capita are enhanced as we approach 
autocracy or democracy extremes. Nevertheless, to provide a complete picture, we shall 
also estimate all the relevant restricted versions of (3.1). 
 Table 3.3 reports the estimated values of the relevant parameters, associated with 
(3.1) and its restricted versions, which capture the impacts of *+, and 23456. As can 
be seen from column (I), the general model in (3.1) is not supported by the data in that 
none of the crucial coefficients are statistically significant. Looking at the other columns, 
we also find that the interaction effects too, captured by =,  and =- , are statistically 





















    
 
Table 3.3. Estimates of equation (3.1) and its restricted versions 
Dependent: conflict onset      
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
7, -12.05*** -11.59*** -11.60*** -11.70*** -11.69*** 
9,  -0.0661 -0.159 -0.158 -0.175* -0.178* 
<, 0.0223 0.0250 0.0294* 0.0510 0.0278* 
<- 0.00806 -0.00745** -0.00742** -- -- 
=, 0.00136 0.000640 -- -0.00333 -- 
=- -0.00213 -- -- -- -- 
R2 0.2761 0.2756 0.2756 0.2726 0.2725 
L -602.08 -602.494 -602.49 -605.03 -605.08 
AIC 1336 1335 1333 1338 1336 
BIC 1759 1751 1743 1748 1739 
The dependent variable is probability of onset of internal armed conflict. The 
sample size in all regressions is 4463, consisting an unbalanced combination of 
139 countries over the period 1961-2011. All regressions include the same control 
variables as explained above. The coefficient estimates report log-odds. ‘***’, 
‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively based on t-ratios 
using standard errors clustered at the country level.  R2 and L are the pseudo 
goodness of fit and log-likelihood value, respectively. AIC and BIC are Akaike 
and Schwarz information criteria (based on the log-likelihood), respectively. 
 
 In addition, the estimated coefficient of 23456, 9,, which is negative in all cases as 
expected, is significant only in columns (IV) and (V). On the other hand, only columns 
(II) and (III) support a negative quadratic impact associated with *+,. Working on the 
assumption that 23456  is a crucial explanatory variable, from the estimates reported in 
Table 3.3 we conclude that our dataset favours the restricted form in column (V) and 
therefore our chosen model is   
  !",$ = 7, + <,*+",$:-, + 9,234",$:-
56 + B,,C + D,,$ + E",$:-
F G, + H",$
, ,						(3.1)′ 
which excludes both quadratic and interaction effects and also suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, (i) 9, < 0: relatively richer countries are less likely to experience an internal 
armed conflict, thus economic development promotes peace; (ii) <, > 0:  the more 
democratic is a country’s regime the more likely it is to experience an internal armed 
conflict, hence democracy per se does not promote peace; and (iii) the interaction term 
between 234"
56  and 	*+",  is statistically insignificant: the effects of economic and 
political development are not contingent on each other.  These results are interesting in 
that they provide a preliminary insight into the way economic and political development 
contribute to the onset of internal armed conflicts within our specific dataset.  However, 
while the absence of non-linearity could be accepted, the lack of any interaction effect is 
not fully in line with the explanations in the literature and require further investigation. 
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We therefore continue our regression analysis by replacing 	*+", with the 	*+"
V dummies 
which allow us to associate a specific type of political regime with a range of Polity score 
as outlined in Section 3.3 above. 
 
3.4.2. The role of specific regimes based on Polity score   
Following Collier and Rohner (2008), we first examine how the above results change 
when we group regimes into ‘democratic’ and ‘non-democratic’ by using the *+"- 
dummy which we defined in Section 3.3. Hence, we estimates  
 
  !",$ = 7- + 9-234",$:-
56 + ;W- + X-	234",$:-
56 >*+",$:-
-  
            +	B-,C + 	D-,$ + E",$:-F G- + H",$- ,																																																										(3.2)  
 
which treats democracies, for which *+"- = 0, as the baseline – thus, W- and X- provide 
a measure of deviation from democracy. Our estimates are reported in the first column 
of Table 3.4 which show that, unlike Collier and Rohner (2008) who found that a higher 
per capita GDP is associated with peace in democracy and with conflict in autocracies – 
namely,  9- < 0, W- < 0, and X- > 0 – we find no evidence supporting a change in per 
capita GDP or regime type across countries to have a significant effect; in fact per capita 
GDP itself does not play any significant explanatory role either.   
 Given the evidence in Table 3.2 which shows that the characteristics of autocracies 
are statistically distinct from the rest (amongst the non-democratic regimes), next we 
examine whether treating democracies as the baseline regime as in (3.2) but dividing the 
non-democratic regimes corresponding to *+"- = 1  into autocracies and the rest 
(consisting of anocratic, interregnum or in transition) by means of *+".  and *+"/ 
dummies (which we defined in Section 3.3) provides an insight into the role of regime 
type in determining the onset of conflicts. Hence, we estimate   
 
  !",$ = 7. + 9.234",$:-
56 + ;Z. + [.234",$:-
56 >*+",$:-
. + ;Z/ + [/234",$:-
56 >*+",$:-
/  
+	B.,C + D.,$ + E",$:-
F G. + H",$
. ,																																																																									(3.3)  
 
 The parameter estimates of equation (3.3) are reported in the 2nd column in Table 
3.4 and again indicate no evidence supporting a change in per capita GDP or regime type 
across countries to have a significant effect – i.e., Z. = Z/ = [. = [/ = 0  cannot be 
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rejected. We also continue to find that per capita GDP does not play any significant 
explanatory role either. 
      
Table 3.4.  Logit estimates of coefficients of regression equations (3.2)-(3.4) 
Dependent: conflict onset    
  (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 
Regressors    
per capita GDP:      234",$:-
56  -0.234 -0.254 -0.235 
non-democracy:        *+",$:--  -1.108 -- -- 
*+",$:-
- × 234",$:-
56  0.153 -- -- 
autocracy                *+",$:-.  -- -0.541 -0.404 
*+",$:-
. × 234",$:-
56  -- 0.0218 0.0002 
anocracy, interregnum, 
transition:             *+",$:-/  -- -1.280 -- 
*+",$:-
/ × 234",$:-
56  -- 0.206 -- 
anocracy:                *+",$:-0  -- -- -0.152 
*+",$:-
0 × 234",$:-
56  -- -- 0.0446 
interregnum, transition:  
*+",$:-
1  
-- -- -4.296* 
*+",$:-
1 × 234",$:-
56  -- -- 0.627* 
R2 0.2711 0.2747 0.2769 
L -606.25 -603.25 -601.40 
AIC 1340 1338 1338 
BIC 1750 1761 1774 
See notes to Table 3.3 for other details.   
 
 
 Finally, we move on to examine whether separating anocratic regimes from 
interregnum regimes and regimes in transition makes any difference. This requires 
estimating   
 
  !",$ = 7/ + 9/234",$:-





0 + ;]1 + ^1234",$:-
56 >*+",$:-
1  
+	B/,C + 	D/,$ + E",$:-
F G/ + H",$
/ ,																																																										(3.4)  
 
Recall that *+"1 = 1 represents observations in which the corresponding regimes are 
politically unstable, hence separating this category from others might help capturing 
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homogeneity ‘within’ categories as well as heterogeneity ‘between’ categories. This 
follows from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) who argue that 
political instability has a robust association with conflict. The estimated coefficients are 
reported in the 3rd column in Table 3.4 where the only significant coefficient whose 
estimated value happens to be statistically significant (at 10% critical level) is ]1 but we 
find its value to be negative, with the counter-intuitive implication that regime instability 
reduces the probability of onset!  
 
3.4.3. Using per capita income levels as alternative   
The fact that the estimated effect of  234",
56  reported in Table 3.4, corresponding to 
specifications (3.2)-(3.4), turns out to be statistically insignificant is somewhat 
unsatisfactory. However, since per capita GDP is used as a proxy for the extent of 
economic development, a more thorough examination of its impact is important. We 
therefore group the countries into income levels, using the low-income countries as the 
baseline and replacing 234",
56  in our regressions with the following income-level 
dummies  
• `a",$ = 1 if country i in year t is a middle-income country;  `a",$ = 0 otherwise  
• ba",$ = 1 if country i in year t is a high-income country;  ba",$ = 0 otherwise 
where the per capita income thresholds, recommended by World Bank (2014a), are as 
follows: low-income with per capita GDP ≤ $875; middle-income with per capita GDP 
within $875- $10725 range; and high-income with per capita GDP > $10725.  
 Table 3.5 reports the estimated coefficients of the regressions with income level 
dummies where baseline is low income democracy. As the 1st column – which is 
associated with the model in (3.2) – shows, moving to higher income levels and/or to 
non-democratic regimes makes no difference in the probability of onset. The estimates 
in the second column – associated with the model in (3.3) – do not provide any 
statistically significant explanation. Finally, the estimates in the third column – 
corresponding to the model in (3.4) – show that the interaction term *+"1 × ba"  has 
highly significant and positive effect: high income countries with unstable regimes – i.e. 
those with interregnum regimes and/or regimes in transition.    
 Our results so far do not fully agree with those reported in Collier and Rohner (2008) 
who find that democracies (autocracies) become safer (less safe) as income rises. On the 
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contrary, our findings suggest autocracies becoming safer at a higher per capita income 
level(see Figure 3.5), and we find no evidence in support of the claim that democracies 




Table 3.5.   Logit estimates of coefficients of regression equations (3.2)-(3.4) 
with per capita income level dummies instead of cdefg 
Dependent: conflict onset    
  (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 
Regressors    
middle-income:          `a",$:- -0.593 -0.635 -0.583 
high-income:            ba",$:- -0.288 -0.261 -0.019 
non-democracy:          *+",$:--  -0.195 -- -- 
*+",$:-
- × `a",$:- 0.498 -- -- 
*+",$:-
- × ba",$:- -0.767 -- -- 
autocracy:               *+",$:-.  -- -0.365 -0.362 
*+",$:-
. × `a",$:- -- 0.247 0.208 
*+",$:-
. × ba",$:- -- -1.561 -1.783 
anocracy, interregnum, 
transition:             *+",$:-/  -- -0.051 -- 
*+",$:-
/ × `a",$:- -- 0.556 -- 
*+",$:-
/ × ba",$:- -- 0.628 -- 
anocracy:                *+",$:-0  -- -- 0.0896 
*+",$:-
0 × `a",$:- -- -- 0.310 
*+",$:-
0 × ba",$:- -- -- 0 
interregnum, transition: 
                        *+",$:-1  
-- -- -0.766 
*+",$:-
1 × `a",$:- -- -- 1.399 
*+",$:-
1 × ba",$:- -- -- 4.973*** 
R2 0.2720 0.2759 0.2800 
L -605.51 -602.25 -597.69 
AIC 1343 1342 1335 
BIC 1765 1784 1783 














    Figure 3.5. AMEs of	cdefg for different regime types  
with 90% CIs based on estimates of equation (3.3) 
 
3.4.4. Incidence versus onset  
As a final check on the role of income level and regime type in determining the 
probability of internal armed conflicts, we re-estimate the regressions in (3.2)-(3.4) 
replacing the ‘onset’ sample with the ‘incidence’ sample. Thus, while all the explanatory 
variables are kept as before, the dependent variable in this exercise is now defined such 
that  !",$ = 1 if there is an incidence of an internal armed conflict in country % in year & 
and !",$ = 0 otherwise. Therefore, this dummy picks up both the onset of a conflict and, 
to some extent, its duration (which were set to missing in the onset sample). As pointed 
out by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the onset and incidence are radically different 
processes and the robustness of the regressions based on the latter sample is likely to 
suffer from endogeneity problem due to intrinsic reverse causality since some of 
determinants of a conflict are highly likely to be influenced by its persistence. We 
therefore consider these estimates for completeness only bearing in mind that they are 
likely to be biased.29 Tables A3.4 and A3.5 in the Appendix report the values of the 
relevant coefficients obtained by estimating regression equations (3.2)-(3.4) using the 
incidence sample. Income effects are now statistically significant in all cases and suggest 
that, ceteris paribus, the higher is income the greater is the probability of conflict 
incidence. We regard the positive effect of income as an anomaly within a context in 
which income acts as a proxy for economic development, and can therefore interpret it 
                                                             
29 An additional problem arises from using the same control explanatory variables which we had identified 
as appropriate based on the onset sample.  However, this is a less important issue and the variables we 




    
 
as being due, most likely, to the above-mentioned simultaneity bias problem. However, 
we acknowledge in passing that similar evidence has been interpreted in the literature as 
picking up a specific channel:  recruiting and organising insurgency is costly and is easier 
to undertake in wealthier countries. 
 In sum, the evidence reported in this section lends some, rather mild, support to the 
claim that per capita income and the regime type contribute to predicting the probability 
of onset of internal armed conflict, and their explanatory roles are contingent on each 
other. However, given the weak, and somewhat disappointing, nature of this evidence on 
the one hand and the importance of the underlying question on the other, further empirical 
investigation into the nature of the relationship, within the context of determining role of 
economic development and political development/stability, is carried out in the next 
section.   
 
3.5.  Reconsidering the explanatory role of economic and political factors  
In light of the evidence presented and discussed above, in this section we continue our 
empirical investigation by focusing on the explanatory role of per capita income when it 
is paired with measures of political stability instead of political regime which could be 
considered as an alternative proxy for political development. In fact, one might argue 
that based on the above evidence political stability could indeed provide a more suitable 
proxy: amongst the regime types considered above, anocracies, interregnum, and 
transition regimes are known to be relatively more unstable compared to those regimes 
which are represented by the extrema of the polity spectrum and are known to oscillate 
between autocracy and democracy; they are not sufficiently democratic to successfully 
remove motivations for rebellion, and at the same time, cannot become sufficiently 
repressive to hinder the organisation of rebel groups (Muller and Weede, 1990). They are 
therefore more likely to be exposed to conflicts. This then begs the question of clearly 
distinguishing between the empirical relevance of political regime type and political 
stability in determining the onset of conflicts.30  Therefore, building on the existing 
literature (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoefler, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 
2006) and the results obtained thus far, we now turn to estimating regression equations 
which focus on the explanatory role of 234"
56  and the measure of political or regime 
                                                             
30 For example: (i) democratic regimes are not necessarily more efficient in maintaining domestic peace;  
and (ii) the breakdown of any political regime is often accompanied by violence (Hegre and Nome, 2010). 
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instability defined as a decay function of the number of years since the last indication of 
major regime instability. A country % is said to have had major regime instability in year 
& if it has experienced at least a three point change in its Polity score in that year. As in 
Chapter 2, we use *a",$, = 2:hij,k ,.1⁄   where *3  is number of years since the last 
indication of major regime instability.  However, since *a",$,  is a continuous measure of 
regime instability it does not allow us to separately assess the relevance of extent of 
instability. Therefore, we also consider replacing it with the following measures of 
regime stability: 
(i) Regime Instability, denoted by *a",$-  and defined as a dummy variable:  *a-",$ = 1 if 
country % has experienced any change in its Polity score in one of the years 	& − 1, 
& − 2 or & − 3; *a-",$ = 0 otherwise. 
(ii) Minor Regime Instability, denoted by *a",$.  and defined as a dummy variable:  
*a.",$ = 1 if country % has experienced a less than three units change in its Polity 
score in one of the years 	& − 1, & − 2 or & − 3;  *a.",$ = 0 otherwise.  
(iii) Major Regime Instability, denoted by *a/",$  and defined as a dummy variable:  
*a/",$ = 1 if country % has experienced a three units or larger change of Polity score, 
in one of the years 	& − 1, & − 2 or & − 3; *a/",$ = 0 otherwise.  
 Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the summary statistics for *an, o = 0,1,2,3, which show 
that major instabilities are relatively more prevalent and, while they occur in all regime 
types, they are more frequent in anocracies; although there are more occurrences of 
minor instability in autocracies and democracies, anocracies still have the highest 
instability ratio. Additionally, the 67.03% rate of occurrence in interregnum and 
transition regimes place them on the top of the most likely regimes to experience major 
unstable events, right above anocracies with a 23.39% rate. Figure 3.6 depicts the annual 
average per capita GDP and the total number of annually observed conflict onsets and 
major regime instabilities over the sample period.  On the whole, the patterns of the latter 
two series show a remarkable similarity, which is enhanced during the ears associated 
with the collapse of the USSR. Per capita GDP does not appear to have any co-movement 




    
 
 Table 3.6. Frequency of Regime Instability 
 Sample Size Frequency S.D. 
pqr,s
t  (Regime Instability: continuous) 6330 10.77 0.29 
pqr,s
u  (Regime Instability) 6297 21.22 0.41 
pqr,s
v  (Minor Regime Instability) 6297 7.79 0.27 
pqr,s
w  (Major Regime Instability) 6297 13.42 0.34 
The frequency is simply the sample mean of *a",$n 	(scaled 
by 100) and S.D. is the standard error. 
 
Figure 3.6. Pattern of conflicts, per capita GDP  










    
 
 
Table 3.7. Instability in different regime types 
 Political Instability 
 Unstable 
 
Stable Instability rate 
Autocracy 388 1878 17.1 
Anocracy 419 872 32.4 
Democracy 401 2156 15.7 
Interregnum  
& Transition 
128 54 70.1 
Total 1336 4960  
In each case, ‘Stable’ periods are those during which the specific type of instability is not observed, hence *a",$- = 0; 




Based on the above explanations, we now examine the explanatory role of 
political instability, captured *an, o = 0,1,2,3,   and test whether their effect is 
contingent on the extent of economic development captured by 23456 as before. To this 
end, we use a modified version of the regression equations (3.2) above, namely  
 
  !",$ = 7n + 9n234",$:-
56 + ;Wn + Xn234",$:-
56 >*a",$
n 		 
 +	Bn,C + 	Dn,$ + E",$:-F Gn + Ä",$n , o = 0,1,2,3,																																													(3.5)  
 
where we have replaced the regime type dummy with regime instability measures, *an.31  
Table 3.8 reports the estimated values of the relevant parameters for the four cases.  
 
 
Table 3.8.  Logit estimates based on equation (3.5)  
Dependent: conflict onset       k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 
Regressors     
per capita GDP:    234",$:-
56  -0.296** -0.246** -0.196** -0.274** 
instability:                   *an",$  -2.384* -0.714 1.504 -1.894* 
*an",$ × 234",$:-
56  0.530*** 0.153 -0.222 0.349** 
R2 0.2773 0.2605 0.2584 0.2632 
L -601.09 -615.05 -616.78 -612.81 
AIC 1330 1358 1361 1353 
BIC 1740 1767 1771 1763 
The sample size in all regressions is 4463. See notes to Table 3.3 for other details.   
                                                             
31 We have maintained the Polity score *+, to complement the latter (as a measure of regime authority). 
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 As can be seen from the column labelled o = 0  which reports the estimates 
associated with *a,, the estimate of 9, is statistically significant at 5% critical value and 
is negative as expected: the higher is per capita GDP, the higher is the level of economic 
development and hence the lower is the probability of onset. As for the effect of regime 
instability, although estimates of both W, and X, are statistically significant at 10% and 
1% significance level respectively, their signs are not very informative. 
 To provide a clearer picture, we plot the impact of  W, + X,234",$:-
56   on the 
probability of onset for different levels of 23456 . Figures 3.7 illustrates the effect for 
the three income levels suggested by the World Bank (see above) and shows that the 
probability of onset is initially higher in lower income levels but this is reversed as the 
extent of regime instability exceeds a certain threshold. Figure 3.8 plots the average 
marginal effects, measured by evaluating the average sample values of W, + X,234",$:-
56  
evaluated at the different income levels, and shows how the contribution of regime 
instability rises with 23456 .  Thus whilst, ceteris paribus, a higher per capita GDP 
reduces the probability of onset, its overall effect is contingent on the extent of regime 
instability: a richer country with a more unstable regime is likely to be more conflict 
prone. This claim however requires some quantification the extent of regime instability. 
As explained above, we have done this by estimating equation (3.5) replacing *a, with 
*an, o = 1,2,3 which allow a distinction between major and minor instability. The 
estimates are reported in the respective columns of Table 3.8 and show that significant 
parameter estimates are only obtained in column labelled o = 3 corresponding to major 
regime instability. Figures 3.9 and 3.10, which illustrate the contribution of major 
instability when its interacted with per capita GDP, shows a similar pattern. 
 In sum, regime stability measures seems to provide a better channel through which 
we can capture the role of political development in conjunction with economic 









Figure 3.7. Predictive Margins of pqt  





Figure 3.8. AMEs of pqt with 90% CI  





    
 
Figure 3.9. Predictive Margins of pqw  
based on estimates of equation (3.5) 
 
Figure 3.10. AMEs of pqw with 90% CI  
based on estimates of equation (3.5) 
 
3.6. Robustness checks 
Before concluding this chapter we check the robustness of our results. There are mainly 
three points which might be of some concern: (a) estimation method; (b) data 
consistency; and (c) the influence of observations corresponding to high leverage cases.  
 With respect to the estimation method, we have used the logit procedure since it does 
not require assuming a specific distribution function to represent the conditional 
probability and is predominantly used in similar studies. Nevertheless, we re-estimated 
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the main regressions using probit (results are not reported) and found the results to be 
very close to those obtained with logit the latter yielding a higher value of the Pseudo R2 
and log-likelihood, as well as being better supported by Akaike and Schwarz Information 
Criteria.  
 In order to check the consistency of our dataset, we estimated the exact specification 
used in Collier and Rohner (2008), namely  
 












where the control regressors in vector E"∗ are: population; ethnic fractionalisation index; 
rough terrain; oil exporter dummy; religious fractionalisation; non-contiguous states 
dummy; new states dummy; and major instability dummy. Table 3.9 presents the results 
comparing which show that the careful choice of control variables matter: although the 
estimated coefficients retain their signs, they become insignificant when control 
variables are chosen more carefully.  
 
Table 3.9. Comparing estimates of equations (3.2) and (3.2*) 
Dependent: conflict onset   
Equation: (3.2) (3.2*) 
non-democracy:                  *+- -1.101 -2.01* 
per capita GDP:           23456 -0.237 -0.581*** 
23456 × *+- 0.152 0.321** 
R2 0.2715 0.1759 
L -605.65 -685.15 
AIC 1339 1394 
BIC 1749 1471 
The sample size is the maximum possible common 
observations (4456). 
 
 Finally, detecting the observations with high leverages and/or large residuals and re-
estimating the models – using (i) the approach recommended in Pregibon (1981) to 
eliminate observations with high leverage from the sample, and (ii) the method advocated 
by Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) and Hosmer et al. (2013) to omit observations with 
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large residuals (based on Pearson and Deviance Residuals) – did not lead to any 
significant change which could influence our conclusions. 
3.7. Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter we have investigated the role of economic and political development in 
curtailing the onset of armed conflicts. We have argued that an a priori belief, which 
emerges from the literature and can be formulated as a testable hypothesis, is that 
economic development per se reduces the probability of conflicts but its impact is 
contingent on the extent of political development and the latter might in fact reverse the 
overall impact of former. That is, depending on the state of its political institution, a 
relatively wealthier country could experience a higher rate of conflict relative to a poorer 
one.   
 Using a cross-section time-series dataset covering 139 countries and spanning the 
period 1961-2011, we have estimated a number of differently specified empirical 
relationships which, after accounting for the most relevant conditioning explanatory 
variables, explain the contribution of economic and political development respectively 
proxied by per capita GDP and regime type or regime instability to probability of conflict 
onset.   Our results suggest that using a measure of regime type, as suggested in the 
literature, does not support the above hypothesis as none of the crucial coefficients turn 
out to be statistically significant. Instead, estimates based on the specification which 
makes the impact of per capita GDP contingent on the extent regime instability support 
the above-mentioned hypothesis. In particular, we find that per capita GDP per se does 
significantly reduce the probability of conflict but its overall effect contributes positively 
to the onset of conflicts in more unstable regimes.   
 Our findings do not fully agree with the claims in Collier and Rohner (2008) on the 
peace promoting (demoting) role of per capita GDP in democracies (autocracies). Our 
evidence suggests that richer autocracies are less likely to experience an onset of conflict 
(see Figure 3.5). We also found some indications that such regimes are less likely to 
experience an incidence of conflict, in terms of frequency and duration, compared to their 
democratic counterparts. This is consistent with the evidence, pointed out in the existing 
literature, that rich autocracies tend to (i) invest heavily on armed forces in order to 
strengthen their ‘repressive power’ (Figures A3.1 and A3.2), and (ii) discourage rebellion 
by offering financial incentives, literally following a ‘carrot and stick approach’. 
Ironically, as Figures A3.3-A3.4 show, rich autocracies do not perform badly, compared 
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to democracies, with respect to Human Development Index (HDI) and GINI Index, and 
substantially outperform anocracies with respect to income equality. 
 One of the key findings of this study is that major political instability, whether 
caused by a positive or negative institutional change, could adversely affect peace. This 
finding favours gradual and steady reforms to sudden changes (e.g. short term drastic 
reforms of the type that are at times imposed by international institutions). This is because 
while major changes in political institutions could result in raising the probability of 
conflict, there is no strong evidence that minor changes have any significant impact. Our 
results also suggest an interesting complementary evidence: the destabilising role of 
sudden political change is likely to be higher the higher is the country’s income-level.  
   Given the crucial importance of sustained peace for prosperity, the line of research 
followed in this chapter suggests a worthwhile future research project which focuses on 
understanding the links between climate change, political and economic stability and 










Table A3.1. Democracies which experienced armed conflicts 
Polity score Country Year Total conflicts Polity score Country Year Total conflicts 
        
10 Israel 2006 3 8 Niger 1995 5 
10 Israel 2000 3 8 Niger 1994 5 
10 United Kingdom 1998 2 8 India 1994 20 
10 Spain 1991 3 8 Philippines 1993 5 
10 Spain 1985 3 8 India 1993 20 
10 United Kingdom 1971 2 8 Venezuela 1992 3 
10 Malaysia 1963 3 8 India 1992 20 
9 India 2009 20 8 Pakistan 1990 7 
9 India 2008 20 8 India 1990 20 
9 Peru 2007 3 8 India 1989 20 
9 India 2006 20 8 Panama 1989 1 
9 India 2005 20 8 India 1983 20 
9 Thailand 2003 2 8 India 1982 20 
9 India 2003 20 8 India 1979 20 
9 India 2000 20 8 Pakistan 1974 7 
9 India 1997 20 8 Sri Lanka 1971 5 
9 India 1996 20 7 Senegal 2011 7 
9 India 1995 20 7 Mali 2007 3 
9 Turkey 1991 3 7 Turkey 2005 3 
9 Israel 1990 3 7 Georgia 2004 3 
9 Trinidad and Tobago 1990 1 7 Mali 1994 3 
9 Venezuela 1982 3 7 Turkey 1984 3 
9 Spain 1978 3 7 Peru 1982 3 
9 India 1969 20 7 Colombia 1964 1 
9 India 1966 20 6 Pakistan 2011 7 
9 India 1961 20 6 Burundi 2008 4 
8 Senegal 2003 7 6 Niger 2007 5 
8 Senegal 2000 7 6 Indonesia 1999 10 
8 Philippines 1999 5 6 Argentina 1974 2 










Table A3.2. Countries with per capita GDP exceeding 10725 US$ which experienced 
armed conflicts  
Income category Country Year Total conflicts 
High income Israel 1990 3 
High income Israel 2006 3 
High income Israel 2000 3 
High income Spain 1985 3 
High income United Kingdom 1971 2 
High income United Kingdom 1998 2 
High income Saudi Arabia 1979 1 
High income France 1961 1 
High income Spain 1978 3 
High income Spain 1991 3 
Upper middle income Argentina 1974 2 
Upper middle income Libya 2011 1 
Upper middle income Turkey 1984 3 
Upper middle income Argentina 1963 2 
Upper middle income Russia 1994 5 
Upper middle income Turkey 2005 3 
Upper middle income Venezuela 1962 3 
Upper middle income Turkey 1991 3 
Upper middle income Trinidad and Tobago 1990 1 
Upper middle income Venezuela 1982 3 
Upper middle income Russia 2007 5 
Upper middle income Russia 1993 5 
Upper middle income Mexico 1996 2 
Upper middle income Mexico 1994 2 
Upper middle income Romania 1989 1 
Upper middle income Russia 1990 5 
Upper middle income South Africa 1985 3 
Upper middle income South Africa 1966 3 
Upper middle income South Africa 1981 3 





    
 
 
Table A3.3.  Autocratic countries in the sample with per 
capita GDP exceeding 10725 US$ 
Polity Score Country Time period 
[-10, -8] Oman 1986-2011 
-8 United Arab Emirates 1976-2011 
[-10, -7] Bahrain 1981-2011 
-7 Kuwait 1996-2011 
-10 Saudi Arabia 1972-2011 
-9 Gabon 1977 
-7 Spain 1970-1974 
 
 
Figure A3.1. Military expenditure share (with respect to GDP) 






    
 
Figure A3.2. Number of military personnel per 1000 people 
by regime type by income level 
 
Figure A3.3. Gini index by regime and income level 
 
§ The Gini index is a measurement of the income distribution of a country's residents. This 
number, which ranges between 0 and 1 and is based on residents' net income, helps define 
the gap between the rich and the poor, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing 
perfect inequality.  
§ WIID provides the most comprehensive set of income inequality statistics, which is an 
updated and improved set of all available GINI data from various sources (UNU-WIDER, 
2017). However, data availability is still incomplete for autocracies, especially the wealthy 
ones. For instance, GINI data in entirely unavailable for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, etc. 
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Figure A3.4. HDI index by regime type and income level 
 
§ The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have 
a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalised indices for each 
of the three dimensions. The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the 
education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and 
more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of 
living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the 
logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. 
The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index 






    
 
 
Table A3.4.   Logit estimates of coefficients of regression equations (3.2)-(3.4) 
with probability of incidence of internal armed conflict as 
dependent variable 
Dependent: conflict incidence   (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 
Regressors    
per capita GDP:       234",$:-
56  0.351** .283* 0.294* 
polity score:             *+",$:-,  -- -- -- 
*+",$:-
, × 234",$:-
56  -- -- -- 
non-democracy:       *+",$:--  2.511* -- -- 
*+",$:-
- × 234",$:-
56  -0.369* -- -- 
autocracy:                *+",$:-.  -- 3.761** 3.806** 
*+",$:-
. × 234",$:-
56  -- -0.642** -0.654*** 
anocracy, interregnum, 
transition:              *+",$:-/  -- 1.961 -- 
*+",$:-
/ × 234",$:-
56  -- -0.247 -- 
anocracy:                *+",$:-0  -- -- 2.839** 
*+",$:-
0 × 234",$:-
56  -- -- -0.372* 
interregnum, transition:  
*+",$:-
1  -- -- -1.209 
*+",$:-
1 × 234",$:-
56  -- -- 0.155 
R2 0.5576 0.5642 0.5662 
L -1054.19 -1038.44 -1033.69 
AIC 2242 2214 2209 
BIC 2684 2669 2677 













Table A3.5.  Logit estimates of coefficients of regression equations (3.2)-(3.4) 
with probability of incidence of internal armed conflict as 
dependent variable and per capita income level dummies 
instead of cdefg 
Dependent: conflict incidence   (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 
Regressors    
middle-income:         `a",$:- 0.967** 0.913** 0.975** 
high-income:             ba",$:- 1.816*** 1.866*** 1.961*** 
polity score:             *+",$:-,  -- -- -- 
*+",$:-
, × `a",$:- -- -- -- 
*+",$:-
, × ba",$:- -- -- -- 
non-democracy:          *+",$:--  0.458* -- -- 
*+",$:-
- × `a",$:- -0.917* -- -- 
*+",$:-
- × ba",$:- -2.511** -- -- 
autocracy:               *+",$:-.  -- 0.139 0.121 
*+",$:-
. × `a",$:- -- -1.325*** -1.357*** 
*+",$:-
. × ba",$:- -- -4.104*** -4.149*** 
anocracy, interregnum, 
transition:             *+",$:-/  -- 0.733
** -- 
*+",$:-
/ × `a",$:- -- -0.89* -- 
*+",$:-
/ × ba",$:- -- -0.650 -- 
anocracy:                 *+",$:-0  -- -- 0.887*** 
*+",$:-
0 × `a",$:- -- -- -1.128** 
*+",$:-
0 × ba",$:- -- -- -1.645*** 
interregnum, transition: 
                        *+",$:-1  -- -- -0.312 
*+",$:-
1 × `a",$:- -- -- -0.006 
*+",$:-
1 × ba",$:- -- -- 3.823*** 
R2 0.5591 0.5657 0.5692 
L -1050.41 -1034.68 -1026.56 
AIC 2238 2213 2201 
BIC 2693 2688 2689 

























In the latest Global Risk Reports by World Economic Forum (2015, 2016) armed 
conflicts and migration are considered as the most likely, and most substantial, risk 
factors of 2015 and 2016. That these factors are in turn influenced by climatic conditions 
is also a well-documented consensus. It is therefore crucial to quantify the magnitude 
and significance of this influence. In Chapter 1 we examined the contribution climatic 
conditions to armed conflicts using a global dataset. In this chapter we investigate the 
way they affect migration.  
 Migration is a rather complex dynamic process and its complexity undermines the 
accuracy of corresponding data. To overcome this problem, we focus our analysis on a 
specific type of migration. In particular, since there is some evidence that – due to the 
cost of relocation and benefits of community networks in familiar and nearby locations 
– most of the displacements caused by climate change primarily take place within 
national borders (Beyani, 2014), we carry out our investigation on internal migration 
within a country that has experienced, and is subject to, significant variations in its 
climate. Iran provides a good case.   
 Mass migrations have been a longstanding feature of humanity. The cause of this 
movement is attributed to civil conflict, war, religious intolerance, and economic 
opportunities (UNEP, 2012). Issues relating to climate induced migration are not new 
and have already been discussed on a smaller scale since the early 90s, for instance 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) first assessment report (IPCC, 
1990) identified human migration as the greatest single impact of climate change. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM, 1992) raised concerns regarding the 
dramatic increase in mass displacements and suggested a substantial rise in their numbers 
when larger areas of the earth become uninhabitable due to climate change. 
The number of natural disasters has more than doubled over the last two decades. 
According to reports by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in 2008 
more than 20 million people were displaced by sudden-onset of climate-related natural 
disasters and extreme weather events, compared to 4.6 million internally displaced over 
the same period by conflict and violence which could have been provoked by climate 
change (OCHA-IDMC, 2009). Projections suggest 25 million to 1 billion displacements 
by 2050, with 200 million being the most widely cited estimate (IOM, 2009). The IOM 





reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their 
lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, 
either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad” 
(UNEP, 2012). 
 It is now well-established that climate change can bring about both sudden 
destructive natural phenomena – such as floods and storms – and gradually eroding 
natural phenomena – such as drought and desertification. These are known to cause large 
scale crop failures, famine, displacements and over-urbanisation (resulting from 
excessive rural-to-urban movement); in a 2010 IOM and Gallup World Poll (Esipova et 
al., 2011), almost 12% of respondents believed severe environmental problems would 
require them to move within the next five years. 
 Despite the fact that the impact of climate change will eventually be spread globally, 
certain regions and/or countries are likely to be more severely affected initially, i.e. less 
developed and relatively poorer countries with weak infrastructure and inability to 
respond quickly (IPCC, 1997), or countries with low geographical altitude. Given its high 
level of water scarcity and the fact that a significant source of its inhabitants’ 
income/livelihood is directly and inflexibly reliant on water dependent agriculture, the 
MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region is considered to be highly vulnerable to 
climate change in the coming decades (Joseph and Wodon, 2013). It is widely 
acknowledged that climate change and induced droughts had a significant role in the 
Syrian civil war (Brown and Crawford, 2009; Kelley et al., 2015).32 In 2007, eastern 
Syria – along with Turkey, northern Iraq and western Iran – entered a three-year 
drought, the region’s worst since data recording started (Kelley et al., 2015). This, along 
with weak governance, led Syria to experiencing water scarcity, crop failure and 
livestock death, which drove an estimated 1.5 million rural population to cities in search 
of better living conditions. The resulting excess demand for food-stuff raised food prices 
and enhanced the existing economic and social tensions that subsequently led to the civil 
war.  
 It has been predicted that the average global temperature will rise between 1.1oC and 
6.4oC by the end of this century (IPCC, 2007) 33  which would lead to changes in 
precipitation patterns – i.e. an increase in rainfall in wet climates, and a decrease in dry 
                                                             
32 Kelley et al. (2015) also predict an increasingly drier and hotter future for climate in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 





climates (World Bank, 2014b). For instance, in the terms of the consequences for Iran on 
which we shall be focussing, the World Resources Institute suggests that a 3oC increase 
in temperature would reduce Iran’s crop yields by 30%.  Gohari et al. (2013) measured 
the impact of climate change on four major crops (wheat, barley, rice, and corn) in Iran 
and predicted a decrease of 2.9% to 16.6% (in average and measured separately for 
different scenarios) in their production over the period 2015 to 2044. It is perceivable 
that a persistent decrease in crop yields in specific regions depletes farmers’ incomes, 
raises regional food insecurity and is likely to eventually cause internal emigration. In 
fact, due to its geographic and environmental conditions, Iran is particularly predisposed 
to the consequences of climate change: in terms of land, more than 80% of the country 
is arid or semi-arid, with around 20% desert coverage and roughly 9% forest area 
(UNDP, 2010). Moreover, the shares of arable and agricultural lands – in respect to total 
land area – have respectively declined from 10.1% and 39.2% in 1996, to 9.3% and 
28.5% in 2011. More specifically, in comparison with global averages, the country is 
severely lacking in rainfall: the annual averages for precipitation and temperature in Iran 
are 326mm and 17oC respectively34, with these values being 1121mm and 19oC globally35 
(World Bank, 2014a).  
 Projections suggest a considerable rise of 1.4oC, 1.8oC, and 2.3oC in temperature and 
fall of 8%, 28%, and 15% in precipitation by 2020, 2035, and 2050 respectively – 
compared to observed values of 1961-1990 (UNDP, 2015). Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
annual average, minimum, and maximum temperatures as well as the annual precipitation 
by province. There is a slight but significant correlation (-0.16 statistically significant at 
1% level) between annual temperature and precipitation across Iranian provinces. This 
means that the effect of climate change may potentially be amplified in regions with low 
rainfall and hot weather as a result of a change in either.  
 Iran is an interesting case study in the MENA region because the country is already 
experiencing a number of serious environmental problems. There have been multiple 
episodes of sand storms in the western parts of the country and some of the major rivers 
and lakes have either dried up or are receding (see Appendix 1 for examples).  
 Such phenomena are likely to have economic consequences and already there have 
been reports of, albeit infrequent,  incidences of minor but fatal disputes over water in 
the affected  regions.  Based on  the  projections  by  the  United  Nations  Development  
                                                             
34 This is based on data from Iran’s National Climate Change Office, for the period 1996-2011. 






Figure 4.1. Annual temperature and precipitation by provinces (sorted by annual temperature) 
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Programme (UNDP) and Iran’s National Climate Change Office (NCCO), areas with a 
higher share of rural population will receive the biggest drop in precipitation (Figures 4.2 
and 4.3). These environmental issues have already alarmed the government whose 
officials have gone as far as predicting outbreaks of ‘water-wars’ in the near future 
followed by large scale migration (Ilna, 2015).  
 
Figure 4.2.  Rural population distribution (SCI, 2015) 
 
Figure 4.3. Changes of precipitation in 2035 compared to 1961-1999 (UNDP, 2015) 
 
share of rural population of province  





 While the environmental concerns might be the major reasons underlying the current 
and future migration patterns, migration per se is not a new phenomenon in Iran. A major 
episode in the recent history of internal migration in Iran occurred when the country went 
through fundamental changes following the discovery of major oil fields in the first 
decade of 20th century. The resulting economic growth transformed the main cities into 
major centres of economic activity and led to the first major waves of rural-to-urban 
migration. The Land Reform Act of the 1960s and the oil boom of the early 1970s further 
boosted this pattern (Taleb and Anbari, 2005). Finally, the 1979 revolution and the Iran-
Iraq war in 1980-1988 substantially contributed to the rural-to-urban trends of migration 
(Mahmoudian and Ghassemi-Ardahaee, 2014). Consequently, of the total population of 
about 75 million people in 2011 (SCI, 2011), 71% is settled in urban areas and this 
number is expected to reach 80% by 2050 (Mahmoudian and Ghassemi-Ardahaee, 2014). 
Demographic data suggest that: (i) over the last three decades on average one million 
people per annum have moved within the borders of the country; and (ii) in the 1996-
2011 period there has been a 5% decrease in the rural population and a substantial rise 
of 44% in the urban population (which clearly cannot be explained solely by net birth 
rates).  
 The severe environmental impacts of climate change and the dynamic pattern of 
migration makes Iran an interesting case study for understanding the nature of link 
between these phenomena. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 
reviews the literature. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 outlines our empirical 
methodology. Section 4.5 presents and discusses the evidence and Section 4.6 checks its 
robustness. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. A brief review of the literature  
As early as 1990, the IPCC warned that the greatest single impact of climate change 
could be on human migration – with millions of people displaced by shoreline erosions, 
coastal floodings and severe droughts. In 1992, the IOM, together with the Refugee 
Policy Group, published a report on ‘Migration and Environment’ that stated: “Large 
numbers of people are moving as a result of environmental degradation that has 
increased dramatically in recent years. The number of such migrants could rise 
substantially as larger areas of the earth become uninhabitable as a result of climate 





 In general, the analysis are built on the idea that mass displacements are caused by 
climate-caused resource scarcity.36  There are a number of studies which quantify the 
effect of climatic factors on food production. For instance: You et al. (2009)  find that a 
1oC increase in temperature can reduce wheat production by about 3% to 10% if it occurs 
during the period in which the crop is growing; Ozdogan (2011) explain that an increase 
of 1o to 4oC can negatively affect winter wheat production by 5% to 35%.  
 Suhrke and Hazarika (1993) claim that studies on environment and migration can be 
classified into two types: one is ascribed to ‘minimalists’ and concludes that environment 
is only a contextual factor in migration decisions; the other is associated with 
‘maximalists’ and claims that environment directly forces people to relocate.  More 
specifically, they suggests that “… [minimalists] focus on the impact of a particular 
process…” (p. 5) and are of the view that “…we lack sufficient knowledge about the 
process to draw firm conclusions…” (p. 4) whilst maximalists focus on extracting 
environmental variables from a cluster of causes and find that “…environmental 
degradation has already displaced millions of people, and more displacement is on the 
way…” (p. 4). Our contribution in this chapter builds on the maximalists’ approach in 
that it seeks to quantify the impact of environmental factors on migration within Iran. 
 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992) 
identified four fragile eco-systems: ‘desertification’, ‘deforestation’, ‘low-lying coastal 
land’ and ‘vanishing islands’. Suhrke and Hazarika (1993) too come to the similar 
conclusion that the most common forms of environmental degradation – which they 
argue to cause population displacement – are: desertification, land degradation, rising sea 
levels induced by global warming, and deforestation. In terms of impact, it appears that 
desertification is a greater threat: e.g., an IOM study (Gemenne et al., 2012) finds that in 
the past 30 years twice as many people have been affected by droughts as by storms – 
1.6 billion compared to approximately 718 million. Studies on Africa, as a potentially 
vulnerable region, suggest that millions of people have already been displaced because 
of desertification (Hjort af Ornas and Salih, 1989; Bennett, 1991). As explained in the 
                                                             
36 This argument is similar to that implied by the neo-Malthusian theory. Malthus (1798) proposed that 
population naturally increases in geometric ratio but the means of subsistence (i.e. agricultural production 
or food) increases only in an arithmetic ratio. This makes it impossible for agricultural production to sustain 
growing populations indefinitely. He continues by arguing that if we do not take control of the population 
growth voluntarily (called as a negative check), diseases, famines and wars (positive check) reduce 
population size and establish the necessary balance with resources. The neo-Malthusian theory accepts the 
opposing tendencies of (i) unlimited demographic expansions and (ii) limited food production, but adds to 
that factors such as technological expansion, exhaustion of mineral resources and other non-renewable 





previous section, since Iran too is a country with vast arid zones and a high tendency to 
desertification, it falls into the vulnerable regions based on the above categorisation.37  
 There are already a number of case studies which consider the link between climate 
and migration. Andersen et al. (2010) investigate the situation in Bolivia and find that on 
average about 2000 people annually leave their place of origin to escape bad climate.  
Joseph and Wodon (2013) focus on the Yemen and conclude that climate feature as one 
of the important push factors but not a significant pull factor in migration decisions. 
Joseph et al. (2014) too examine migration in Yemen and find that higher temperature 
and its variability have significant, but small, effect on net-migration in the country. 
Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris (2012) predict that climate is likely to lead to around 3 to 
10 million internal migrations over the next 40 years in Bangladesh. Backhaus et al. 
(2015) study international migrations from the developing countries regions to OECD 
countries and suggest that a 1oC increase in temperature is associated with 1.9% increase 
in annual bilateral migration flows.  
 Finally, it is important to note at the outset that climate change and migration are 
most likely to affect each other in the form a vicious circle. On the one hand, climate 
change leads to migration via its adverse effect on resources and production (Andersen 
et al., 2010; Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris, 2012; Joseph and Wodon, 2013; Backhaus 
et al. 2015). On the other hand, migration causes climate change through the excess 
demand for resources generated by the rising population (Kalnay and Cai, 2003; Zhou et 
al., 2004). However, the latter process is likely to be more of a long-term consequence. 
In this chapter, therefore, we shall only focus on the former channel.  
 
4.3. The data 
We use construct our dataset using the information on individual characteristics provided 
by the Iranian National Census data. Up until 2006, nationwide censuses used to take 
place every ten years and since 2006 their frequency has been reduced to every five years. 
We use the standard definition of a ‘migrant’ as an individual who has changed his or 
her place of residence during the census period. Thus, for instance, a migrant in the 2006 
census dataset is one who has changed his or her place of residence at some point in time 
between 1996 and 2006.  We concentrate our analysis on internal migration and only 
                                                             
37 However, only 0.85% of its area is of low-lying land and 1.27% of its population live in places where 





consider inter-provincial 38  movements within the country. We therefore disregard 
movements between locations within the same province as well as all international 
migrations. Our sample is constructed using the pooled cross-section data from the two 
censuses covering March 21 1996 to March 20 2006 and March 21 2006 to March 20 
2011.39 This dataset covers the migration matrix for 30 provinces and includes 1740 
(=30×29×2) observations, with 870 (=30×29) different province-pairs in a balanced 
structure. We exclude the earlier censuses because they lack data on most variables and 
a province reform was implemented during 1988-1996 period which affected the 
geographical boundaries.40  
 We use the gravity-based regression analysis, outlined in Section 4, to estimate the 
impact of climatic and other factor on migration. Thus, dependent variable is a measure 
of migration which varies over origin and destination as well as over time. Given the 
difference in the time intervals that the two censuses cover, we measure migration by the 
average annual number of inter-provincial migrants in each census recorded under 
immigration, instead of emigration; this choice was made simply because data on the 
emigration were found to be less accurate due to a higher number of un-stated 
responses.41 Figures 4.4 and 4.5 plot the average annual number, and the corresponding 
rate, of province-level emigration over the two census periods. It is clear that the number 
of internal emigrants slightly decreased in the more recent census period, and this drop 
is enhanced in terms of the proportion of people annually leaving their place of origin. 
The three main explanations put forward for this, are:  
(a)  The former census covers the years of adjustment that followed the Iran-Iraq war. 
Thus, a part of the relatively large movement in population could therefore be 
accounted for by relocation of those displaced during the war year.  
(b) The period also coincided with post-war reconstruction years as well as the 
industrial development policy years of 1993-2001. As a result, waves of migration 
                                                             
38 Inter-district migration would have been a better choice but the information at the district level is not 
available in the dataset. Appendix A2 discusses a number of issues encountered when compiling the data. 
39 The Iranian calendar starts on 21 March. 
40 Apart from Alborz that was created in 2010 and is treated as part of Tehran in our estimations; i.e. 
Movements to/from Alborz are added to Tehran’s for 2010 and 2011, also movements between Alborz and 
Tehran are considered as intra-province movements and therefore omitted. Other provinces created as the 
result of the mentioned reforms are Golestan (separated in 1996 from Mazandaran), Qazvin (separated 
from Tehran in 1996), and North, Razavi, and South Khorasans (all three were created in 2004 from the 
original Khorasan). See Appendix A2 for further details. 






towards the cities targeted by these policies, in response to the new opportunities, 
accounts for another part of the relatively large movement in population.  
Figure 4.4. Number of emigrants by province and census period 
 
Figure 4.5. Rate of emigration by province and census period
 





(c)  At the same time, the on-going infrastructure improvement policies were 
increasingly targeted towards the less developed regions helped reducing the 
stream of migrants from those parts. This explains the drop in inter-province 
migrations in the more recent years, which was further enhanced by the impact of 
the global financial and trade sanctions imposed on Iran which significantly 
diminished the level of economic activity and depressed migration in pursuit of 
better opportunities.  
 The explanatory variables used as determinants of migration are divided into three 
main groups and comprise:  
(I) Gravity factors:  distance42; area; population; GDP43; and growth. The first 
three are measures of size while the latter two respectively 
reflect the actual and potential economic size.  
(II) Climatic factors:  average annual temperature and precipitation, and their 
absolute and relative deviations from the climate44.  
(III) Non-climatic factors, which are divided into four sub-groups:  
(III.i)  Economic factors: income-based Gini coefficient, inflation, and 
unemployment rate;  
(III.ii)  Demographic factors:  share of educated population and share of 
population living in rural areas;  
(III.iii) Health factors:  rural health centres and healthcare professional45 
density (per 10,000 inhabitants);  
(III.iv)  Geographic factors: ratio of rangeland and desert areas in total area.  
 
 With the exception of the distance which is constant over time, all variables vary 
over both province and time and are therefore measured either as the midpoint value or 
as the average value over the census periods.46 More precisely, the midpoint value is used 
for variables such as population which exhibit a consistent trend over time whereas the 
                                                             
42 Distance is measured as the driving distance between capitals of provinces and is obtained from Google 
maps.   
43 Real GDP is measured by deflating the – publicly available – nominal values using ‘spliced’ price 
indices. Splicing is the process of combining two or more index numbers covering different base years into 
a single series. We used this method as the base year of price indices were dissimilar. 
44 Definition of ‘climate’ is given in footnote 11. See Table 4.1 for details.  
45 The figure consists of general practitioners, dentists, vets, pharmacists, and other health care specialists. 






average value is utilised for variables which fluctuate over time, e.g. temperature 
deviation. Tables 4.1 presents the list and definition of province-level the above variables 
which are used in our regression analysis in Section 5.47 Given that our investigation 
focuses on the impact of climatic variables, we note at the outset that a positive (negative) 
deviation in temperature (precipitation) over the period in question from their climate 
levels is noticeable. This trend is illustrated by means of histograms in Table 4.2 which 
show that in that there is a warming up and drying up trend in Iran over the 1996-2011 
period. 
   
Table 4.1.  List and definition of the variables used in the regression analysis  
Notation Definition 
<=> number of people leaving the origin i for destination j (the dependent variable) 
?=> driving distance, in km, between the origin i for destination j  
@A total area in square km 
BA total population 
CA real GDP in constant 2003 prices in domestic currency (millions of Iranian rials) 
DA growth rate of income  
EA average annual temperature (in Celsius) 
E?A absolute temperature deviations 
BFA total annual precipitation in mm 
BF?A absolute precipitation deviations 
DGHGA income-based Gini index 
GHIA inflation rate 
JFA share of the unemployed in working age population (as % of total working population) 
KFA share of educated population (as % of the over 5 year old population) 
FBLA share of rural population (as % of total population) 
FM?A number of rural health centres per 10000 rural population 
MB?A number of health professionals per 10000 population 
FFA share of the area covered with rangeland (as % of total area) 
F?A share of desert area (as % of total area) 
§ Unless otherwise stated, all variables are measured as annual averages over the census period; 
midpoint averages were used in cases where annual observations over the census period was 
unavailable.  
§ The raw data on climatic variables were obtained from the Iranian National Climate Change Office. 
§ NO  is the mean over the census period of the average the daily temperature of province’s capital city, 
i.e. (maximum daily temperature + minimum daily temperature)/2. NPO = NO − RNO where  RNO is the 
moving average of  NO	 of over the last 30 years. 
§ STO is the mean over the census period of the total precipitation for each province’s capital city for 
each year. STPO = STO − RSTO where RSTO is the moving average of STO	of over the last 30 years. 
 
                                                             





Table 4.2. Climatic factors’ deviations by provinces  
   
   
§ The above histograms demonstrate that there has been an overall increase in temperature and fall in 
precipitation across provinces during the sample period.  
§ NPUUUU = +0.66oC and SPUUUU =	-41mm are the average absolute changes in temperature and precipitation.  
§ %∆NUUUU =	+4.5% and %∆SUUUU =	-12% are the average relative changes in temperature and precipitation. 
 
 
4.4. Empirical methodology 
We use the gravity principle to determine the specification of our regression equations. 
Economists have used the gravity model (inspired by Newton’s Universal Gravitation 
Law) to explain the flow of goods, capital as well as to study migration.48   More 
specifically, we postulate the gravity equation  
 
  5XY = PXYZ[X[Y,  (4.1) 
 
where 5XY and PXY respectively denote the number of migrants and the distance between 
locations between #  and \ , and [O  is the relevant gravity variable for the respective 
location (] = #, \), and _ is the constant parameter – if P and [ are accurate measures 
one would expect _ = −2 as in the original gravity equation. As mentioned above, we 
approximate P by the driving distance between the capital cities of provinces. As for [, 
we assume it is a composite measure defined as a weighted basket of variables that reflect 
the importance and attractiveness of a location. As explained in the above section, the 
                                                             
48 Tinbergen (1962) is one of the first studies of trade flows between regions across the world proposing 
and using the gravity model. See Anderson (1979) for the original theoretical explanations and Lowry 
(1966), Greenwood (2005), Beine et al. (2015), and Backhaus et al. (2015) for applications of the gravity 





main such variables, which are most commonly used in this context, are growth, GDP, 
population and area respectively denoted by a, b, S and 1. Hence, we let 
 
  [O = expfgO + ij,OaOk bO
lm,nSO
lo,n1O
lp,n , ] = #, \, (4.2) 
 
where ij,O, iq,O, ir,O  and is,O  are the respective weights and gO  embodies all other 
omitted observable and unobservable factors. The basic specification consisting of (4.1) 
and (4.2) is therefore further augmented by replacing gO  with the relevant explanatory 
variables whose omission could bias the parameter estimates of the basic model above. 
Amongst these variables, which were outlined above and listed in Table 4.1, our focus 
will be on those which represent the role of climate. We denote the relevant climatic 
variables by vector t, whose elements will include one or more of N, NP, ST, STP. The 
rest of the variables, which are used as control explanatory variables to reduce the omitted 
variable effect, are denoted by u′ = (awxw, wxy, zT, !T, TS{, T|P,|SP,TT, TP)  – 
see Table 4.1 for definitions. Finally, we also include the destination province and census 
fixed effects, denoted by }Y and ~ respectively, where the subscript ' = 1,2 refers to the 
two censuses.  
 Substituting from (4.2) into (4.1) to eliminate 	[O, ] = #, \, using the log-linear 
version of the resulting equation, and augmenting it with tO , uO , }Y  and ~ , the 
corresponding general linear regression equation therefore is, 
 
  ln5XY, = Ç + _4)PXY + ij,XaX, + ij,YaY, + iq,XlnbX, + iq,YlnbY, 
+	ir,XlnSX, + ir,YlnSY, + 	is,Xln1X, + is,Yln1Y, 	+ t′X,iÉ,X + t′Y,iÉ,Y  
+	uX,Ñ iÖ,X + uY,Ñ iÖ,Y + }Y + ~ + ÜXY,      (4.3)  
 
where Ç  is a constant intercept and  ÜXY,	  is the random disturbance term of the 
regression. While !áÜXY,à = 0 for all #, \ and ' and !áÜXY,â	ÜYX,ä	à = 0 for all #, \ are the 
standard assumptions, we cannot rule out ![ÜXY,	ÜYX,	] ≠ 0 since the reasons that a large 
number of people move from one province to another could be highly correlated with the 
reasons why a small number of people move in the opposite direction. Therefore, while 





to use standard errors which are clustered at province-pair level in order to take account 




The gravity theory predicts _  to be negative with its magnitude exceeding unity 
(closer to 2), and distance PXY is on the whole expected to play a significantly dominant 
role in explaining migration. This is because distance is known to represent the cost of 
migration, not only in terms of relocation cost but also with respect to costs arising from 
difficulties in adapting to farther away districts, maintaining close contact with the place 
of origin, etc.  
If the theory holds in its strict form, the main gravity factors aO, bO, SO and 1O are 
expected to have positive and significant effects for ] = #, \. This is because [O  reflects 
the so called attraction or importance associated with location ]: there is likely to be a 
greater movement between two locations as the importance of one or both increases.  
However, it is perceivable that the estimated values of the coefficients of aO, bO, SO and 
1O, ] = #, \ , are also affected by push and pull motives. This is because the gravity 
equation of migration can also be justified theoretically on the basis of the random utility 
model (Molho, 1986) which compares the expected utilities that an individual assigns to 
living in the two specific locations – origin # and destination \ – where the comparison 
involves the expected benefits and/or losses which increase and/or reduce the relative 
attractiveness of the destination, e.g. a higher expected relative income, a relatively 
higher population, or a relatively larger area. On the whole, therefore, while one would 
expect the impact of aO  to be positive for = #, \ – since growth promotes mobility – the 
following scenarios with respect to bO, SO and 1O could be it is envisaged: 
(i)  iq,Y > 0 and iq,X < 0: relative prosperity matters, therefore a higher income in 
the destination would add to its attraction but in the origin it is likely to weaken 
emigration motives.   
(ii)  ir,Y < 0 and ir,X > 0: large populations crowd out opportunities, therefore a 
less (more) populated destination (origin) could make it more (less) attractive 
and hence strengthen emigration motives. However, the effect of such motives 





populations of the two provinces the larger is likely to be the cross migration, 
hence expecting both SX and SY to exert positive effects.  
(iii)  Regarding is,Y  and is,X , there is no clear evidence available in the existing 
literature. It is, however, tempting to speculate that the larger are the two 
provinces the greater is the cross migration, hence to expect both coefficients to 
be positive. However, while is,X > 0 is easier to perceive, the impact of 1Y is a 
priori ambiguous.   
 
 Once the effect of the main gravity factors and the additional control variables in 
vector u, as specified above, are accounted for, we expect to find climatic deterioration 
in a province to increase emigration. Therefore, we anticipate iÉ,X > 0, iÉ,Y < 0 when t 
is a measure of temperature, and the opposite is expected when it is a precipitation 
measure.  
 The effects of gravity and climatic factors, based on OLS estimates of different 
versions of equation (4.3), are reported in Table 4.3. Column A gives the estimates which 
exclude any climate factors and can be compared with (i) columns B to E where we 
examine the effect of adding separately each temperature or precipitation measures, one 
at a time, i.e. setting t = N, t = NP, t = ST, or t = STP, and (ii) columns F and G 
where in contrast we add both measures, t′ = (N, ST)  or t′ = (NP, STP	) , on the 
grounds that their linear combination could better captures the climate effect.   
 In all cases, the coefficient of distance has the anticipated negative sign, is highly 
significant and, in fact, its estimated values are not much different from the expected 
theoretical size of _ = −2 . Moreover, based on partial correlation analysis (not 
reported),  PXY appears to be the single most important discouraging factor as it explains 
on average about 23% of variations in 5XY,, which is considerable. In fact, as can be seen 
from Figure 4.6, 90% of internal emigrations in Iran occur within a radius of 625km from 
the original location. This is less than the average distance between provinces of 867km, 
implying that the relocation cost factor is effective and migrants tend to move to the 








Table 4.3. Effects of gravity and climatic factors on Iran’s inter-province migration  
 A B C D E F G 
Dependent: 5XY (migration from i to j)      
distance:            ?=> -1.677*** -1.693*** -1.682*** -1.677*** -1.686*** -1.693*** -1.692*** 
growth rate:         D= 0.0339*** 0.0222*** 0.0338*** 0.0344*** 0.0401*** 0.0226*** 0.0405*** 
D> 0.00287 0.00246 0.00405 0.0128** 0.0202*** 0.0132** 0.0213*** 
real GDP:            C= 0.0641 -0.0918 0.0635 0.0850 0.0415 -0.0708 0.0385 
C> 0.460** 0.468* 0.597** 0.512** 0.622*** 0.595** 0.757*** 
population:          B= 1.092*** 1.253*** 1.034*** 1.124*** 1.122*** 1.265*** 1.062*** 
B> -1.572** -1.631 -2.386** -1.567** -1.522** -1.955* -2.326** 
area:                     @= 0.233*** 0.162*** 0.212*** 0.185*** 0.229*** 0.115* 0.199*** 
@> -3.586 -3.716 -4.007 -2.977 1.703 -3.587 1.267 
temperature:        E= -- 0.852*** -- -- -- 0.853*** -- 
E> -- 0.144 -- -- -- 0.757 -- 
temperature 
deviation:         E?= 
-- -- 0.0896*** -- -- -- 0.124*** 
E?> -- -- 0.0899 -- -- -- 0.0901 
precipitation:   BF= -- -- -- -0.141** -- -0.141** -- 
BF> -- -- -- -0.347*** -- -0.376*** -- 
precipitation 
deviation:     BF?= 
-- -- -- -- -0.00233*** -- -0.00255*** 
BF?> -- -- -- -- -0.00155*** -- -0.00155*** 
Fê 0.8307 0.8388 0.8316 0.8315 0.8350 0.8396 0.8366 
Fëê 0 .8250 0 .8332 0 .8258 0 .8256 0 .8293 0 .8338 0 .8307 
L -1719 -1677 -1714 -1715 -1697 -1672 -1688 
AIC 3552 3471 3547 3548 3511 3466 3498 





























§ OLS estimates based on the regression equation (4.3) with the dependent variable ln5XY  as defined in Table 4.1; all 
regressions include the additional control variables in vector u and the destination province and census fixed effects, 
and differ only with respect to climatic explanatory variables.   
§ The sample size in all regressions is 1740, consisting a balanced combination of 30 provinces over the two census 
periods covering 1996-2011. 
§ ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% critical values based on standard errors 
clustered at the province level.  We used Huber/White estimators (or robust standard errors or sandwich estimators 
of variance) to treat heteroscedasticity throughout the analysis in this chapter. 
§ L is the log-likelihood value; AIC and BIC are the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria;  yÖ is the F ratio based 
on the exclusion of the control variables in vector u , with p-values in parentheses; Reset is Ramsey’s reset 





 Economic growth, aO , has positive effects in all cases as expected, consistent with 
the idea that growth in general encourages mobility, and its coefficient is on the whole 
statistically significant, especially after we account for climatic factors. But the effects 
of income, population and area seem to be affected by the pull/push factors. In particular:  
• GDP at destination, bY, has positive and statistically significant effect in all cases but 
its coefficient is statistically insignificant for the origin, bX . This suggests that 
income plays a pull factor.  
• Population, SO, has a positive and statistically significant effect throughout (except 
in column B) with a positive (negative) sign for ] = #	(] = \) indicating that its 
influence is driven by the push/pull process: a higher population crowds out 
opportunities.   
• The area of the origin, 1X, has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in 
all cases and the coefficient of 1Y is negative (except in column G) but statistically 
insignificant. Thus, in this case too, the ‘push process’ seems to be the determining 
factor where larger provinces are considered less desirable.   
 
Figure 4.6. Distribution of PXY (left) and 90% of PXY (right) 
  
90% of PXY omits the highest decimal of distance migrants moved.  
 
 With respect to the influence of climatic factors, which are the main focus of this 
chapter, we find that on the whole hotter and drier climate lead to migration. In particular: 
(i) a rise in temperature in the origin increases emigration since both NX and NPX have 
positive and statistically significant coefficient (see columns B, C, F and G); and (ii) 





coefficients of the latter are always negative and statistically significant (see columns D, 
E, F and G). Therefore, while temperature can be clearly classified as push factor, we 
cannot unambiguously identify a pull factor amongst the measures of climatic we have 
used.  
 The results presented in Table 4.3 are consistent with those reported in other studies 
on the role of both climatic and non-climatic factors in determining migration cross-
location flows – see, e.g., Andersen et al. (2010), and the study on Yemen by Joseph and 
Wodon (2013). However, the robustness of our estimates might have been undermined 
by a possibly high potential correlation between province area 1Y and the province fixed 
effect }Y; as pointed out in footnote 43 above, this is because although 1Y varies across 
provinces, its value remains fixed over time except in the few occasions when some 
boundary changes were implemented. We therefore re-estimated the specifications 
presented in Table 4.3 by dropping the province fixed effect in order to check whether 
this problem had affected the results. The corresponding estimates are reported in Table 
A4.4 in the Appendix and show that excluding the province fixed effect changes the 
results in an interesting way. In particular:  
• There is a minor change in the explanatory roles of distance and growth: the 
coefficient PXY becomes slightly smaller in all cases, and aO  has a significant and 
positive effect in all cases (recall that aY  effect was previously insignificant in 
specifications in columns A, B and C).    
• The effect of bX remain as before: its coefficient estimates retain the same sign and 
are still statistically insignificant. But there is an anomalous change in the effect of 
bY  whose coefficients estimates lose in statistical significance and also become 
negative in columns B and F. This inexplicable alteration of the impact of income 
in destination province undermines the robustness of these estimates.  
• The effects SO  and 1O  become positive and statistically significant in all cases. 
Therefore, they are now consistent with the general gravity model and no longer 
comply with the push/pull process as implied by the previous results. 
• The effects climate variables too are now consistent with the general gravity model: 
they are statistically significant throughout (except for STY in columns D and F), and 






 Given that dropping the province fixed effect leads to less plausible effect of income 
and somewhat unrealistic lack of evidence on the existence of any kind of push/pull 
process on the one hand, and it does not improve the overall statistical performance of 
the regressions on the other hand, we shall disregard the results in Table A4.4 and opt in 
favour of keeping the destination province dummies. 49  In particular, based on a 
comparison of the corresponding estimates which are reported in the columns of Table 
4.3, we choose the specifications in either column F or G as our preferred model as they 
are statistically almost equivalent (the non-nested encompassing and augmented J tests 
did not help distinguish between these specifications).  The specifications in Table 4.3, 
however, do not allow for any interaction between the two types of variables that 
represent climate and size. Since there is a valid argument that the impact of climate 
factors might be contingent on size factors, before finalising our model selection 
therefore we investigate this issue. More precisely, we re-estimate the modified versions 
of the specifications in columns C, E and G of Table 4.3 by augmenting them with the 
interaction effects between the climate variables – NPO and STPO – and the two main 
variables representing size – bO  and SO  – that vary over time.  The corresponding 
estimates with and without interaction terms are reported in Table A4.5 in the Appendix: 
while there are some significant interaction effects, on the whole their inclusion weakens 
the contribution of climatic factors and does not necessarily improve the overall 
performance of the model. We therefore opt for excluding the interaction effects.   
 We conclude our discussion of evidence of climatic effects on migration by using 
our selected models to predict how a rise in average temperature and/or in dryness would 
stimulate migration. Evidently hotter provinces and those that experienced a larger 
growth tend to emit more migrants. Both NO and NPO have positive effect on emigration 
with average marginal effects of 19.7% and 8.4% for one s.d. increase respectively. 
Oppositely and as expected, drier provinces or those that became drier tend to push 
people out since both STO  and STPO  influence emigration negatively with average 
marginal effects of 9.9% and 14.4% for one s.d. decrease respectively.  
 
 
                                                             
49 Nevertheless, it is encouraging that dropping the dummies does not in any way diminish the importance 





4.6. Robustness  
The evidence provided above was based on the application of OLS estimation method to 
a log-linear specification which is typically used when estimating regression equations 
based on the gravity principle. However, the raw data used to construct the dependent 
variable, i.e. cross location migration flows, can also be interpreted as the statistical data 
type known as ‘count data’ whose elements are integers that are obtained by counting a 
certain type of individuals within a given population. As can be seen from Figure 4.7, 
which plots data frequency of both 5XY and ln5XY, the underlying distribution seems to 
be consistent with both Poisson and log-normal distributions (measured at the bottom 
axis and top axis in Figure 4.7, respectively).  Hausman et al. (1984) have shown that 
count data can be efficiently modelled using an appropriate Conditional Negative 
Binomial specification. Therefore, given that 5XY conforms to count data with Poisson-
shaped distribution with over-dispersion, it might be argued that an alternative to 
estimation with OLS using ln5XY as the dependent variable is to use their recommended 
conditional fixed-effects over-dispersion model with 5XY  as the dependent variable.50 
The estimates corresponding to columns C, E and G are reported in Table A4.6 in the 
Appendix and show that the original results do not change substantially.   
 
Figure 4.7.  Distribution of migration flows 
 
 
                                                             





 An alternative way of measuring the dependent variable, instead of using 5XY, is to 
use the share of emigrants, "XY = 5XY ∑ 5XYX⁄ .  Figure 4.8 below depicts the distribution 
of "XY which shows that it is rather similar to that of 5XY illustrated above. In fact, we 
found that using "XY instead of 5XY does not alter the results in any significant way.  
 
Figure 4.8.  Distribution of migration flow shares, î=> = <=> ∑ <=>=⁄  
 
 Similar to the previous chapter, we also located outliers and observations with high 
leverages, in order to test the results in their absence; some illustrations of post-
estimation analysis are presented in Figures A4.7-A4.10 in the Appendix. Re-estimating 
equation (4.3) after excluding such outliers did not alter the general conclusions. 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have empirically examined the existence and robustness of the 
relationship between climatic factors and internal migration in Iran. This was motivated 
by the received knowledge that climate change is associated with migration and human 
displacement. We chose Iran because the country has become increasingly vulnerable to 
climate change and has had a recent history of significant internal migration that was 
caused by the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, the country provides a good opportunity for a 
case study which examines if climatic factors induce migration above and beyond that 
caused by other factors.  
 Our results, which are based on the period 1996-2011, suggest that push factors are 





by distance, and economic factors are the most important reasons driving internal 
migration. Although climatic factors are not the most important determinants of internal 
migration in Iran, their role, especially as push factors, is eminent even after rigorous 
robustness checks. Our findings suggest that people do tend to leave warmer and/or drier 
regions. However, we did not find sufficient evidence to ascertain that the choice of 
destination depends on climatic factors as the latter do not appear to act as pull factors. 
In terms of impact, distance, economic and wellbeing factors rank highest respectively: 
neighbouring regions are more frequently targeted, followed by locations that offer better 
opportunities.  
 As an indication of the magnitude of the climatic impact on internal migration in 
Iran, our results suggest the following: 
Ø a one s.d. rise in annual temperature, which is equivalent to becoming 4oC hotter, 
would lead to 19.7% more emigration. Alternatively, a one s.d. rise in temperature 
with respect to the climate average, which is equivalent to becoming 0.7oC 
warmer, would increase emigration by 8.4%.  
Ø a one reduction of 260mm in annual rainfall, which is equivalent to one s.d. fall 
in annual precipitation, would raise emigration by  9.9%. Alternatively, a one s.d. 
fall in precipitation with respect to the climate average, which is equivalent to 
55mm less rainfall, would stimulate 14.1% increase in emigration.  
 Examining the impact of the other explanatory variables, the on-going migration 
indicate an urbanisation pattern developing in that migrants tend to favour bigger 
economies, perhaps because they have better job opportunities, access to better education 
facilities, better health care system, etc. This result is consistent with random utility 
model and is based on the expectations of bettering one’s overall wellbeing.  
 It is worth stressing that while there is strong evidence that climatic factors influence 
the decision to leave, they do not play a clear role in shaping the strategy to choose the 
destination; they simply stimulate migration. Migration is not necessarily bad, either for 
the country or the people; as Bunea (2012) states, “internal migration is a key mechanism 
for adjustment to regional economic shocks, especially when other tools prove useless” 
(p. 127). However, the problem lies in excessive unregulated migration; to put it simply, 
the regional balance of a country would be irreparably damaged if all potential migrants 
were to leave for more prosperous locations which offered better economic opportunities 





needs to be a strong collaboration between authorities responsible for the environment, 
climate, urbanisation, demographic, regional and migration policies since the harmful 
consequences resulting from a vicious circle of deterioration of rural regions and over-
crowding of the urban regions could be irreversible.   
 With respect to specific policy recommendations concerning the situation in Iran, 
one strategy would be to seek funding and expert advice from the relevant international 
institutions. Article 4.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, states that financial assistance will be made available 
“... shall also assist the developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of adaptation to these adverse 
effects”.  Our evidence can be further built upon to illustrate that Iran is in a strong 
position to qualify for such funds; the country will then have a reasonable chance to 
succeed in securing a financial assistance programme provided it is clearly targeted to 
capacity building and adaptation measures which aim to improve localised resilience so 
as to reduce the impact of specific climatic effects.  While there are different ways of 
stimulating localised resilience, it could be argued that the following policies might prove 
more effective: 
(a) promoting individual-level innovation via development of sustainable and 
appropriately targeted micro-finance schemes which prioritise artisan traditional 
agricultural activities that utilise suitable irrigation methods;   
(b) introducing micro-insurance for compensating the impact of climate-based 
anomalies, e.g. a rainfall insurance where pay-out is triggered when rainfall 
deviation reaches a certain size, as proposed by Gine et al. (2008) and Hertel and 
Rosch (2010);   
(c)  introducing forest cultivation and drought resistant crop policies – see Farzin (2014) 
and Lilleør and Van den Broeck (2011) respectively.  
 Given the encouraging and informative nature of the evidence, further research could 
focus on identifying, and enhancing our understanding of the role of, the push and pull 
factors which motivate migration. To this end, a combining data from different countries 
would help in assessing more precisely the role of climatic factors which are bound to 







A4.1. Examples of climatic change effects in Iran  
One of the most disturbing and worrying episodes is the drying up of the ‘Zayandehrood’ 
River which flows through Isfahan (the second biggest city of Iran) and is the most 
important water resource for urban, industrial, and agriculture water consumptions of 
more than 3.7 million residents as well as for the survival of the ‘Gav-Khuni’ marsh and 
its valuable ecosystem.51 The river, whose name literally translates into ‘life-giving river’ 
and flowed for 400 kilometres from the Zagros mountains, has practically changed into 
dirt and stones. Low rainfall and wrong irrigation plans are considered as the main 
reasons for this phenomena (Financial Times, 2014).  
 The second major environmental threat in Iran is the receding of the Urmia Lake –
situated in the north west of the country – whose depth has reduced from 16m in 2000 to 
10m.52 This is thought to have been caused, mainly, by the drier climate and the change 
in water consumption patterns for irrigated agricultural operations (Delju et al., 2013). 
Due to droughts, overuse of surface water resources and dam constructions, the water 
level has decreased in such a way that one quarter of the lake has changed to saline area 
over the last 10 years; see Figure A4.1 below.53 Acknowledging the role of climate 
change, Madani (2014) suggests that the major factors causing the country’s water crisis 
are in fact agricultural production inefficiency and mismanagement. Some believe 
climate change intensified the problem, for instance, Delju et al. (2013) state “the 
combined effect of these dams along with high exploitation of ground water intensified 
by recent drought cycles has brought the lake to a critical situation” (p. 286). They also 
indicate that mean precipitation has decreased by 9.2% and the average maximum 
temperature has increased by 0.8°C over the last four decades. Hassanzadeh et al. (2012) 
identifies changes in inflows due to climate change and overuse of surface water 
resources as the dominant factors of the disaster, being responsible for 65% of the 
shrinkage, and dam over-construction (mismanagement) as the second major contributor 
with 25% share54. Overall, there is a general belief amongst scholars that climate change 
has been at least partly responsible. 
                                                             
51 Gohari et al. (2013) report that 73% of Zayandeh’s water is used for agriculture. See Water Research 
Institute (2005) for details. 
52  See Figure A4.2 in Appendix for a series of satellite pictures taken at different times by NASA 
demonstrating the shrinkage. 
53 See Hassanzadeh et al., (2012). According to Delju et al. (2013), there are now 35 dams built on 21 
rivers flowing to the lake. 





Figure A4.1. Change in the Lake Urmia’s surface area  
September 2000   August 2010            July 2014 
 
Source: (USGS, 2014)  
 
 Such crisis raise concerns regarding the likelihood of escalated tension and even 
conflict in Iran, a country surrounded by unstable neighbours – most notably Afghanistan 
and Iraq – with water shortages of their own. The resident representative of the UNDP 
in Tehran stated “environmental challenges, especially water, ought to be the real future 
human security priority for Iran” (Financial Times, 2014). 
 
A4.2. Data issues  
In this section we explain a number of problems which were encountered when raw data 
from the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) were used to compile migration data for this 
study.  
 
A4.2.1. Data accuracy  
When constructing the dataset on inter-province migration flows in Iran, we noticed the 
following issues which are worthy of pointing out: 
 
Migration data 
An inspection of the official migration data, compiled by SCI using responses to their 
survey questionnaires, shows that there is a gradual increase in the number of ‘blank 
responses’ when immigrant respondents are asked about their place of origin. This trend 
became apparent when we compared data from a number of past censuses; see Table 
A4.1 below. There is no clear explanation as to why responses to this specific question 





destination and the original location of the immigrants, steps need to be taken to 
investigate and remedy this phenomenon. In our study we had no choice but to drop these 
observations. 
 







Percentage of  
Blank Responses 
1996 1986-1996 45,000 0.51% 
2006 1996-2006 104,000 0.85% 
2011 2006-2011 343,000 6.25% 
The last column is the percentage of migrants who did not reveal their origin. 
 
Rural migration 
Official data also shows that the population of rural areas is falling (negative growth 
rate). Official data also shows that the number of people emigrating from the rural areas 
is decreasing (less people are leaving the rural areas). Figures A4.2, A4.3 and A4.4 show 
these statistics. Given that, by definition,  
Change in Population = (Births – Deaths) + (Immigration – Emigration) 
holds for any community at any given year, we verified the consistency of official data 
by checking how the right-hand-side of the above compared with the left-hand-side. 
Unfortunately, we found a significant discrepancy where the latter figures turned out to 
be positive when the right-hand-side was negative.  Since data on population, births and 
deaths are relatively accurate, the inconsistency is bound to arise from the recording of 
rural migration data.  
 One explanation for this anomaly might lie in the designation of communities as 
rural or urban. According to the Iranian demographic regulations, the urbanised area of 
the country comprises of towns, or cities, which consist of more than 5000 inhabitants; 
villages, which form the rural areas of the county, are communities with a smaller number 
of inhabitants. Official data also shows that the number of cities has been rising and the 
number villages are shrinking (Figures A4.5 and A4.6).55 
                                                             
55 There are various reasons why the local authorities of a village might prefer their community to take a 





Figure A4.2. Annual number of emigrants in Iran (Total)   
 
Figure A4.3. Annual emigration in Iran (share in total) 
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Figure A4.5. Number of urban cities in Iran
 
Figure A4.6. Number of rural villages in Iran
 
 
 This drastic change in the numbers of cities and villages could partly explain data 
inconsistencies noted above since: (i) blank responses in questionnaires are explained by 
the fact that villages which were respondents’ place of origin have in fact ceased to exist; 
and (ii) emigration from such villages cannot be correctly recorded hence is not reflected 
in the data. For these reasons, in this study we focused on migration in general and could 
not analyse the rural-to-urban migration due the data reliability issues. 
 
A4.2.2. Province boundary changes during census periods 
There were a number of boundary changes during the census periods, mainly due to 
splitting some provinces which had become too large over time. In order to keep the 
consistency of our data, we carried out the following adjustments:  
(i)  The Alborz province was created by splitting the Tehran province in 2010. This 
took place right in the middle of the last census period. We therefore treated Alborz 
as part of Tehran for the remaining two years, until 2011.  
(ii)  Regarding the rest of the boundary adjustments, which took place earlier, we have 
maintained the new set up and used following simple imputation techniques to fill 
in the data gaps: if province A was the original province that was divided into B 
and C at time t, then !",$%& = (!",$ !),$⁄ +!),$%& where ! is the variable for which 
data for years , − . do not exist. This approached is justifies on the assumption 
that general socio-economic trends of provinces stay steady over a short period of 
time so that the ratio in square brackets does not fluctuate too much. 



























(∑ !",$012134 56!",$01 + !",$0189 +	 where 5 is the number of years for which data 
for the newly formed provinces exist did not change the results.  
 
 
A4.3. Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 
 
Table A4.2. Main set of variables  
Variable Mean S. D. Min Max 
migration:   ;<= 472 1132 1 17263 
distance:   ><= 866.7861 431.3721 115.81 2171.33 
area:   ?@ 54291.67 49754.66 11526 181758 
population:   A@ 2301172 2376081 516836.5 140e+07 
real GDP:   B@ 5.47e+07 8.72e+07 7185320 5.23e+08 
growth rate:   C@ 4.470154 7.191452 -10.32443 32.93311 
temperature:   D@ 16.94784 4.034144 9.862378 27.25607 
temperature deviation:   D>@ 0.655705 0.677761 -2.73001 1.791346 
precipitation:   AE@ 326.0772 259.2722 42.724 1352.98 
precipitation deviation:   AE>@ -41.2378 55.22882 -220.474 83.40334 
gini index:   CFGF@ 0.363855 0.032644 0.299494 0.440655 
inflation rate:   FGH@ 22.55018 8.584403 11.86731 45.47197 
unemployment:   IE@ 13.47273 5.668302 6.782848 30.39204 
education:   JE@ 81.97022 4.537251 63.66185 90.83269 
rural population:   EAK@ 37.99476 12.25106 5.433073 56.24207 
rural health centre:   EL>@ 1.22204 .4124574 .5754982 2.306632 
rural health staff:   LA>@ 4.099713 1.118305 1.523783 7.327104 
rangeland:   EE@ 53.26955 13.23568 3.920587 90.50834 
desert:   E>@ 10.59286 14.40046 0 52.43863 








Table A4.3. Variables descriptions by census  
The sample size in all cases is 870 in each census. 
 
  
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
  2006 census  2011   census   
migration:   ;<= 4.97 1.61 0 9.75 4.77 1.54 0.69 9.03 
distance:   ><= 6.62 0.58 4.75 7.68 6.62 0.58 4.75 7.68 
area:   ?@ 10.53 0.83 9.35 12.11 10.53 0.83 9.35 12.11 
population:   A@ 14.28 0.75 13.16 16.29 14.38 0.75 13.22 16.46 
real GDP:   B@ 17.14 0.90 15.79 19.75 17.40 0.89 16.04 20.07 
growth rate:   C@ 10.02 5.52 5.45 32.93 -1.087 3.33 -10.32 7.43 
temperature:   D@ 2.81 0.23 2.29 3.31 2.79 0.23 2.29 3.30 
temperature deviation:   D>@ 6.89 4.10 2.10 22.19 2.12 4.64 -14.87 12.64 
precipitation:   AE@ 5.61 0.71 3.96 7.21 5.47 0.68 3.75 7.11 
precipitation deviation:   AE>@ -7.11 14.48 -37.11 33.65 -16.81 13.12 -43.67 6.35 
gini index:   CFGF@ 0.344 0.026 0.299 0.392 .383 0.026 0.33 0.44 
inflation rate:   FGH@ 14.85 1.08 11.86 17.07 30.24 5.26 22.38 45.47 
unemployment:   IE@ 2.43 0.39 1.91 3.22 2.62 0.35 2.18 3.41 
education:   JE@ 4.39 0.06 4.15 4.50 4.42 0.05 4.25 4.51 
rural population:   EAK@ 3.62 0.45 1.99 4.02 3.47 0.51 1.69 3.93 
rural health centre:   EL>@ 0.018 0.29 -0.55 0.82 0.277 0.29 -0.447 0.83 
rural health staff:   LA>@ 1.348 0.273 0.518 1.931 1.49 0.236 1.08 2.02 
rangeland:   EE@ 3.92 0.53 1.37 4.51 3.92 0.22 3.43 4.19 






Table A4.4. Effects of gravity variables and climatic factors inter-province migration 
 in Iran (estimation without province fixed effect) 
 A B C D E F G 
Dependent: MN1      
distance:                ><= -1.550*** -1.589*** -1.557*** -1.549*** -1.564*** -1.589*** -1.576*** 
growth rate:            C< 0.0327*** 0.0214*** 0.0326*** 0.0332*** 0.0388*** 0.0219*** 0.0392*** 
C= 0.0369*** 0.0183*** 0.0365*** 0.0369*** 0.0430*** 0.0183*** 0.0429*** 
real GDP:                B< 0.0594 -0.0926 0.0590 0.0804 0.0377 -0.0715 0.0350 
B= 0.111* -0.134** 0.113* 0.111* 0.0933 -0.133** 0.0941* 
population:             A< 0.419*** 0.771*** 0.347** 0.429*** 0.432*** 0.781*** 0.331** 
A= 1.218*** 1.286*** 1.268*** 1.218*** 1.254*** 1.286*** 1.328*** 
area:                        ?< 0.215*** 0.149** 0.196*** 0.167** 0.212*** 0.101 0.184*** 
?= 0.173*** 0.0582 0.154** 0.174** 0.170*** 0.0540 0.141** 
temperature:            D< -- 0.836*** -- -- -- 0.837*** -- 
D= -- 1.356*** -- -- -- 1.357*** -- 
temperature  
deviation:            D>< 
-- -- 0.0839** -- -- -- 0.118*** 
D>= -- -- 0.0850** -- -- -- 0.120*** 
precipitation:       AE< -- -- -- -0.141** -- -0.142* -- 
AE= -- -- -- 0.00232 -- -0.0125 -- 
precipitation 
deviation:        AE>< 








EO 0.7823 0.8098 0.7836 0.7829 0.78965 0.8103 0.7922 
EPO 0.7788 0.8064 0.7799 0.7791 0.7859 0.8068 0.7883 
L -1937 -1820 -1932 -1935 -1908 -1817 -1897 
AIC 3933 3702 3926 3932 3878 3701 3860 































OLS estimates, repeating the regressions reported in Table 4.3 but excluding the province fixed effects. 





Table A4.5.  Comparing regressions with & without interaction effects 
Dependent: MN1   
 Temperature Precipitation Temperature & Precipitation 
 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 
distance:          ><= -1.682*** -1.687*** -1.686*** -1.689*** -1.692*** -1.695*** 
growth rate:      C< 0.0338*** 0.0346*** 0.0401*** 0.0419*** 0.0405*** 0.0416*** 
C= 0.00405 0.0128** 0.0202*** 0.0283*** 0.0213*** 0.0230*** 
real GDP:          B< 0.0635 0.122* 0.0415 0.0100 0.0385 0.0330 
B= 0.597** 0.519 0.622*** 0.949*** 0.757*** 0.846** 
population:        A< 1.034*** 0.758*** 1.122*** 1.166*** 1.062*** 0.959*** 
A= -2.386** -2.262* -1.522** -2.002*** -2.326** -2.370* 
area:              	?< 0.212*** 0.204*** 0.229*** 0.241*** 0.199*** 0.204*** 
?= -4.007 -1.188 1.703 1.932 1.267 3.043 
temperature 
deviation:      D>< 0.0896
*** -0.682 -- -- 0.124*** -0.265 
B< × D>< -- -0.116* -- -- -- -0.0200 
A< × D>< -- 0.195*** -- -- -- 0.0522 
D>= 0.0899 -1.415** -- - 0.0901 -1.521*** 
B= × D>= -- -0.170 -- -- -- -0.142 
A= × D>= -- 0.316** -- -- -- 0.289 
precipitation 
deviation:   AE>< -- -- -0.00233
*** -0.0000523 -0.00255*** -0.00739 
B< × AE>< -- -- -- -0.000763 -- -0.000233 
A< × AE>< -- -- -- 0.000781 -- 0.000639 
AE>= -- -- -0.00155*** 0.0155 -0.00155*** 0.0185* 
B= × AE>= -- -- -- -0.00151** -- -0.000612 
A= × AE>= -- -- -- 0.000642 -- -0.000630 
EO 0.8316 0.8331 0.8350 0.8354 0.8366 0.8377 
EPO 0.8258 0.8269 0.8293 0.8293 0.8307 0.8311 
L -1714 -1706 -1696 -1694 -1688 -1682 
AIC 3546 3538 3511 3514 3498 3502 
BIC 3869 3883 3833 3858 3831 3879 
H<ST -- 
8.59  
















The dependent variable is lnMN1. See the notes to Table 4.3 for other details. Estimates in columns A1, B1 and C1 
are the same as those in columns C and E and F in Table 4.3. WN&$ is the F ratio based on the exclusion of the interaction 





Table A4.6.  Alternative estimates of the selected models (Negative Binomial) 
Dependent: MN1   
 C E G 
distance:             ><= -1.408*** -1.412*** -1.414*** 
growth rate:          C< 0.0247*** 0.0288*** 0.0289*** 
C= 0.0173*** 0.0265*** 0.0264*** 
real GDP:              B< 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 
B= 0.320*** 0.354*** 0.338*** 
population:           A< 0.880*** 0.841*** 0.862*** 
A= -0.386*** -0.394*** -0.401*** 
area:                      ?< 0.168*** 0.157*** 0.152*** 
?= 0.372*** 0.375*** 0.396*** 
temperature 
deviation:          D>< 
0.0480* -- 0.0561** 
D>= -0.0386 -- -0.0313 
precipitation 
deviation:      AE>< 
-- -0.00161*** -0.00166*** 
AE>= -- -0.00121*** -0.00120*** 
L -10392 -10379 -10376 
AIC 20847 20820 20819 
BIC 21016 20989 20999 
The dependent variable is MN1 and the estimation method is based on Conditional Negative 
Binomial specification. See the notes to Table 4.3 for other details. Estimates in columns 
labelled C and E and F correspond to the specifications in the same columns of Table 4.3. 








Figure A4.7. Scatter plot of XY;<= and the linear prediction 








Figure A4.8. Scatter plot of linear prediction and predicted residuals of XY;<= 








Figure A4.9. Leverage against the (normalised) residuals squared 
based on model specification of G in Table 4.3 
 
 
Points above the horizontal line have higher-than-average leverage; points to the 








Figure A4.10. Distribution of predicted residuals of 	XY;<= 
based on model specification of G in Table 4.3 
 
 























5.1. Summary and conclusions 
The contribution of this thesis could be summarised as an empirical study of the 
relationships that help explaining the determination of two social phenomena: internal 
armed conflicts and migration. Together with severe climate change, these are ranked 
highest amongst the most pressing risks facing humanity in terms of both their likelihood 
of occurrence and their impact (World Economic Forum, 2017). It is also believed that 
climate change influences the likelihood and nature of the conflicts and migration.  We 
therefore centred our empirical analysis on understanding the nature and extent of this 
influence. 
 In Chapter 2 we constructed and used a pooled cross section time series dataset, 
comprising 139 countries over the period 1961-2011, to carry out a systematic 
econometric study of the role of climatic factors, proxied by the average levels of 
temperature and precipitation, on the onset of internal conflicts. Our main findings 
suggest that, once all other relevant country-specific characteristics (which are believed 
to affect the probability of an armed conflict) are accounted for, (i) climate warming is 
instrumental in raising the probability of onset of armed conflicts, and (ii) the effect is 
more enhanced the hotter are the regions. Given that these results survived various 
robustness tests, these findings convey an important policy message regarding the global 
political efforts to (i) reduce the extent, and prepare for the consequences, of climate 
warming, and (ii) to understand the causes, and hence curtail, the onset of armed 
conflicts.56  
 Whilst conducting our empirical search in order to identify the relevant country-
specific characteristics that affect the onset of armed conflict, our results revealed a 
peculiar ambiguity regarding the impact of per capita income. Given the critical 
importance of curtailing internal armed conflicts for sustaining the world peace on the 
one hand, and the fact that the extent of economic and political development are known 
to shape a nation’s tendency to engage in and/or to tolerate armed conflicts on the other, 
we devoted Chapter 3 to further investigating the role of per capita income in conjunction 
with the ‘quality’ of political institutions. Building on the existing contributions (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Collier and 
Rohner, 2008), the results of our empirical analysis confirm that the influence of these 
                                                             
56 The Paris Climate Accord (an agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change dealing with greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, adaptation and finance starting in the year 2020) 




political institutions and the extent of development are contingent on each other.  More 
specifically, our main findings indicate that (i) while per capita GDP per se does 
significantly reduce the probability of onset of internal armed conflicts, its overall effect 
contributes positively to the onset of conflicts in more unstable regimes; and (ii) major 
political instability (defined as a relatively substantial positive or negative change in the 
index measuring institutional quality), could adversely affect peace. The policy message 
of these results seem to advise against implementing short term drastic reforms of the 
type that are at times imposed by international institutions to promote long term 
economic prosperity.  
 In Chapter 4 we turned our focus on the role of climate change on migration. In the 
absence of a coherent dataset that accurately records the characteristics of migrants, we 
opted for a case study of causes of inter-province migration within a specific country 
using the census data. We chose Iran as the subject of our case study because of two 
reasons. First, the country has become increasingly vulnerable to climate change which 
is officially documented. Second, in addition to having a rich history of internal rural 
migration which is embedded in the ethnic culture of the country57, Iran has had a recent 
history of significant internal migration that was caused by the Iran-Iraq war. We used 
two waves of national census data covering the period 1996-2011 to construct an inter-
province dataset consisting of migration flows and the relevant province-level socio-
economic variables, as well as data on temperature and precipitation levels, and used this 
dataset to estimate the impact of the latter on migration flows in the context of a 
generalised gravity model. Our main findings suggested that although climatic factors 
are not the most important determinants of internal migration in Iran, their role, especially 
as push factors, is eminent. In short, even after vigorous robustness checks we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that people emigrate from warmer and/or drier regions. While it is 
tempting to generalise the implication of this finding and claim climate warming as a 
major stimulating factor in decision to migrate, we postpone this task to future research. 
Regarding specific policy recommendations concerning the situation in Iran, however, 
the conclusion could not be clearer. Given that such migrations easily end up in a vicious 
circle of poverty associated with overcrowding of urban centres and desertification of the 
rural regions, the country should take advantage of ‘financial assistance’ and ‘expert 
                                                             
57 We refer to indigenous nomadic tribes of Iran. For a ‘documentary style’ study of impacts of climate 





advice’ opportunities, such as those provided by the conclusions drawn from Article 4.4 
of the Kyoto Protocol, to design and implement appropriate projects which aim to 
improve localised resilience so as to reduce the impact of specific climatic effects.  
 
5.2. Possible future research 
The future lines of research, on the basis of the work of this thesis, would focus on the 
empirical modelling of the relationships that help in quantifying the contribution of 
different factors which influence the onset and impacts of armed conflicts and migration.  
 A glance through the recent reports by the Institute for Economics and Peace58, 
especially in their Global Peace Index documents, shows that severe human casualties, 
in particular the number of deaths, caused by internal armed conflicts have increased 
dramatically in the last decade. This alarming rise is explained to be due both to the 
higher intensity as well as a wider spread of conflicts. In such circumstances, a deeper 
knowledge of how different factors interact to fuel, intensify and spread armed conflicts 
is required to inform the badly needed effective policy making. An extension of our 
analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 in which one would attempt to explain alternative 
quantifiable measures of armed conflicts and further focus on the way the influential 
factors interact in shaping the onset and impact of provides a worthwhile future line of 
research.  
 As mentioned above in passing, a fruitful future line of research on migration would 
be to extend the work of Chapter 4 to understand if patterns identified in different 
countries support the same conclusions, and therefore identifying the most common, or 
general, determinants of migration once the most influential factors such as distance are 
allowed for. The difficulty in conducting an econometric study that extends beyond one 
country lies in the availability of raw data which could be used to construct a consistent 
pooled dataset. A line of research which invests in alternative ways of constructing 
suitable datasets is therefore essential. Given that a reasonable number of countries now 
compile survey data based on individual characteristics, e.g. income and expenditure 
surveys, a way forward might lie in identifying matching waves of survey data across a 
number of countries where respondents are required to provide details of any changes in 
their residence location. Matching such a dataset with the relevant administrative, 
economic and climatic data from the countries involved would facilitate a cross country 
                                                             




econometric study of migration and could enable drawing more general conclusions 
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